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This thesis examines the role of securities class actions (SCAs) in corporate 
governance.   Three empirical chapters are presented examining the relationship SCAs 
have with debt financing, lobbying and firm innovation. 
Chapter 2 examines the impact SCAs have on a firm’s debt financing and lending 
relationships, with particular focus on the lender’s reputation and a firm’s ex-ante 
relationship with its lenders.  The results indicate that reputable lenders are better screeners 
and as a result are less likely to lend to high litigation risk firms.  Turning to ex-ante 
relationships with lenders, the evidence indicates that firm’s that did not have a 
relationship with a lender are less likely to be able to develop one post-filing.  On the other 
hand, if a firm had an established relationship with a lender before the filing, they are more 
likely to continue borrowing from that lender.  Furthermore, for firms that had an existing 
relationship with a lender, loans initiated after the filing are larger in size and have smaller 
spreads relative to those firms without a relationship.  Overall, it appears that corporate 
misconduct does not undermine a firm’s relationship with its providers of financial capital. 
Chapter 3 examines the impact of lobbying on the time it takes to detect managerial 
misconduct and the size of penalties associated with SCAs.  Managers of lobbying firms 
are able to get away with misconduct for longer and are marginally less likely to have to 
settle a class action up to 2004.  From 2005 onwards, lobbying no longer impacts the time 
it takes to detect misconduct or the outcome of the case.  It is argued that regulatory action 
(the Sarbanes Oxley Act) has had the desirable effect of reducing the tacit power of 
lobbying firms. 
Finally, Chapter 4 examines the relationship between SCAs and firm innovation.  The 
evidence indicates that innovative firms are relatively more likely to be sued.  This chapter 
presents evidence that innovation may increase the opportunities and pressures to commit 
misconduct.  Furthermore, investment in innovation immediately declines post-filing 
resulting in a decline in the quantity of patents.  However, the filing has no impact on 
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Securities class actions (SCAs) have become increasingly prevalent over the last two 
decades.
1
  Traditionally, most SCAs have occurred in the US, however, shareholder 
litigation is becoming more frequent in other countries and some countries are currently 
debating the adoption of a legal framework for class actions.
2
  Despite the increasing 
frequency, there is still debate over the costs and benefits of SCAs.  SCAs are one of the 
few private forms of recourse investors have against a firm’s managers (Gillan, 2006).  
However, the effectiveness of SCAs as an ex-post method of disciplining a firm’s 
managers has yet to be fully determined.  This thesis contributes to the understanding of 
the efficacy of SCAs in corporate governance, by examining their determinants and 
consequences. 
To explore the efficacy of SCAs as a disciplinary mechanism, three empirical studies 
are undertaken in this thesis.  These studies employ a comprehensive dataset of SCAs filed 
in the US.  The first study (Chapter 2) investigates the association between corporate 
lending and the filing of a SCA.  Specifically, this chapter examines whether reputable 
lenders are better at screening and monitoring litigation risk.  Furthermore, this study also 
                                                 
1
 In 2016 there were a total of 270 new SCAs filed in the US, which is significantly higher than the historical 
average between 1997 and 2015 of 188 filings (Cornerstone Research, 2017a). 
2
 SCAs are becoming more frequent in countries such as Canada and Australia.  Whereas, New Zealand and 
Switzerland are currently debating whether to establish a legal framework for class actions (see 
Baumgartner, 2009; Wicks, 2015; Hensler, 2016). 
 




examines whether the filing of a SCA impacts a firm’s relationship with its lenders and the 
terms it receives on new loans. The relationship between political lobbying and SCAs is 
examined in Chapter 3.  This chapter investigates whether a firm’s tacit power, signalled 
by its lobbying, is associated with the time it takes to detect corporate misconduct before 
and after the enactment of SOX.  The final empirical chapter (Chapter 4) examines the 
association between corporate innovation and SCAs.  This study analyses whether 
innovative activities influence the probability of shareholder litigation occurring and if 
corporate innovation is impacted by the filing of a SCA. 
Through these different studies, this thesis provides a better understanding of the 
determinants and consequences of SCAs.  The findings reported, therefore, provide greater 
insight into the cost/benefit trade-off associated with SCAs. 
 
1.2 Background on Securities Class Actions 
A SCA is a lawsuit filed by a group of investors against a firm’s mangers alleging losses 
caused by the violation of securities laws.  Allegations often relate to some form of 
managerial misconduct.  Typical accusations include:  accounting irregularities (e.g. 
improper revenue recognition or understatement of liabilities or expenses), false or 
misleading disclosures and regulatory violations.  SCAs have traditionally been most 
common in the US however, they are occurring more frequently in other countries.  
Canada and Australia, in particular, are becoming more attractive places for shareholder 
litigation (Monestier, 2011; Issacharoff and Eagles, 2015).  Furthermore, other countries 
(including New Zealand and Switzerland) are debating whether to adopt formal class 
action procedures (see Baumgartner, 2009; Wicks, 2015; Hensler, 2016).  However, the 
efficacy of class actions is still being debated in the literature (e.g. Dam, 1975; Choi, 2004; 
Mullenix, 2014). 
There are several key benefits and drawbacks associated with SCAs.  The most 
noteworthy benefit is that SCAs are an efficient way to deal with a large number of claims.  
In a SCA a single entity can act on behalf of others’ in a similar position allowing the 
resolution of a large number of claims in a single action.  By combining the individual 
claims into a single action the case can be dealt with in a timelier and more cost efficient 
manner than if all the individual entities in the class were to file independent cases (Dam, 
1975).   
 




The aggregation of claims also provides a form of recourse for individuals who suffer 
relatively small losses.  The cost of litigation for these individual claimants would most 
likely exceed the losses sustained.  By combining all the individual claims, a SCA can 
achieve economies of scale.  This efficiency provides a viable manner for smaller 
claimants to gain access to justice (Murphy and Cameron, 2006). 
SCAs could also serve a role as a deterrence mechanism.  The threat of a class action 
and the costs stemming from litigation may serve to modify management’s behaviour, 
thereby limiting the occurrence of corporate misconduct in the first place.  However, the 
frequency of filings in 2016 is the highest it has been since the dot-com bubble 
(Cornerstone Research, 2017a; NERA, 2017).  This suggests that SCAs likely only play a 
limited role in deterring misconduct.  Furthermore, SCAs can also be a way of imposing 
discipline on managers even after the occurrence of misconduct.  The reputational and 
financial penalties imposed on managers can serve as a method of disciplining managers, 
thereby reducing agency issues (Becht et al., 2003). 
A major drawback of SCAs is the filing of frivolous cases.  Frivolous SCAs typically 
occur when shareholders attempt to opportunistically recover losses on their investments.  
Frivolous cases, as opposed to meritorious cases, are unrelated to the violation of securities 
laws.  The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) was enacted to limit 
the incidence of frivolous cases.  Despite the PSLRA resulting in fewer non-nuisance 
claims (Johnson et al., 2007; Choi et al., 2009) it is becoming more common for cases to 
be dismissed (NERA, 2017).
3
  This suggests that frivolous cases are still a major issue in 
the US system.  These nuisance cases merely serve as a distraction to managers and are 
typically targeted at large firms with “deep pockets” who are likely to pay a settlement to 
avoid the cost associated with litigation.   
Further, since, Directors’ and Officers’ (D&O) insurance typically covers settlement 
pay-outs wrongdoers often face limited direct financial culpability.  Coffee (2006) argues 
that settlements typically just result in the transfer of losses from one group of 
shareholders to another.  Coffee further contends that since these penalties are not always 
imposed on the culpable parties, SCAs likely only provide limited deterrence. 
                                                 
3
 NERA (2017) report that of the US cases that were resolved in 2016 over half of them were dismissed (113 
settled vs 149 dismissed) compared to 1996 when the majority of cases were settled (149 settled vs 43 
dismissed). 
 




Another drawback of SCAs is the conflict of interest that exists between lawyers and 
the investor class.  The suing class’s primary goal is to maximise the losses recovered.  
Whereas, the class counsel’s main interest is in maximising the fees obtained.  These two 
interests will not always align.
4
  Furthermore, in some cases the settlement is only enough 
to cover the lawyer’s fees and the plaintiff class do not recover any of their losses 
(Romano, 1991).  From the existing literature, it is unclear whether the benefits of SCAs 
outweigh the costs. 
There has also been much debate as to the relative importance of both private and 
public forms of enforcement for financial markets (e.g. La Porta et al., 2006; Djankov et 
al., 2008; Jackson and Roe, 2009; Welsh and Morabito, 2014).  As such, the importance of 
a private form of legal recourse, such as SCAs, is not fully understood.  This thesis extends 
the current literature by examining the determinants and consequences of SCAs in a 
corporate governance framework.  This study, therefore, contributes to the ongoing debate 
about the efficacy of SCAs as a disciplinary mechanism. 
 
1.3 Prior Research on SCAs 
Prior research, in the finance literature, on SCAs can be broken into two separate types of 
studies.  The first type examines the determinants or causes of shareholder litigation and 




1.3.1 Determinants of Litigation Risk 
Numerous studies have used predictive models to assess a firm’s litigation risk.  These 
models are not only useful in assessing the ex-ante litigation risk of firms but can also 
provide an ex-post understanding of why firms are sued.  These studies have found that 
shareholder litigation frequently occurs in biotech, computers, electronics and retail based 
industries.  Sued firms are also typically larger in size, have a larger proportion of 
intangible assets, are more likely to be overinvesting, have poorer stock performance, and 
                                                 
4
 Lawyer’s fees are based on the outcome of the case, so losing a case at trial could result in the loss of a 
substantial amount of fees for the lawyers.  The class counsel, therefore, has an incentive to settle rather than 
risk possibly losing a trial.  However, a settlement will not always be in the best interest of the shareholders 
involved in the class action.  As a result, the shareholder class may not always receive appropriate 
compensation relative to the amount of damage that was done. 
5
 See Arena and Ferris (2017) for a survey of the literature on SCAs. 
 




have higher stock volatility and turnover during the period of alleged misconduct (Jones 
and Weingram, 1996; Strahan, 1998; Gande and Lewis, 2009; McTier and Wald, 2011).  
Firms are also more likely to have a SCA filed against them if executives are compensated 
with more option or stock grants (Bauer et al., 2008; Peng and Roell, 2008; Jones and Wu, 
2010).   
However, no research so far has examined litigation risk with respect to the reputation 
of a firm’s lenders or corporate innovative activities.  Whether the reputation of a firm’s 
lender and its innovative activities explain the occurrence of SCAs is examined in Chapter 
2 and Chapter 4 respectively.  This thesis, therefore, contributes to the literature by 
providing a better understanding of ex-ante litigation risk.  Even though not all SCAs are 
meritorious in nature a better understanding of litigation risk will also be useful for the 
detection and prevention of future corporate misconduct. 
Relatively few studies have examined the underlying mechanisms involved in the 
detection of managerial malfeasance.  Dyck et al. (2010) examine the various economic 
agents that are associated with the detection of fraud.  Similarly, Yu and Yu (2011) 
investigate the time it takes to detect fraud and find that lobbying firms are more likely to 
get away with it for longer.  Chapter 3 extends the findings of Yu and Yu by examining 
whether lobbying firms are able to get away with misconduct after the enactment of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX).  As such, this chapter provides valuable insight into the 
factors that could influence the detection of misconduct. 
 
1.3.2 Consequences of SCAs 
The consequences and changes firms make after the filing of a SCA are useful in 
determining the effectiveness of SCAs as a disciplinary mechanism.  One notable 
consequence of shareholder litigation is the direct costs that they can impose on firms.  
These direct costs come in the form of settlement disbursements.  The average settlement 
size was approximately $56 million between 1996 and 2015, and the total amount of 
settlements approved by courts was nearly $6 billion dollars in 2016 (Cornerstone 
Research, 2017b).  Although, these settlements are typically covered by D&O insurance, 
the direct financial penalties can be substantial.
6
 
                                                 
6
 The ten largest settlements all exceed $1 billion. 
 




Prior research indicates that settlements are related to, the severity of the case as well 
as the losses sustained by investors (Cox et al., 2004; Karpoff et al., 2008a).  Furthermore, 
if an institutional owner is the lead plaintiff, settlements are on average larger (Cheng et 
al., 2010).  However, no research has examined whether a firm’s political influence is 
associated with the outcome of a SCA.  Chapter 3 addresses this issue by investigating 
whether the probability of a case being settled or the size of a settlement is related to a 
firm’s lobbying activities.  The results from this chapter provide a greater understanding of 
what influences the direct financial consequences of shareholder litigation. 
SCAs not only impose direct financial penalties but can also indirectly damage the 
reputation of firms.    Karpoff et al. (2008a) report that the reputational loss imposed on 
firms prosecuted for financial misrepresentation is 7.5 times greater than the direct legal 
penalties.  The cost or penalties imposed by SCAs are associated with its effectiveness at 
deterring misconduct and disciplining managers that violate securities laws.  
Understanding indirect costs of shareholder litigation, therefore, provides greater insight 
into the effectiveness of class actions as a disciplinary mechanism. 
The filing of a SCA can create significant uncertainty and adversely damage a firm’s 
credibility with its customers, suppliers and providers of financial capital.  Consistent with 
this, numerous studies have found a significant negative market reaction to the filing of a 
class action (see Karpoff and Lott, 1993; Bhagat et al., 1994; Griffin et al., 2004; Gande 
and Lewis, 2009; Bauer and Braun, 2010).  Furthermore, sued firms also face a higher cost 
of equity (Chava et al., 2010) and are charged higher spreads on new loans (Deng et al., 
2014; Yuan and Zhang, 2015).  Chapter 2 extends the current understanding of 
reputational penalties faced by firms seeking debt financing, following the filing of a SCA, 
by accounting for the ex-ante relationship with its lender.  This chapter, therefore, extends 
the current understanding of reputational penalties that are imposed on firms after the 
filing of a SCA. 
Shareholder litigation can also result in improvements in internal governance 
mechanisms.  Following the filing of a class action, the likelihood of managerial turnover 
is higher and the probability of turnover is related to the merits of the case (Romano, 1991; 
Niehaus and Roth, 1999; Humphery-Jenner, 2012).  Board structure is also more likely to 
improve following litigation or the discovery of fraud, as a result of an improvement in the 
percentage of outsiders and a separation of the roles of CEO and Chairman of the Board of 
Directors (Marciukaityte et al., 2006; Ferris et al., 2007; Cheng et al., 2010). 
 




Investing activities are also impacted by the filing of a class action.  Capital 
expenditures and R&D expenditures decline proceeding the filing of a class action (Autore 
et al., 2014; Yuan and Zhang, 2014; Arena and Julio, 2015).  Despite this evidence of a 
change in investment, no study so far has examined whether a firm’s innovation is affected 
by the filing of a SCA.  Chapter 4 fills this gap in the literature by examining the short- 
and long-term impact the filing of a SCA has on corporate innovative activities.  
Therefore, this chapter contributes to the understanding of the consequences of SCAs and 
provides insight as to whether they improve managerial discipline. 
By examining the direct penalties of a SCA (Chapter 3), as well as the penalties 
imposed by lenders on sued firms (Chapter 2) and the changes in innovation (Chapter 4), 
this thesis extends the existing literature and provides a better understanding of the costs 
and benefits associated with shareholder litigation.  As such, this thesis provides further 
insight into the usefulness of SCAs as a disciplinary mechanism. 
 
1.4 Research Objectives and Contributions 
The three empirical chapters investigate the association between SCAs and various 
important corporate characteristics, including debt financing (Chapter 2), political 
lobbying (Chapter 3) and innovation (Chapter 4).  Each of these chapters provides several 
important contributions regarding the determinants and consequences of SCAs.  The 
empirical chapters examine SCAs that are filed in the US, which have been obtained from 
the Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse (SCAC).
7
  Each study augments this 
SCA information with data obtained from various sources.   In Chapter 2, a sample of 
loans obtained from Dealscan is analysed.  Chapter 3 investigates political connections as 
measured by the amount of money firms spend on lobbying.  Lobbying data for this 
chapter was obtained from the Centre for Responsive Politics (CRP).
8
  Finally, innovation 
as proxied by R&D expenditures and patenting activities, is examined in Chapter 4.  Firm 
patenting information was obtained from a dataset compiled by Kogan et al. (2017).
9
 
The focus of this thesis is on the accusation of managerial misconduct, however, all of 
the analysis undertaken is at the firm-level.   This setup for the analyses has been used in 












each of the empirical papers since the filing of a class action is filed against a firm.  
Although individuals are named in the class action the majority of the liability falls to the 
firm.  As such, it is appropriate to look at firm level changes in this context even though 
the commission of the alleged illegal activity is being undertaken by individuals within 
those firms. 
As previously mentioned, Chapter 2 examines the association between corporate 
lending and SCAs.  This chapter contributes to the literature by examining whether 
reputable and relationship lenders are associated with corporate misconduct.  Specifically, 
the following three key research questions are examined:  (1) Are firms that borrow from 
reputable lenders less likely to be subject to a SCA?  (2) Are firms more likely to continue 
a relationship with a lender after the filing of a SCA?  (3) Do firms with an existing 
relationship with a lender receive more favourable terms on new loans than sued firms 
without a relationship after the filing of a SCA? 
Chapter 2 makes three major contributions to the existing literature on SCAs and 
corporate loans.  First, this is the first empirical work to examine whether reputable 
lenders are more adept at avoiding or limiting the incidence of shareholder litigation.  
Second, this is the first empirical work to examine how a firm’s relationship with its 
lenders is impacted by the filing of a SCA.  Finally, this paper extends the current 
understanding of reputational penalties imposed on new loans by explicitly accounting for 
firms’ ex-ante lending relationships. 
The main findings from Chapter 2 include the following.  Firms are less likely to face a 
SCA if they borrow from a reputable lender, which appears to be a result of reputable 
lenders screening out prospective borrowers with a high risk of litigation.  Sued firms are 
also less likely to be able to develop a relationship with a lender after the filing of a class 
action, if they did not already have one.  Furthermore, if a firm did not have a relationship 
with a lender pre–filing, loans initiated after being sued are more likely to exhibit larger 
spreads and be shorter in maturity.  However, firms with an existing lender relationship are 
more likely to continue to borrow from the same lender after the filing.  Sued firms with an 
ex-ante relationship with a lender receive more favourable loan terms than sued firms 
without a relationship.  These benefits include relatively smaller spreads and better access 
to more capital.  Overall, these findings indicate that banks with an established lending 
relationship may be willing to provide more lenient loan terms to ensure a continuing 
 




relationship with a firm.  As a result, reputational penalties on new loans faced by sued 
firms can largely be offset by developing a lending relationship. 
Chapter 3 analyses the relationship between political lobbying and SCAs.  This chapter 
investigates whether a firm’s tacit power signalled by its lobbying activities is associated 
with the time it takes to detect corporate misconduct before and after the enactment of 
SOX.  The following three research questions are analysed in this chapter:  (1) Are firms 
that lobby able to get away with their misconduct for longer?  (2) Are firms that lobby 
more likely to settle a SCA?  (3) Do lobbying firms that are sued cause more damage and 
face greater reputational penalties? 
This study makes several contributions to the existing literature.  First, it extends the 
work conducted by Yu and Yu (2011) and shows that although lobbying firms are able to 
get away with their misconduct for longer prior to 2004 they are not able to afterward.  
Second, it examines the impact of political connections on the probability of settlement 
and the size of the settlement.  As such, it provides a greater understanding of the drivers 
of the direct costs of shareholder litigation.  Finally, this study provides insight into the 
effect that SOX has had on the detection of corporate misconduct. 
A summary of the main results of Chapter 3 are as follows.  Up to 2004, lobbying firms 
exhibit longer class periods and are marginally less likely to settle a class action.  It is 
argued that this longer detection time is most likely a result of economic agents being 
unwilling to speak out against lobbying firms, for fear of the repercussions.  However, 
after 2005, lobbying is unrelated to the length of the class period or the probability of a 
SCA being settled.  These findings are consistent with the tacit power of lobbying firms 
declining as a result of the enactment of SOX, which has improved the incentives for 
economic agents to reveal evidence of corporate misconduct. 
Finally, the interrelationship between corporate innovation and SCAs is examined in 
Chapter 4.  This chapter examines whether a firm’s innovative activities are associated 
with the ex-ante risk of litigation.  Furthermore, this chapter also investigates the impact 
the filing of a SCA has on corporate innovation.  Chapter 4 examines the following 
research questions: (1) Are firms that innovate more likely to be subject to a SCA than 
firms that do not innovate?  (2) Amongst firms that innovate, are firms that are relatively 
less innovatively successful more likely to be sued?  (3) Does innovative efficiency 
improve after the filing of a SCA? 
 




Chapter 4 makes several key contributions to the extant literature.  First, this chapter is 
the first empirical work that explicitly examines whether firms innovative activities are 
related to the filing of a SCA.  This study, therefore, enhances the current understanding of 
the determinants of shareholder litigation.  Second, this chapter contributes to the literature 
on the consequences of SCAs.  Specifically, this chapter examines the impact a filing of a 
class action has on a firm’s innovative activities. 
A summary of the key findings of Chapter 4 are as follows.  Firms are more likely to 
be sued if they have invested in innovation, relative to those that do not invest.  It is argued 
that this finding is a result of firms that innovate having greater opportunities to commit 
misconduct.  Further, among innovating firms, the relative level or change in innovative 
success is negatively associated with the probability of shareholder litigation.  This finding 
is consistent with the expectation that firms that are struggling to innovate face greater 
pressures to violate securities laws.  Post-filing investment in innovation immediately 
declines, which appears to result in a decline in the number of patents produced in the 
following years.  However, the quality of patents being produced, as well as the overall 
innovative efficiency, is relatively unaffected by the filing of a class action. 
Although the analyses in this thesis are conducted on SCAs that were filed in the US 
the findings will be of use for market-participants and policymakers outside of the US.  
The findings of this thesis are relevant not only from an investor or other stakeholder’s 
perspective but also for regulators.  This thesis sheds light on not only the causes of 
shareholder litigation, which can be useful for detection and prevention of misconduct, but 
also the consequences.  Hence, the findings reported contribute to a better understanding of 
the costs and benefits of shareholder litigation.  As such, this thesis serves to provide a 
better understanding of the efficacy of SCAs as a corporate governance mechanism. 
  
 





Chapter 2  
 




The revelation of corporate misconduct can cause irreparable damage to the reputation of a 
firm and its stakeholders.  Lenders, therefore, have an incentive to avoid being associated 
with firms accused of misconduct.  However, it will not always be possible for lenders to 
avoid firms that end up being sued.  As a result of reputational damage, the filing of a 
securities class action (SCA) may adversely impact a firm’s ability to raise debt financing.  
Despite the high frequency of SCAs, the response of lenders to these filings is not fully 
understood.  This chapter extends the current state of the literature by examining whether 
reputable and relationship lenders are associated with corporate misconduct, based on 
those lenders distinguishing characteristics.  Specifically, this chapter examines whether a 
SCA impacts a firm’s debt financing terms and its relationship with its lenders.  
Furthermore, this study also investigates whether reputable lenders are better at screening 
and monitoring for potential misconduct. 
Theory emphasises the importance of two different lending characteristics: lender 
reputation (e.g. Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994a; b) and lending relationships (e.g. 
Greenbaum et al., 1989; Sharpe, 1990; 1995; Diamond, 1991; Rajan, 1992; Boot and 
Thakor, 1994; Petersen and Rajan, 1995).  These two unique attributes of lending 
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dynamics can help to mitigate information asymmetry problems through enhanced 
incentives or repeated interactions.  As a result, the reputation of a lender and a 
relationship with a lender can provide various costs and benefits to borrowing firms. 
Theory suggests that reputable lenders have greater incentives to apply more rigorous 
ex-ante screening of prospective borrowers (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994a) and 
undertake more ex-post monitoring of borrowing firms in order to maintain their reputation 
(Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994b).  This theory would suggest that reputable lenders 
should be more capable of avoiding firms that eventually face litigation as a result of better 
screening processes.  Reputable lenders should also be able to provide more adequate 
oversight via their enhanced monitoring activities and limit the possibility of misconduct 
occurring.  In the first part of this chapter, the association between the incidence of 
misconduct and the reputation of lenders is examined. 
Relationship lending can help to mitigate potential problems associated with 
information asymmetry between lender and borrower through repeated interactions.  This 
improved transparency with its lenders can result in significant benefits and costs to 
borrowing firms.
10
  The benefits that can accrue from relationship lending include: smaller 
spreads, greater availability of financing and a lower probability of requiring collateral 
(Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger and Udell, 1995; Bharath et al., 2011).  Relationship 
lending can also result in borrowing firms facing hold-up costs as a result of being 
informationally captured (see Greenbaum et al., 1989; Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992; Petersen 
and Rajan, 1995).  The filing of a class action creates uncertainty about the prospects of a 
firm.  This increased uncertainty will also enhance the informational advantage held by 
relationship lender, relative to outside lenders.  As a result, sued firms may become more 
informationally captured and will, therefore, be stuck in a relationship with a lender.  
Alternatively, lenders may be more willing to help firms out during periods of distress to 
sustain a relationship and obtain benefits from that relationship in the long run.  In either 
case, it would be expected that firms will be more likely to continue a lending relationship 
after being sued.   
Which lenders a firm borrows from post-filing is also likely to be a key determinant of 
the terms received on new loans.  Recent research has found that lenders alter loan terms 
after the filing of a SCA.  Firms pay higher loan spreads after the filing of a class action 
                                                 
10
 See Boot (2000), Ongena and Smith (2000) and Elyasiani and Smith (2004) for surveys of research on 
relationship lending. 
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and other non-price terms are also adversely impacted (Deng et al., 2014; Yuan and Zhang, 
2015).  The reputational penalties incurred by sued firms may be impacted by the 
relationship a borrowing firm has with its lender.  If sued firms become informationally 
captured by their relationship with a lender they may lose significant bargaining power, 
which could result in greater reputational penalties.  These greater reputational penalties 
could stem from the loss of the benefits in loan terms associated with lending relationships 
(see Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger and Udell, 1995; Bharath et al., 2011).  
Alternatively, lenders may be willing to support borrowing firms that they had a 
relationship with after the filing of a SCA.  Lenders may help sued firms by providing 
more favourable loan terms, effectively offsetting any reputational damage.  Whether firms 
are able to sustain a relationship with its lenders and how lenders deal with sued firms is an 
important empirical question.  Consequently, the findings of this chapter provide an 
important insight into whether relationships with lenders help or hinder a sued firms’ 
ability to recover from the accusation of misconduct. 
To summarise, this chapter addresses the following three research questions: 
1) Are firms that borrow from reputable lenders less likely to be subject to a SCA? 
2) Are firms more likely to continue a relationship with a lender after the filing of a 
SCA? 
3) Do firms with an existing relationship with a lender receive more favourable 
terms on new loans than sued firms without a relationship after the filing of a 
SCA? 
Further, this chapter provides three major contributions to the existing literature on 
SCAs and debt financing.  First, this chapter is the first empirical work to investigate 
whether reputable lenders are more capable of avoiding or limiting the occurrence of 
corporate misconduct.  The findings provide insight as to whether the theoretical 
proposition that reputable lenders have enhanced incentives to screen and monitor has any 
empirical validity.  Second, this chapter is the first to examine if a firm’s relationship with 
its lender is impacted by the filing of a class action. The results give an understanding of 
the dynamics of relationship lending and its potential importance in gaining access to 
capital during periods of distress.  Finally, this chapter also analyses how loan terms 
change after being sued, taking into account a firm’s ex-ante relationship with its lenders.  
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This paper extends the works of Deng et al. (2014) and Yuan and Zhang (2015) by taking 
into account the relationship firms have with its lenders before being sued. 
With respect to the first research question, the results of this chapter show that firms 
are less likely to face a SCA if they borrow from a reputable lender.  The evidence 
suggests that this is a result of reputable lenders being less likely to lend to firms with high 
litigation risk, which is probably a result of reputable lenders having greater incentives to 
effectively screen prospective borrowers.  However, there is no evidence to suggest that 
reputable lenders enhanced incentives to monitor borrowers, impacts the occurrence of 
misconduct.  As such, reputable lenders appear to be more capable of avoiding high 
litigation risk firms through ex-ante lending decision but are no better than other banks at 
limiting the incidence of managerial malfeasance ex-post (once a loan has been made). 
In terms of the second research question, if a firm did not have a relationship with a 
lender prior to the filing of a class action, they are unlikely to be able to develop a 
relationship with a lender after being sued.  However, firms with an existing lender 
relationship are more likely to continue to borrow from the same lender after being sued. 
For the third research question, reputational penalties are investigated by examining the 
characteristics of loans originated after the filing of a class action with respect to the 
relationships a firm had with its lenders.  If a firm did not have a relationship with a lender 
pre–filing, loans initiated after being sued are more likely to exhibit larger spreads and 
have shorter maturities.  These changes in loan terms are consistent with firms being 
penalised after being sued.  However, consistent with expectations sued firms that have an 
ex-ante relationship with a lender receive more favourable loan terms than sued firms 
without a relationship.  These benefits include relatively smaller spreads and better access 
to more capital.  These findings suggest that banks may be willing to provide more lenient 
loan terms to ensure a continuing relationship with a borrowing firm.  Overall, the results 
suggest that lending relationships are beneficial for a firm’s recovery from the revelation 
of misconduct. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows.  In Section 2.2 the key 
hypotheses that are tested are outlined.  Section 2.3 provides an overview of the 
methodologies and data used.  Section 2.4 presents the empirical results and Section 2.5 
contains the concluding remarks. 
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2.2 Hypothesis Development 
2.2.1 Reputation of Lenders 
The US commercial loan market is dominated by syndicated loans, which are issued 
jointly by a number of lenders.  The lead arranger of these loans is responsible for the 
screening of potential borrowers (pre-loan due diligence) and monitoring after the loan is 
made.
11
  Other participants in syndicated loans typically take a more passive role and 
rarely negotiate directly with the borrower.  Participants in the syndicated loan market 
include not only large banks but also non-bank institutional investors (Ivashina and Sun, 
2011).  These non-bank participants typically do not have the processes in place to 
effectively screen and monitor borrowers, relying instead on the lead arrangers for these 
procedures.  Consequently, the quality of the lead arranger plays an important role in the 
“certification” of borrowing firms (see Bushman and Wittenberg-Moerman, 2012). 
One way to identify the quality of a lender is by their reputation.  The reputation of a 
financial intermediary functions as a bonding mechanism, creating incentives to screen and 
monitor borrowing firms (Booth and Smith, 1986).  Therefore, to maintain a good 
reputation, a lender must ensure that they only lend to quality companies.  This is done by 
effectively screening and monitoring borrowing firms.   
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994a) develop a model of the screening process used by 
banks.  In their model, more reputable banks apply more rigorous ex-ante screening of 
prospective borrowers and as a result will be more likely to lend to firms with better future 
prospects.  Consistent with this, prior research has found that the reputation of a financial 
intermediary plays an important certification role.  For example, firms that borrow from 
reputable lenders are more likely to perform better in the future and have better credit 
quality (Bushman and Wittenberg-Moerman, 2012).  Furthermore, loan announcement 
abnormal returns are positively related to the lenders’ reputation (Billett et al., 1995; Ross, 
2010).  These positive announcement returns can be viewed as a certification of the quality 
of a firm stemming from the due diligence performed by the reputable lenders.  Overall, 
the literature indicates that the reputation of lenders is important for certifying the quality 
of borrowing firms. 
                                                 
11
 Throughout this chapter, the lead arranger will be referred to as the lender. 
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This enhanced due diligence and certification process will likely have an impact on the 
ability of high litigation risk firms being able to borrow from a reputable lender.  Prior 
research has found that sued firms are more likely to exhibit agency issues and have poorer 
performance (e.g. Peng and Roell, 2008; Gande and Lewis, 2009; McTier and Wald, 
2011).  Since reputable lenders have greater incentives to effectively screen prospective 
borrowers, they should be less likely to lend to firms with potential issues or poorer 
prospects.  Consequently, firms that are more likely to commit misconduct should be 
relatively less likely to be able to borrow from a reputable lender.  Therefore, it is expected 
that sued firms are less likely to borrow from reputable lenders. 
It is also possible that firms that borrow from reputable lenders will be less likely to be 
sued as a result of more rigorous monitoring.  Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994b) develop 
a model that indicates that more reputable banks have greater incentives to undertake ex-
post monitoring activities.  Prior research suggests that firms that are accused of corporate 
misconduct do not have adequate oversight (McTier and Wald, 2011).  The lack of 
oversight likely provides managers with the opportunity to commit corporate malfeasance.  
The more rigorous monitoring applied by reputable lenders will likely result in fewer 
opportunities to commit misconduct. 
Based on this discussion there are two possible explanations for why sued firms will be 
less likely to have borrowed from a reputable lender.  First, high litigation risk firms will 
be more likely to be screened out by reputable lenders and are, therefore less likely to 
borrow from a reputable lender ex-ante.  Second, as a result of superior ex-post 
monitoring, firms borrowing from reputable lenders will be less likely to violate securities 
laws.  Both of these explanations (better screening and monitoring) lead to the expectation 
that firms that borrow from a reputable lender will be less likely to be sued.  This leads to 
the first hypothesis which, in turn, relates to research question 1. 
Hypothesis 1: Firms that borrow from a reputable lender will be less likely to have a 
SCA filed against them. 
 
2.2.2 Lending Relationships 
Lenders can obtain proprietary information about a borrower through repeated interactions, 
thereby reducing information asymmetry.  The improved transparency between lender and 
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borrower facilitates monitoring and some of these benefits are passed onto the borrower.
12
  
Consistent with this information asymmetry theory, prior research indicates that repeated 
borrowing from the same lender results in lower spreads, reduced collateral requirements 
and better access to larger loans (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger and Udell, 1995; 
Bharath et al., 2011).  Covenants are also more likely to be relatively less tight for firms 
with a lending relationship (Prilmeier, 2017).  Furthermore, lenders are more willing to 
provide credit to a firm with which it has an existing relationship and that the length of the 
relationship is unimportant (Cole, 1998). 
Relationship lending also comes at a cost to borrowers.  Lenders acquisition of 
proprietary information can result in borrowers being informationally captured and provide 
lenders with the opportunity to extract rents.  These hold-up costs are formally modelled 
by Greenbaum et al. (1989), Sharpe (1990), Rajan (1992) and Petersen and Rajan (1995).  
In an empirical study, Kim et al. (2003) model switching costs associated with retail 
lending in Norway.  The authors estimate that the average switching cost is 4.1%, which is 
approximately one-third of the average interest rate on loans.  As a result of these 
relatively high switching costs, customers become locked into their existing lending 
relationships.  Although the focus of the Kim et al. (2003) study was on retail lending, the 
same hold-up costs exist for larger corporate borrowers.  In a related study, Ioannidou and 
Ongena (2010) present evidence that interest rates on loans obtained from a new bank are 
significantly lower than comparable loans from existing lenders.  The new bank uses lower 
interest rates to entice customers to switch banks but then afterward increases rates.  This 
strategy is consistent with bank hold-up costs stemming from borrowers becoming 
informationally captured.   
Theory suggests that relationship building is more valuable for firms with high 
information asymmetry (Rajan, 1992; Boot and Thakor, 2000).  Consistent with this, 
Gopalan et al. (2011a) find informationally opaque private firms are more likely to sustain 
an existing lending relationship.  As such, the information environment plays an important 
role in both the benefits that borrowers can accrue as well as the hold-up costs they face.  
Evidence suggests that less transparent firms face higher interest rates as a result of the 
informational monopoly that banks hold.  For example, Hale and Santos (2009) find that 
following the first public bond issuance, firms are able to borrow at lower rates.  This 
                                                 
12
 Diamond (1991) and Boot and Thakor (1994) formally model the benefits associated with long-term 
relationships. 
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finding supports the theory that banks are able to hold up borrowers by charging higher 
interest rates as a result of the informational monopoly they hold.  Similarly, Schenone 
(2010) find that the average loan interest rate falls following a borrowers’ equity IPO.  
Furthermore, information sharing results in a reduction in the benefits associated with 
relationships (Gehrig and Stenbacka, 2007).  Overall, these papers suggest that the greater 
the informational advantage the lender holds, the higher the hold-up costs.  The uncertainty 
created by the filing of a class action will increase the informational advantage of 
relationship lenders.  As such, hold-up costs would be expected to increase after a firm is 
sued, which will result in these firms being informationally captured by their lenders. 
Banks must take a long-term perspective on relationship lending so that they can 
maximise the rents stemming from the informational monopoly they hold.  As such, they 
have an incentive to maintain a lending relationship even during periods of distress or 
when borrower credit quality deteriorates.  Consistent with this, Longhofer and Santos 
(2000) theorise that firms with lending relationships will be less likely to face credit 
constraints.  Supporting this hypothesis, numerous papers have found that during a crisis 
firms are more likely to receive a loan with more favourable terms from a relationship 
bank (Jiangli et al., 2008; Cotugno et al., 2013; Bolton et al., 2016).  Elsas and Krahnen 
(1998) also find evidence to suggest that lenders will support firms that suffer a decline in 
credit quality if they have a relationship with them.  Examining the German market, the 
authors find that housebanks (equivalent to a relationship lender) provide liquidity 
insurance for unexpected declines in borrower ratings.  However, for large rating declines 
(more than two rating classes), there is no evidence of liquidity insurance.  Furthermore, 
Rosenfeld (2014) finds that firms that obtain a loan from a relationship lender in the six 
months prior to distress are more likely to emerge from distress.  These results indicate 
that banks may be willing to continue to provide access to capital despite the financial 
distress that may result from the filing of a SCA. 
To summarise, there are two possibilities for why a lending relationship may continue 
even after a firm has been sued.  First, firms may be informationally captured and as a 
result of hold-up costs, be unable to borrow from alternative lenders.  Second, banks may 
want to continue the lending relationship so that they can benefit by extracting future rents.  
These two propositions are not mutually exclusive and both effects will result in sued 
firms continuing a relationship with their lender. 
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Alternatively, it is also possible that lenders may discontinue a relationship with a firm 
to avoid potential negative reputation effects.  The revelation of fraud not only impacts the 
fraudulent firm but it also negatively affects those associated with the firm.  Lin and 
Paravisini (2011) find that lenders to firms that commit fraud suffer a loss in reputation 
following the discovery of the fraudulent activity.  These lenders see a reduction of at least 
25% in new syndicated loans during the two years following the fraud discoveries.  
Lenders to firms that commit fraud are also more likely to hold a larger portion of loans 
when they perform a monitoring role, which is consistent with these lenders being required 
to have more skin in the game.   
In similar research, Gopalan et al. (2011b) analyse the effect that large-scale 
bankruptcies have on lead arrangers’ reputation.  They find that lead arrangers in these 
cases are less likely to syndicate loans and retain larger fractions of syndicated loans, 
which is consistent with reputational damage.  Dahiya et al. (2003) find negative returns 
when a corporate borrower announces default.  The loss sustained by lenders is larger if 
they had a relationship with the borrower.  Furthermore, Jorion and Zhang (2009) find that 
bankruptcies result in significant negative market reactions and higher credit default swap 
(CDS) spreads for creditors.  Creditors are also more likely to face financial distress if they 
have large exposures to firms that become bankrupt.  These findings indicate that poor 
performance and illegal activities can have a negative impact on a firm’s creditors.  As a 
result, lenders may terminate a relationship with a firm that has been sued in order to avoid 
being associated with that firm and to evade any future distress that may arise from the 
class action. 
Based on this discussion, it is possible that the filing of a class action may plausibly 
lead to either the ending of a lending relationship or, alternatively, increase the firm’s 
dependence on the relationship.  In the context of these conflicting forces, it is 
hypothesised that the benefit, on average, of a lending relationship with a bank, in the form 
of future rents, will likely exceed the negative reputational consequences that may stem 
from continuing to lend to a sued firm.  As such, it is postulated that firms with ex-ante 
banking relationships will be informationally captured and their banks will be more willing 
to support them even after being sued.  This leads to the second hypothesis which, in turn, 
relates to the second research question explored in this chapter. 
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Hypothesis 2a: Firms are more likely to continue a relationship with a lender after the 
filing of a SCA. 
As discussed, it is also possible that the relationship between a firm and a lender ends 
up ceasing as a result of the filing of a class action.  As such the following alternative 
hypothesis is also examined in this chapter. 
Hypothesis 2b: Firms are less likely to continue a relationship with a lender after the 
filing of a SCA. 
 
2.2.3 Loan Terms 
Prior research has found that firms suffer reputational penalties as a result of the filing of a 
class action.  For example, firms face a significant negative market reaction to the filing of 
a class action (Griffin et al., 2004; Gande and Lewis, 2009; Bauer and Braun, 2010) and a 
higher cost of equity post-filing (Chava et al., 2010).  Consequently, the filing of a class 
action will likely negatively impact a firm’s reputation with its lenders.  Consistent with 
this expectation, Deng et al. (2014) and Yuan and Zhang (2015) find that firms subject to 
class actions suffer reputational penalties in terms of poorer price and non-price terms of 
bank loan contracts.  Both studies find sued firms pay significantly higher loan spreads 
after the filing.  However, they present conflicting evidence on the effect class actions 
have on non-price terms.  On the one hand, Deng et al. (2014) find that sued firms face 
more financial covenants and are more likely to require collateral, but find no impact on 
the maturity of loans.  On the other hand, Yuan and Zhang (2015) find that after the filing, 
loans are shorter in maturity but the number of covenants and collateral required are 
unchanged.  In related research, Graham et al. (2008) find loans initiated after a financial 
restatement have significantly higher spreads, shorter maturities, are more likely to require 
collateral and include more covenant restrictions.  Overall, the literature indicates that 
corporate misreporting or misconduct undermines a firm’s reputation with lenders 
resulting in tighter loan contract terms. 
As outlined in the discussion of Hypothesis 2a, there are numerous benefits that can be 
gained by firms that develop a relationship with a lender.  These benefits come in the form 
of more favourable loan terms (see Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger and Udell, 1995; 
Cole, 1998; Bharath et al., 2011; Prilmeier, 2017).  These favourable terms can be 
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attributed to the enhanced transmission of information that occurs within a lending 
relationship.   
Banks may be relatively more willing to support sued firms that they had a relationship 
with following the filing of a class action.  Relationship lenders will likely help sued firms 
by providing more lenient loan terms in order to extend the relationship and benefit by 
extracting future rents.  Consequently, although sued firms that have a relationship with a 
lender may still face reputational penalties, it would be expected that these penalties will 
be relatively less severe for sued firms without a lending relationship.  Sued firms with an 
ex-ante lending relationship should, therefore, receive relatively more favourable loan 
terms than firms without an ex-ante relationship. 
Alternatively, sued firms that have a relationship with a lender may suffer more severe 
reputational penalties.  The filing of a class action creates significant uncertainty about the 
ability of firms to repay its debt.  This uncertainty could result in firms being 
informationally captured by lenders with which they had a relationship.  As a result of the 
increased uncertainty, sued firms that are involved in a relationship with a lender could 
also lose significant bargaining power.  Based on this loss of bargaining power argument, 
it would be expected that firms will also lose the benefits associated with a lending 
relationship.  As mentioned above, the benefits stemming from relationships with a bank 
come in the form of more favourable loan terms.  Based on this argument, it would be 
expected that firms with an ex-ante lending relationship will be subjected to more severe 
reputational penalties following the revelation of misconduct. 
To summarise, it is possible that firms with a lending relationship could either suffer 
greater penalties or, alternatively, receive relatively more lenient loan terms following the 
filing of a class action.  The future rents that banks can obtain from a lending relationship 
will likely, on average, be more beneficial than imposing harsher loan terms on firms that 
are sued.  It is likely that sued firms with an existing relationship will still face reputational 
penalties but they are expected to be relatively better off than non-relationship sued firms.  
Therefore, with respect to the third research question addressed in this chapter, it is 
hypothesised that firms with an ex-ante banking relationship will receive relatively more 
favourable loan terms than firms without a banking relationship.  This leads to the third 
hypothesis. 
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Hypothesis 3: After the filing of a SCA, firms that had a relationship with a lender will 
receive more favourable terms on new loans than sued firms without a relationship. 
 
2.3 Method 
2.3.1 Probability of Being Sued 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that firms with reputable lenders will be less likely to have a SCA 
filed against them.  As outlined in Section 2.2.1 there were two explanations used to justify 
this expectation: (1) reputable lenders are better at screening firms and (2) reputable 
lenders are better at monitoring firms.  Two methods are used to examine whether these 
explanations are correct. 
 
2.3.1.1  Screening Ability of Reputable Lenders 
The first explanation for Hypothesis 1 is reputable lenders are better at screening firms 
with a high risk of being sued and as a result will be less likely to lend to them.  To test 
this screening explanation, a two-stage model was estimated.  In the first-stage, the 
following logit model was estimated for all firms with available data. 
 𝑆𝑢𝑒𝑑𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛴𝛽 · 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡−1 +  𝜀𝑡 (2.1) 
The dependent variable (Sued) in equation (2.1) is equal to one if the firm was sued in 
year t and is zero otherwise.  There are numerous events surrounding the filing of a class 
action.
13
  The focus of this chapter is on the filing of a SCA for several reasons.  First, 
using the filing of a SCA as the key analytical date has the advantage that it is an easily 
identifiable exogenous event, which represents an accusation of misconduct.  Second, the 
other events associated with the discovery of misconduct typically occur only shortly 
                                                 
13
 Karpoff et al. (2008a) perform an analysis of the financial costs firms face for financial fraud across these 
numerous key events associated with SEC enforcement actions.  These key events include the violation 
period, which consists of the beginning date and the end date of the violation.  Furthermore there is the 
enforcement period or enforcement events, which include a triggering event, informal inquiry, formal 
investigation, initial regulatory proceeding, other regulatory events and the concluding regulatory 
proceeding. 
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before the filing of a class action.
14
  Finally, using the filing of a class action to analyse the 
occurrence of misconduct and surrounding changes is a standard approach used in the 
literature (e.g. McTier and Wald, 2011; Humphery-Jenner, 2012; Deng et al., 2014; Yuan 
and Zhang 2015). 
Control variables that have been shown in previous studies to be related to the 
likelihood of being sued are also used in the first-stage (e.g. McTier and Wald, 2011; Kim 
and Skinner, 2012).  These variables include firm size, leverage, ROA, book-to-market, 
amount of tangible assets and dividends.
15
  Industry and year fixed effects are also 
included as controls. 
The firm’s ex-ante litigation risk is estimated from the first stage of the model.  This is 
then used in equation (2.2) below. 
 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑃(𝑆𝑢𝑒𝑑)𝑡−1 + 𝛴𝛽 · 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡−1 +  𝜀𝑡 (2.2) 
The second-stage is a logit model estimated at the loan facility level of syndicated 
private loans.
16
  This chapter analysis revolves around private syndicated loans as opposed 
to public forms of debt as evidence suggests that during period of distress firms are more 
likely to use private forms of debt (Denis and Mihov, 2003).  As such, analysing 
syndicated loans surrounding the filing of a SCA provides a richer understanding of how 
corporate misconduct impacts a firm’s access to capital. 
The dependent variable (Reputable) is equal to one if a particular loan obtained in year 
t was borrowed from a lender that is deemed to be highly reputable.  Following Bushman 
and Wittenberg-Moerman (2012) and Sufi (2007), bank reputation is identified based on 
the lenders loan market share.  Lead arrangers who capture more than 3% of the total 
market share of loans are classified as highly reputable.  Using this market share approach 
results in only the largest banks being classified as reputable.  These dominant banks have 
greater incentives to screen and monitor in order to retain their market share and their 
reputation (see Section 2.2.1).  Furthermore, these larger banks will likely have more 
                                                 
14
 The average number of days to file, which is the number of days between the end of the class period when 
the alleged misconduct took place over and the filing of the class action, is 108 days in the sample analysed 
in this chapter (see Table 2.2). 
15
 See Table 2.1 for variable definitions. 
16
 The Dealscan database lists each credit facility or tranche as a separate record.  Syndicated loan packages 
typically consist of a number of facilities.  Throughout this chapter the term loan refers to an individual 
credit facility.  
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sophisticated processes and have greater resource availability, which results in the superior 
ability to screen and monitor borrowers. 
Two measures of reputation are used in this analysis.  The first measure, (Reputable 
(Amount)), is the total dollar amount of loans a bank serves as the lead arranger divided by 
the total dollar of loans issued in that year.  Reputation is also measured based on the 
number of loans for which the bank serves as the lead arranger relative to the total number 
of loans issued in that year (Reputable (Number)).  If the proportion for either measure is 
greater than 3% then the bank is deemed to be reputable. 
The key independent variable of interest is the litigation risk (P(Sued)) in year t-1. 
Based on the screening justification, it is expected that firms will be less likely to be able 
to borrow from reputable lenders if they have higher ex-ante litigation risk.  As such, it is 
expected that 𝛽1 will be negative. 
The control variables used in this regression are similar to those used by Bushman and 
Wittenberg-Moerman (2012).  The second-stage includes the same control variables as the 
first-stage.  This model also includes controls for characteristics specific to the loan facility 
including: loan size and the loan maturity. 
 
2.3.1.2 Monitoring Ability of Reputable Lenders 
The alternative context for Hypothesis 1 is that reputable lenders are superior monitors of 
borrowing firm’s ex-post, resulting in a lower likelihood of corporate misconduct.  The 
logit regression model given in equation (2.3) is estimated to test this monitoring 
explanation. 
 𝑆𝑢𝑒𝑑𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑡−1,𝑡−3 + 𝛴𝛽 · 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 (2.3) 
As in equation (2.1), the dependent variable (Sued) takes a value of one if a class action 
is filed against a firm in year t and is zero otherwise. 
The primary independent variable of interest in this analysis is PreReputable.  
PreReputable is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm has obtained a loan in the prior 
three years (t-1 to t-3) where the lead arranger is deemed to be reputable.  As mentioned 
above, lender reputation was determined based on loan market share (see Section 2.3.1.1).  
It is expected that reputable lenders are better at monitoring firms and ensuring that 
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managers do not violate securities laws (see Section 2.2.1).  If this expectation is correct, 
the coefficient for the PreReputable variable will be negative. 
The control variables used in this model are the same as those used in equation (2.1). 
 
2.3.2 Lending Relationship after Filing 
Hypothesis 2a predicts that, after the filing of a SCA, sued firms will be more likely to 
continue a relationship with a lender.   
To examine this hypothesis, loans initiated around the filing of a class action are 
examined.  Loans are analysed from three years prior to the filing of a SCA and up to three 
years after the filing.  Firms are included in the sample if they have been sued and have 
obtained at least two bank loans where one is obtained during the three-year period prior to 
the filing and the other is taken during the three-years after the filing.
17
  As such, this is a 
within sample analysis examining only those loans that are obtained by firms that were 
sued within the three year window surrounding the filing year.
18
 
The following logit regression was then estimated at the loan level. 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 +   𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑙
+ 𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑙 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛴𝛽 · 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡−1 +  𝜀𝑡 (2.4) 
The dependent variable (Relationship) is a dummy variable for a loan that takes a value 
of one if the borrower and the bank have a pre-existing relationship.  Similar to the 
approach used by Bharath et al. (2011), the Relationship variable is equal to one if the lead 
arranger of the loan had also been the lead arranger for a firm loan in the prior five years. 
Hypothesis 2a predicts that sued firms will be more likely to retain a relationship with a 
bank.  To analyse this, it is necessary to identify firms that have an established relationship 
in the pre-filing period.  The pre-filing relationship (PreRel) is a dummy variable equal to 
one if the bank was the lead arranger for more than two loans in the five years prior to the 
filing of a SCA.  The PostFiling variable is equal to one if the loan was initiated after the 
filing of a SCA. 
                                                 
17
 In unreported results, loans initiated in a five-year window around the filing year provide quantitatively 
similar results. 
18
 In robustness tests, a control sample is selected and Hypothesis 2 and 3 are re-examined using a diff-in-
diff-in-diff approach (see Section 2.4.4). 
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The interaction term (PreRel*PostFiling) coefficient indicates if there has been a 
change in an established relationship after the filing.  If Hypothesis 2a is correct then the 
interaction term will have a positive coefficient.  A positive coefficient would indicate that 
after the filing of a class action, sued firms that had a relationship with a lender are more 
likely to obtain a loan from the same lender.  The use of this diff-in-diff style of regression 
analysis also helps to alleviate concerns associated with endogeneity. 
The control variables used in this analysis are similar to those used in equation (2.2).  
Macroeconomic conditions are also controlled for using CreditSpread, defined as the 
difference in yields between BAA and AAA corporate bonds, and TermSpread, defined as 
the yield difference between 10 and 2 year Treasury bonds.
19
  Robust standard errors 




2.3.3 Change in Loan Contract Terms after Filing 
Hypothesis 3 predicts that, after the filing of a SCA, firms that had a relationship with a 
lender will receive relatively more favourable loan terms than sued firms without a 
relationship.  The model used to test Hypothesis 3 is given by equation (2.5) below. 
 
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝐹𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 +  𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑙
+   𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑙 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛴𝛽 · 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡−1 +  𝜀𝑡 (2.5) 
The dependent variable (LoanFeature) measures one of seven loan contract 
characteristics.  The characteristics include: loan spread, maturity, number of covenants, 
loan size, collateral, syndicate size and the percentage of the loan held by the lead 
arranger. 
The main independent variable of interest is the interaction term (PreRel*PostFiling).  
This interaction term is equal to one if the firm has been sued in the prior three years and if 
the firm had a borrowed more than once from the same lender in the prior five years.  It is 
expected that the reputational penalties will be relatively less severe for firms that had a 
relationship with a lender.  In this case, the interaction term should represent the relatively 
more favourable loan terms.  For example, research suggests that firms pay significantly 
higher loan spreads after the filing of a class action (Deng et al., 2014; Yuan and Zhang 
                                                 
19
 See Table 2.1 for all variable definitions. 
20
 Clustering the standard errors at the bank level provides quantitatively similar results. 
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2015).  It is expected that with an existing lending relationship, sued firms will receive 
relatively more favourable terms.  Therefore, when the loan spread is the dependent 
variable the interaction term (PreRel*PostFiling) should be negative.  Using this diff-in-
diff style of approach is also a useful way to address concerns related to endogeneity. 
The control variables will include firm characteristics, loan characteristics and 
measures of macroeconomic conditions and are similar to those used in prior regressions 
(equations (2.3) and (2.4)) and by Deng et al. (2014). 
 
2.3.4 Data 
2.3.4.1 Sample Selection 
Firm financial data has been obtained from the CRSP/Compustat merged database.  The 
sample of loans analysed are obtained from the DealScan database compiled by the Loan 
Pricing Corporation (LPC) of Thomson Reuters.  DealScan contains detailed price and 
non-price terms of loans.  The DealScan and Compustat databases are merged using the 
linking table assembled by Chava and Roberts (2008). 
Data for SCAs, in the United States, are obtained from the Stanford Securities Class 
Action Clearinghouse (SCAC).
21
  The Stanford SCAC provides information on the filing 
date of the suit, the outcome of the case, ticker symbol and SIC code for all class actions 
filed after the institution of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA).  All 
class actions listed between 1996 and 2011 with at least one loan initiated during the three 
years before and the three years after the filing are used for this analysis.  This loan 
availability requirement does introduce some survivorship bias into the analysis.  
However, in this case, since the focus is on how relationships and loan terms change 
following the filing of a class action this form of survivorship bias is unavoidable.  It 
should also be noted that requiring loans pre- and post-filing is also a standard approach 
used in the literature (see Deng et al., 2014; Yuan and Zhang, 2015).  Only those firms that 
have not been sued in the prior three years are included in the sample.  To be included in 
the sample the outcome of the case must also be known.  These restrictions result in a final 
sample consisting of 448 class actions. 
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2.3.4.2 Sample Statistics 
Table 2.2 shows a comparison of characteristics between sued and non-sued firms that are 
analysed for Hypothesis 1.
22
  The most obvious difference is that sued firms are 
significantly larger in size based on total assets and market capitalisation.  Furthermore, 
there are a number of significant differences between sued and non-sued loan 
characteristics.  In the year a firm is sued loans are significantly less likely to have been 
obtained from a reputable lender, which is consistent with Hypothesis 1.  Loans obtained 
by sued firms are also more likely to have a larger spread, shorter maturity, be more likely 
to require collateral and have a larger syndicate than non-sued firms.  These findings 
indicate that sued firms are viewed as riskier and as a result receive stricter loan terms.  
Loans obtained by sued firms are also significantly larger than those obtained by non-sued 
firms, which can be attributed to the size difference.  Furthermore, loans obtained by sued 
firms have fewer covenants and the lead arranger retains less of the loan relative to non-
sued firms. 
Table 2.3 provides a breakdown of the sample of sued firms by year and industry.  In 
Panel A, it can be seen that the number of class actions filed in each year is relatively 
stable over the sample period.  There was a slight increase in class actions filed in the early 
2000’s coinciding with the tech bubble and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX).  Panel B 
shows the number of class actions in the sample by industry.  The majority of the sample 
consists of class actions filed against firms in the manufacturing (36.6%), and services 
industries (17.9%).  It should be noted that finance and utility firms are included in the 
sample, however, dropping these firms provides quantitatively similar results (see 
Appendix E). 
Table 2.4 presents Spearman correlation coefficients and variance inflation factors 
(VIFs) for the key variables.  In general, the correlations are relatively small and the 
variance inflation factors (VIFs) are also very small, which suggests that multicollinearity 
is unlikely to be an issue. 
 
                                                 
22
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2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Probability of Being Sued 
This section reports the results from the tests of Hypothesis 1, which predicts that firms 
will be less likely to have a SCA filed against them if they have borrowed from a reputable 
lender. 
 
2.4.1.1  Screening Ability of Reputable Lenders 
The first justification for Hypothesis 1 was that reputable lenders have greater incentives to 
screen prospective borrowers and are therefore less likely to lend to firms with high ex-
ante litigation risk.  To test this, a two-stage analysis was estimated as in equations (2.1) 
and (2.2) (see Section 2.3.1.1).  Table 2.5 reports the results from this analysis.  
The coefficient for the probability of being sued (P(Sued)) in the second-stage is 
consistently negative and highly significant in all model specifications.  This result 
strongly indicates that the higher the risk of litigation, the less likely a firm is able to 
obtain a loan from a reputable lender.  This finding is consistent with Hypothesis 1 and 
suggests that reputable lenders are better at screening out firms with high litigation risk 
(see Section 2.3.1.1).  This result provides empirical evidence to support the Chemmanur 
and Fulghieri (1994a) model in the context of SCAs; reputable banks apply more rigorous 
ex-ante screening of prospective borrowers which is leading them to avoid firms that are 
potential targets of litigation. 
 
2.4.1.2 Monitoring Ability of Reputable Lenders 
An alternative context for Hypothesis 1 is that reputable lenders have greater incentives to 
perform ex-post monitoring of borrowing firms and ensure that misconduct does not occur 
in the first place.  Equation (2.3) is estimated to test this relationship.  The results are 
reported in Table 2.6.  The dependent variable for these models takes a value of one if the 
firm was sued in year t.  If the monitoring explanation is correct then the coefficient for the 
PreReputable variables should be negative.  However, both variables are insignificant 
indicating that whether a firm had borrowed from a reputable lender has no impact on the 
probability of a SCA being filed.  This result suggests that the possibility of reputable 
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lenders providing superior monitoring does not affect a manager’s propensity to commit 
misconduct. 
The lack of a finding here could be in part attributed to reputable lenders being better 
screeners and avoiding high litigation risk firms in the first place (as noted in Section 
2.4.1.1).  The probability that sued firms obtain a loan from a reputable lender in the three 
years prior to the filing is significantly less than for non-sued firms (29.9% vs. 35.8%).  
Despite this difference sued firms are still able to obtain loans from reputable lenders.  As 
such, the findings indicate that a reputable lenders enhanced incentive to monitor does not 
have an impact on the likelihood of a borrowing firm being sued. 
Overall, there is evidence to suggest that firms that borrow from reputable lenders are 
less likely to be sued.  Firms borrowing from reputable lenders do not appear to be less 
likely to be sued as a result of better monitoring.  Instead, the results indicate that this 
relation is a result of reputable lenders being better at screening out potential borrowers 
with high litigation risk and as a result, other banks are left to lend to these riskier firms.  
As such, it appears that it is only possible for reputable lenders to avoid lending to firms 
that are at a greater risk of being sued.  Furthermore, firms borrowing from a reputable 
lender do not appear to be less likely to commit misconduct, despite reputable lenders 
having greater incentives to perform more rigorous monitoring.  Reputable lenders 
monitoring activities, therefore, appear to have no effect on curbing the probability of 
borrowing firms violating securities laws.  These findings suggest that the occurrence of 
corporate misconduct cannot be stopped, it can only be avoided.  This has implications for 
bank loan policies, efforts to screen rather than monitor are likely more effective at 
reducing instances of lending to firms subject to SCAs. 
 
2.4.2 Lending Relationship after Filing 
Table 2.7 reports the estimated models given in equation (2.4), which test Hypothesis 2a 
and 2b.   Table 2.7 reports estimates from three different setups.  The first two models (All) 
were estimated for all sued firms.  The sample of class actions was then split in two based 
on the outcome of the case (Dismissed and Settled columns).  Dismissed cases are more 
likely to be frivolous in nature and typically indicate that no managerial misconduct has 
occurred.  Whereas settled cases are more likely to be meritorious in nature and these cases 
are therefore more likely to be instances of managerial misconduct.  By splitting the 
 
Chapter 2. SCAs, Banking Relationships and Lender Reputation 31 
 
    
 
sample into two, based on the outcome, an understanding of the importance of the merits 
of the case can be ascertained.
23
 
If Hypothesis 2a holds, the coefficient for the interaction term PreRel*PostFiling will 
be positive indicating that after being sued firms with an existing lending relationship are 
more likely to continue borrowing from that lender (see Section 2.3.2).  However, the 
coefficient for the interaction term varies both in sign and significance across all three 
models.  When the class action is dismissed, a negative and marginally significant 
relationship is found.  Whereas for class actions that were settled, a positive and significant 
relationship is evident.  Under Hypothesis 2a, the more severe the misconduct, the more 
likely it is for firms to retain a relationship with a lender.  Consistent with this expectation, 
a positive coefficient is found for the PreRel*PostFiling term in the last regression model 
(Settled), which indicates that firms that had a relationship with a lender are more likely to 
keep borrowing from that lender after being sued.  This finding is consistent with sued 
firms being informationally captured by banks (see Greenbaum et al., 1989; Sharpe, 1990; 
Rajan, 1992; Petersen and Rajan, 1995).  Given this result, it is possible that the 
reputational losses stemming from the filing of a class action may limit a firm’s ability to 
obtain a loan from another bank.  Sued firms may, therefore, have no other option but to 
borrow from a lender with whom they have a relationship.  Alternatively, lenders may be 
more willing to help sued firms through the period of distress to extract future rents by 
preserving the relationship. 
The PostFiling variable also provides insight into how relationships with lenders 
change after the filing.  The PostFiling coefficient is negative and significant when a class 
action is settled but it is not significant when cases are dismissed.  These results suggest 
that the more meritorious the case is, the less likely a firm will be able to borrow from the 
same bank, if they did not have a relationship before being sued.  As such, it seems that 
reputational penalties impact a firm’s ability to obtain financial capital and to establish a 
relationship after being sued. 
Overall, the results show that reputational penalties may impact a firm’s borrowing 
options after being sued.  If a firm did not have a relationship with a lender, they are less 
likely to develop one post-filing.  In contrast, as a result of being informationally captured,  
an inability to borrow from other banks, or as a result of lending banks wanting to help out 
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 This partitioning of cases based on the outcome is used throughout the analyses in this thesis to provide an 
understanding of whether the merits of the case are important. 
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relationship clients during times of stress, firms with a relationship with a lender prior to 
filing are more likely to continue borrowing from that lender.  This suggests that 
relationships play an important role in the ability of firms to maintain access to capital 
after being sued. 
 
2.4.3 Change in Loan Contract Terms after Filing 
2.4.3.1 Summary of Results for Settled SCAs 
Next Hypothesis 3 is tested, namely, that, after the filing of a SCA, firms that had a 
relationship with a lender will receive more favourable loan terms than firms without a 
relationship.  Loan size, maturity, covenants, spread, collateral, syndicate size and 
percentage of loan held by the lead arranger are the seven loan characteristics analysed to 
explore the extent of reputational penalties. 
Table 2.8 summarises the results for those cases that were settled.  Two models were 
estimated for this analysis: (1) a reduced model, which includes the PostFiling dummy 
variable and control variables, and (2) a difference-in-difference (diff-in-diff) model, 
which includes the PostFiling and PreRel dummy variables as well as the interaction term 
(PreRel*PostFiling) and control variables.  The reduced model is similar to the analysis 
conducted by Deng et al. (2014) and Yuan and Zhang (2015) and as such should provide 
similar results to those studies.  The interaction term PreRel*PostFiling in the diff-in-diff 
model is the primary variable of interest and will provide insight as to whether Hypothesis 
3 is supported.  The expected coefficients for the two variables of interest, PostFiling and 
PreRel*PostFiling, are reported in Table 2.8.  The expectation is that sued firms with a 
lending relationship will receive more favourable loan terms after being sued, effectively 
offsetting the reputational penalties being faced by sued firms. 
It is important to note that the results reported in Table 2.8 are estimated on the sample 
of sued firms.  This within sample analysis is relatively restrictive and excludes the 
variation associated with non-sued firms.  As a result, the coefficient for the PreRel 
variable is occasionally inconsistent with the literature.  The main purpose of this analysis 
is to determine the impact of the filing of a class action has on loan terms with respect to a 
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firm’s ex-ante lending relationship.  As such, the inconsistencies between the observed 
PreRel variable and the literature are unlikely to be adversely impacting results.
24
 
When loan spread is the dependent variable, the coefficient for the PostFiling variable 
is positive and significant in both models.  This indicates that after the filing of a class 
action, the average loan spread is greater than the pre-filing period.  This result is 
consistent with expectations as well as prior studies (see Deng et al., 2014; Yuan and 
Zhang, 2015). 
Consistent with expectations the PreRel*PostFiling coefficient is significantly 
negatively related to the spread.  The negative relation indicates that, after the filing of a 
class action, sued firms that had an existing relationship with a lender are significantly 
better off, relative to sued firms without a relationship.  This suggests that any reputational 
damage that occurs as a result of the filing of a class action can be largely offset if the firm 
has a lending relationship.  This result is also consistent with relationship lenders being 
more willing to support firms during periods of distress, such as after the filing of a class 
action, by providing loans with relatively lower yields (see Section 2.2.3). 
The PreRel is insignificant in the diff-in-diff model with loan spread as the dependent 
variable.  This finding is inconsistent with Berger and Udell (1995) and Bharath et al. 
(2011) who find firms that have a relationship with a lender benefit through smaller loan 
spreads.  As previously mentioned this is likely a result of conducting a within sample 
analysis. 
Loan size, has an insignificant coefficient for the PostFiling term in both models.  This 
indicates that the filing of a SCA has no impact on the amount being borrowed relative to 
the pre-filing period. 
On the other hand, the PreRel*PostFiling coefficient is positive and significant when 
loan size is the dependent variable.  This indicates that after the filing sued firms that had a 
relationship with a lender obtain loans that are larger relative to sued firms that did not 
have a relationship.  The PreRel coefficient is also positive and significant indicating that 
firms with a relationship have greater access to loans, which is consistent with Bharath et 
al. (2011).  Taken together, this suggests that sued firms with a relationship have greater 
access to capital.  This finding supports Hypothesis 3 and suggests that sued firms with a 
                                                 
24
 In robustness tests, a control sample is used to help ameliorate these concerns (see Section 2.4.4).  In these 
robustness tests, the PreRel variable is often more consistent with the literature (see Table 2.17). 
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lending relationship appear to be relatively better off than sued firms without a 
relationship. 
The next loan characteristic to be analysed is loan maturity.  Consistent with 
expectations, the PostFiling coefficient is negative and significant in the reduced model.  
However, it is insignificant in the diff-in-diff model.   This result indicates that post-filing 
sued firms obtain loans with shorter maturities, which is consistent with Yuan and Zhang 
(2015). 
The PreRel*PostFiling interaction coefficient is not significantly related to loan 
maturity.  Whereas, the PreRel variable is positive and marginally significant.  This 
finding conflicts with Bharath et al. (2011) who find that firms that have a relationship 
with a lender are more likely to obtain shorter maturity loans.  However, the coefficient for 
the PreRel variable is only marginally significant and as already mentioned, it could be the 
result of conducting a within sample analysis.  The findings suggest that, contrary to 
expectations, having a relationship with a lender has no significant impact on the maturity 
of loans a firm obtains after being sued. 
To examine the collateral requirement characteristic, logit regressions were estimated 
where the dependent variable equals one if the loan required some form of collateral.  
Bharath et al. (2011) find that firms with an existing lender relationship are less likely to 
require collateral.  Contrary to this finding, the PreRel coefficient in the diff-in-diff model 
is insignificant when loan collateral is the dependent variable, which again can be 
attributed the analysis being conducted only on firms that were sued.  In these models, 
neither the PostFiling nor the PreRel*PostFiling variable are significant.  This indicates 
that the filing of a class action does not have an impact on the likelihood of a loan having a 
collateral requirement irrespective of whether the firm had a relationship with a lender. 
A similar result is also observed when the number of covenants is the dependent 
variable.  The PostFiling and the PreRel*PostFiling variables are insignificant in both 
models.  This result suggests that the filing of a SCA does not have an impact on the 
number of covenants imposed on new loans, which is consistent with Yuan and Zhang 
(2015).  The results using collateral and the number of covenants as the dependent variable 
do not support Hypothesis 3. 
Next, the size of the syndicate is examined.  Lee and Mullineaux (2004) find that 
syndicates are smaller when credit risk is relatively high.  As a result of the uncertainty 
associated with the future of sued firms, loans for these firms should be obtained from 
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smaller syndicates post-filing.  However, PostFiling is insignificant in both the reduced 
and the diff-in-diff models.
25
 
A firm can build reputational capital with a lender by borrowing from the same lead 
arranger over time.  As a result of a firm developing a good reputation with a lender, the 
lead arranger may be able to establish larger loan syndicates due to the lower perceived 
risk.  The a priori expectation is that firms with an existing lender relationship are viewed 
as being more trustworthy and the syndicate size is, on average, larger.  Consistent with 
this expectation, the PreRel coefficient is positive and significant when syndicate size is 
the dependent variable.  However, the PreRel*PostFiling variable is insignificant.  This 
finding indicates that the larger syndicate size evident in firms with a relationship is not 
impacted by the filing of a SCA.  The combined effect of these two results (PreRel + 
PreRel*PostFiling) is significant (5%).  In a lending relationship the lender can obtain 
proprietary information about a borrower as a result of repeated interactions.  This 
reduction in information asymmetries will provide the lender with a greater understanding 
of the underlying risks associated with the borrower.  Therefore, a lender providing a loan 
to a borrower that it has a relationship with will serve as a certification of the quality of the 
borrower (see Bosch and Steffen, 2011).  As a result, loan market participants will likely 
view loans provided by relationship lenders to be relatively less risky and form larger 
syndicates.  The evidence of a larger syndicate size for sued firms with a relationship is, 
therefore, likely a result of this certification process.   
The final loan characteristic analysed is the percentage of the loan held by the lead 
arranger.  Lenders will retain a higher percentage of a loan or have more skin in the game 
if a borrower is risky.  Therefore, it is expected that after being sued lenders will be more 
likely to hold a higher percentage of loans.  Consistent with expectations, the PostFiling 
variable is positive and significant in the reduced model but it is insignificant in the diff-in-
diff model.  The PreRel*PostFiling variable is also insignificant in the diff-in-diff model.  
The PreRel variable is negative and marginally significant indicating that if a firm had a 
relationship with a lender then the lender is likely to hold on to a smaller percentage of the 
loan.  However, the overall effect of obtaining a loan post-filing and having a relationship 
with a lender (PreRel + PreRel*PostFiling) is insignificant.  As such, there is little 
evidence to indicate that lenders view sued firms as riskier after the filing of a SCA. 
                                                 
25
 After including a sample of control firms, the post-filing effect for sued firms is found to be negative and 
significant, which is consistent with expectations (see Table 2.17). 
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2.4.3.2 Full Results 
The reputational penalties that firms face after being sued are also related to the merits of 
the case.  Tables 2.9 to 2.15 present three regression models where the dependent variable 
is one of the seven loan characteristics.  Three models are presented in each table.  The 
column labelled “All” refers to all sued and control firms.  The other two models are 
subsamples based on whether the SCA was dismissed or settled.   If the class action was 
settled then the case is more likely to have merit and as such should face more severe 
reputational penalties. 
In reference to Tables 2.9 to 2.15, the PostFiling coefficient in the dismissed models is 
either insignificant or the relationship is not as strong as in the settled model.  In Table 2.9, 
where loan spread is the dependent variable, the PostFiling coefficient is more positive 
when the case was settled than if it was dismissed, for both models.  However, when a firm 
has a relationship with a lender before being sued, the increase in loan spread is largely 
offset when the case is meritorious.  When loan maturity is the dependent variable (see 
Table 2.11) the PostFiling coefficient is insignificant in the dismissed models and 
significant in the settled reduced model. 
Overall, the results support Hypothesis 3 and indicate that sued firms with a 
relationship with a lender are relatively better off.  Sued firms with a relationship have 
greater access to larger loans and the loan spreads that they face are significantly less than 
sued firms without a relationship.  Firms that have a relationship with a lender also have 
significantly larger syndicates, which are not affected by the filing of a SCA.  These results 
indicate that lenders may be more willing to provide more favourable loan terms after a 
firm is sued if they had an existing relationship.  This willingness to help these firms out 
could stem from having a greater understanding of the financial health of these firms 
because they have been lending to them for several years.  Alternatively, lenders may be 
more willing to provide favourable loan terms to try and maintain a relationship with the 
firm in the long run (see Section 2.2.3). 
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2.4.4 Robustness 
So far Hypotheses 2 and 3 have been analysed using a sample of sued firms.  This 
approach raises the potential concern of selection bias.  In an attempt to alleviate this 
concern, a control sample was also selected and the analyses were rerun using a difference-
in-difference-in-difference (diff-in-diff-in-diff) approach.  It should be noted that using this 
approach causes an issue with multicollinearity, however, the results obtained are for the 
most part consistent with the prior findings. 
For this robustness test, a control firm is selected for each sued firm using propensity 
score matching (PSM) method. The matched sample is used to compare sued and non-sued 
firms.  The propensity score is the probability of a class action being filed against a firm 
based on observable characteristics.  The propensity score for each firm-year is estimated 
using the coefficients obtained from equation (2.1). A matched sample of up to ten non-
sued firms is selected for each sued firm.  The matched firms are obtained by selecting the 
non-sued firms with the closest propensity scores to the sued firms within the same 
industry (2-digit SIC).  The control firms are also required to have at least two loan 
originations. One loan must be taken before and one loan must be taken after the 
corresponding matched firm’s class action filing date. 
 
2.4.4.1 Lending Relationship after Filing 
To re-examine Hypothesis 2a and 2b, the following logit model was estimated for all loans 
obtained by sued firms as well as the sample of control firms selected using PSM. 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑢𝑒𝑑 +  𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 +  𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑙
+ 𝛽4𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 𝑆𝑢𝑒𝑑 +  𝛽5𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑙 ∗ 𝑆𝑢𝑒𝑑
+ 𝛽6𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑙 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑙 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 𝑆𝑢𝑒𝑑
+ 𝛴𝛽 · 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 (2.6) 
This is the same setup that was used in equation (2.4).  The key difference is the 
inclusion of the Sued term, which is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm was sued.  
The PostFiling*Sued interaction term is equivalent to the PostFiling term in equation 
(2.4).  It indicates whether the filing of a SCA has an impact on a firm’s relationship with 
its lenders.  Similarly, the PreRel*PostFiling*Sued term is the equivalent of the 
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PreRel*PostFiling term in equation (2.4).  It provides insight into whether the relationship 
with lenders changes after a firm is sued if the firm had a relationship.   
The results from this diff-in-diff-in-diff model can be found in Table 2.16.  In the two 
models reported for the cases that were settled the PostFiling*Sued interaction term is 
negative and statistically significant, which is consistent with the results from the within 
sample analyses (see Table 2.7).  This finding indicates that after being sued, firms that did 
not have an existing relationship with a lender are less likely to be able to establish one.  
When the case is settled, the PreRel*PostFiling*Sued is positive and significant.  This 
result is also consistent with the findings from the within sample analyses and suggests 
that after being sued firms are more likely to continue a relationship with a lender (see 
Section 2.4.2).  Also consistent with the results presented in Table 2.7, the filing of a SCA 
only has an impact on the relationship with a lender when the cases are more meritorious 
in nature.  Overall, Table 2.16 indicates that the original results are robust when using a 
diff-in-diff-in-diff approach with a sample of control firms. 
 
2.4.4.2 Changes in Loan Contract Terms after Filing 
To test the robustness of the results relating to changes to loan contract terms after the 
filing of a SCA, a similar setup to equation (2.6) is used. 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑢𝑒𝑑 +  𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 +  𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑙
+ 𝛽4𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 𝑆𝑢𝑒𝑑 +  𝛽5𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑙 ∗ 𝑆𝑢𝑒𝑑
+ 𝛽6𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑙 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑙 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 𝑆𝑢𝑒𝑑
+ 𝛴𝛽 · 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 (2.7) 
The same seven loan contract characteristics are once again used as the dependent 
variables.  As outlined in the previous section, the key independent variables of interest are 
the interaction terms PreRel*PostFiling and PreRel*PostFiling*Sued. 
Table 2.17 presents a summary of the results for those cases that were settled.
26
  Most 
of the coefficients found are similar to those reported in Table 2.8.  When loan spread is 
the dependent variable the PostFiling*Sued interaction term is positive and significant 
whereas the PreRel*PostFiling*Sued is negative and significant.  These findings are 
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 Full regression results for each of the seven loan characteristics analysed can be found in Appendix A.1 to 
Appendix A.7. 
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consistent with the previously reported findings in Table 2.8 and indicate that firms receive 
relatively smaller spreads after being sued if they had a relationship with the lender. 
The coefficients are mostly insignificant when loan size is the dependent variable, 
compared to the results reported in Table 2.8.  As previously mentioned there is an issue 
with multicollinearity in the diff-in-diff-in-diff setup stemming from the high correlation 
between the various dummy variables and interaction terms.  As such, the insignificant 
coefficients when loan size is the dependent variable could be a result of multicollinearity. 
For the model with loan collateral as the dependent variable the coefficient for the 
PreRel*PostFiling*Sued term is negative and significant.
 27
  This indicates that after being 
sued firms that had a relationship with a lender are less likely to have a collateral 
requirement on new loans.  This finding is consistent with lenders being more willing to 
trust firms accused of misconduct if they had a prior relationship. 
When syndicate size is the dependent variable, the PostFiling*Sued is negative and 
significant whereas the PreRel*PostFiling*Sued is positive and significant.  This indicates 
that after being sued, lenders are more likely to form smaller lending syndicates if they did 
not have a relationship with the borrowing firm.  Syndicates are smaller when firms have 
relatively high credit risk (Lee and Mullineaux, 2004).  As such, the negative coefficient 
for the PostFiling*Sued term suggests that lenders view sued firms as riskier if they did 
not have a relationship with them.  On the other hand, if lenders have an existing 
relationship with a sued firm, they are less likely to form a smaller syndicate.  This is 
indicated by the positive and significant coefficient for the PreRel*PostFiling*Sued 
interaction term.  This finding suggests that lenders are more willing to trust firms that 
they have an existing relationship. 
It should also be noted that the relationship between the various loan characteristics 
and the PreRel variable are consistent with expectations and with those found in the 
literature (e.g. Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger and Udell, 1995; Bharath et al., 2011).  
Overall, the results appear to be robust using a diff-in-diff-in-diff approach. 
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 It should be noted that for this model dividends were dropped from the model as an independent variable.  
This is a result of the model not converging when estimated in Stata, however the model does converge when 
estimated in SAS.  Since it was necessary to adjust the interaction terms for the issues pointed out by Ai and 
Norton (2003) and Karaca-Mandic et al. (2012) it was necessary to estimate the model in Stata. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter examines whether a firm’s relationship with its lenders is adversely impacted 
by the filing of a SCA.  It is found that firms that borrow from a reputable lender are less 
likely to be sued.  This relation does not appear to be a result of reputable lenders 
providing better oversight to ensure that misconduct does not occur.  Rather reputable 
lenders appear to be better at screening prospective borrowers and are therefore less likely 
to lend to firms with high litigation risk.  These findings suggest that reputable lenders are 
more likely to be able to avoid firms that end up committing misconduct but are not more 
capable of stopping its occurrence.  This has implications for loan policies of lenders that 
seek to avoid firms with high litigation risk. 
This chapter also presents evidence that, after being sued, firms that did not have an 
existing relationship with a lender are more likely to borrow from a new lender.  Loans 
initiated after the filing of a SCA are more likely to have larger spreads and shorter in 
maturities.  These findings are consistent with sued firms facing harsher contracting terms 
as a result of the loss of reputation. 
If a firm had a relationship with a lender before the filing, they are more likely to 
continue borrowing from the same lender.  Sued firms with ex-ante lending relationships 
receive more favourable loan terms compared to sued firms without a relationship with a 
lender.  These more lenient loan terms could be a result of lenders having a better 
understanding of the financial health of firms that they had an existing relationship with.  
Alternatively, lenders may provide more favourable terms to sued firms with which they 
have a relationship in an effort to preserve that relationship in the long run. 
Overall, shareholder litigation can have a substantial impact on a firm’s access to 
private debt if a firm does not maintain a relationship with its lenders.  The filing of a class 
action appears to damage a firm’s reputation, which results in harsher loan terms.  
However, reputational damage caused by corporate misconduct can be largely offset by 
having an existing relationship with a lender.  Corporate misconduct, therefore, does not 
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Table 2.1: Variable Definitions 
 
    
Panel (A): Lender Related Variables 
    
  
Variable Definition 
    
  
PreRel Dummy variable equal to one if the firm had borrowed from the same lender more 
than once in the prior five years. Source: Dealscan. 
PreReputable Dummy variable equal to one if the firm had borrowed from a reputable lender in 
the prior three years. Source: Dealscan. 
    
    
Panel (B): Loan Characteristics 
    
    
Loan Spread The natural log of the all-in drawn spread, which is defined as the amount the 
borrower pays in basis points over LIBOR for each dollar drawn down. Source: 
Dealscan. 
Loan Size Natural log of the loan facility amount. Source: Dealscan. 
Loan Maturity Natural log of the number of months to maturity. Source: Dealscan. 
Loan Collateral Dummy variable equal to one if the loan requires collateral. Source: Dealscan. 
Loan Covenants Number of covenants in the loan contract. Source: Dealscan. 
Syndicate Size The number of participants in the loan syndicate. Source: Dealscan.  
Lead Allocation Percentage of the loan held by the lead arranger. Source: Dealscan.  
    
    
Panel (C): Other Variables 
    
    
PostFiling A dummy variable equal to one if the loan deal is established after the filing of a 
class action. 
Sued A dummy variable equal to one if the firm was sued.  Source: Stanford Securities 
Class Action Clearinghouse. 
Size Natural log of the firm's market capitalisation. Source: Compustat. 
Leverage Ratio of total book value of current and long term debt to market capitalisation. 
Source: Compustat. 
ROA Ratio of net income to assets. Source: Compustat. 
Return Annual return on the firm's stock. Source: CRSP. 
B/M Ratio of common equity to market capitalisation. Source: Compustat. 
Tangibles Ratio of the gross plant property and equipment (PPE) to total assets. Source: 
Compustat. 
Dividends Ratio of total ordinary share dividends paid to total assets. Source: Compustat. 
Term Spread The difference between the 10 year treasury yield and the 2 year treasury yield. 
Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors. 
Credit Spread The difference between BAA corporate bond yield and AAA corporate bond yield. 
Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors. 
Ind 48 industry dummy variables in accordance with Fama and French (1997). Source: 
Compustat. 
Year Dummy variables equal to one for a particular year and zero otherwise. 
    
 
 




Table 2.2: Comparison of Sued and Non-Sued Firms 
Table 2.2 reports descriptive statistics for sued and non-sued firm-year observations between 1996 and 2011.  The table includes the mean and number of observations for the 




 percentiles.  The difference between the two samples are calculated as the mean of the sued firms variable less 
the mean of the non-sued firms variable and these are shown in the last column with significance calculated using a paired t-test.  Variables definitions can be found in.Table 
2.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 







            
      Firm Values 
     Market Cap 9,986.47 1,037 2,847.75 36,480 7,138.72*** 
Assets 25,265.85 1,037 4,950.24 36,480 20,315.61*** 
Leverage 0.27 1,037 0.29 36,480 -0.02** 
ROA 0.00 1,037 0.00 36,480 0.00 
Return 0.10 1,037 0.15 36,480 -0.05 
B/M 0.64 1,037 1.64 36,480 -1.00 
Tangibles 0.37 1,037 0.55 36,480 -0.18*** 
Dividends 0.01 1,037 0.01 36,480 0.00* 
 
     
SCA Info 
     Settled 0.58 1,037 
   Days In CP 420.36 1,037 
   Days to File 108.34 1,037 
   Days to Outcome 1,225.85 1,037 
         Bank Loans 
     Reputable Lender (Amount) 0.31 1,037 0.35 36,480 -0.04*** 
Reputable Lender (Number) 0.25 1,037 0.30 36,480 -0.05*** 
Loan Spread 191.26 1,331 165.01 30,486 26.25*** 
Loan Size 922.42 1,605 637.97 36,142 284.45*** 
Loan Maturity 40.13 1,519 47.59 34,269 -7.46*** 
Collateral 0.69 885 0.66 21,497 0.03** 
Number of Covenants 2.28 700 2.35 17,325 -0.07* 
Syndicate Size 11.74 1,605 10.39 36,168 1.35*** 
Lead Allocation 20.65 473 25.41 11,487 -4.76*** 








Table 2.3: Distribution of Class Actions Across Time and Industry 
Table 2.3 reports the number of SCAs filed each year and in each industry for the sample of 448 class actions 
filed during the period of 1996 to 2011 obtained from the Stanford SCA Clearinghouse.  Panel A displays the 
number and percentage of SCAs filed each year.  Panel B reports the frequency of class actions by industry. 
 
        
Panel A: Distribution of Sample across Years 
        
 
   Year 
 
N Percentage 
        
 




















































        
 
   Panel B: Distribution of Class Actions across Industries 
        
 
   Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 0 0.0% 
Mining 13 2.9% 
Construction 10 2.2% 
Manufacturing 164 36.6% 
Transportation 60 13.4% 
Wholesale Trade 24 5.4% 
Retail Trade 34 7.6% 
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 62 13.8% 
Services  80 17.9% 
Public Administration 0 0.0% 
Other 1 0.2% 




        
 




Table 2.4: Correlations 
Table 2.4 shows the matrix of Spearman correlation coefficients for the independent variables that are analysed in equation (2.2).  Correlations are calculated based on the full 
sample of sued and non-sued firms analysed in equation (2.2).  Variance inflation factors (VIFs) are also presented for the independent variables used in equation (2.2).  
Variables definitions can be found in Table 2.1. 
 


































































                        
           
PostFiling 1.00 
         
1.05 
PreRel 0.14 1.00 
         PreReputable (Amount) 0.04 0.12 1.00 
       
1.09 
Size 0.04 0.10 0.90 1.00 
      
2.05 
Leverage 0.04 0.20 0.24 0.21 1.00 
     
1.17 
ROA 0.01 0.00 0.10 0.09 -0.12 1.00 
    
1.18 
Return -0.04 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.20 -0.26 1.00 
   
1.05 
B/M 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.11 0.02 -0.02 1.00 
  
1.03 
Tangibles 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.10 -0.04 0.01 1.00 
 
1.05 
Dividends -0.01 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.25 -0.08 0.20 -0.01 0.16 1.00 1.17 








Table 2.5: Impact of Risk of Class Action on Bank Reputation 
Table 2.5 reports two stage analysis for the effect of litigation risk on the probability of a loan being obtained 
from a reputable lender, using equations (2.1) and (2.2).  The dependent variable in the first stage (Sued) 
takes a value of one if a class action was filed in a particular year and is equal to zero otherwise.  The 
dependent variable in the second stage is equal to one if a loan is obtained from a reputable lender and is 
equal to zero otherwise.  For Reputable (Amount) a lender is deemed to be reputable if the market share 
based on the amount of money lent exceeds 3%.  For Reputable (Number) a lender is deemed to be reputable 
if the market share based on the number of loans provided exceeds 3%.  Robust standard errors clustered at 
the firm level are reported in parentheses.  Variable definitions can be found in Table 2.1. *, **, *** 
Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 
            
 
First Stage Second Stage 
 
          
  
        
 
SCA Dummy Reputable (Amount) Reputable (Number) 
            
      
Predicted P(SCA) 
 
-7.882*** -3.002*** -7.025*** -3.087*** 
  
(0.85) (0.97) (0.86) (0.95) 
 
     Size 0.294*** 0.357*** 0.101*** 0.275*** 0.059*** 
 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
 
     Leverage 0.412*** 0.711*** 0.156* 0.390*** -0.046 
 
(0.16) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) 
 
     ROA -0.123** 0.407*** 0.256* 0.334** 0.182 
 
(0.06) (0.14) (0.15) (0.13) (0.14) 
 
     B/M -0.019* 0.003*** 0.001** 0.002*** 0.000 
 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
     Tangibles -1.398*** -0.322*** -0.246*** -0.261*** -0.192*** 
 
(0.15) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) 
 
     Dividends -2.647* 1.562*** 1.174** 1.625*** 1.248** 
 
(1.57) (0.49) (0.46) (0.51) (0.50) 
 




















    Intercept -5.743*** -1.512*** -8.730*** -1.384*** -7.168*** 
 
(0.29) (0.14) (0.27) (0.13) (0.25) 
 
     Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R
2
 0.02 0.10 0.15 0.06 0.10 
N 46542 22926 21345 22926 21345 
            
  
 




Table 2.6: Impact of Bank Reputation on Probability of Class Action 
Table 2.6 reports logit regression estimates for the effect the reputation of banks have on the probability of a 
firm being sued, using equation (2.3).  The dependent variable in these regressions takes the value of one if a 
class action was filed in a particular year and is equal to zero otherwise.  Robust standard errors clustered at 
the firm level are reported in parentheses.  Variable definitions can be found in Table 2.1. *, **, *** 
Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 
      
 
Dependent Variable: Sued 
      
   










































  Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes 
Pseudo R
2
 0.09 0.09 
N 37,517 37,517 








Table 2.7: Impact of Class Action on Relationship with Bank 
Table 2.7 reports logit regression estimates for the effect the filing of a class action has on whether a loan is 
obtained from a lender that the firm has a relationship with, using equation (2.4).  The dependent variable in 
these regressions takes the value of one if the loan was obtained from a lender that the firm has previously 
borrowed from and is equal to zero otherwise.  Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported 
in parentheses.  Variable definitions can be found in Table 2.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from zero at 
the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 
              
 
Dependent Variable: Relationship with Lender 
       
 
            
 
All Dismissed Settled 
              
       
PostFiling -0.125 -0.572* -0.045 0.683 -0.308** -2.081*** 
 
(0.10) (0.32) (0.15) (0.46) (0.15) (0.55) 
 















     














      Size 0.108*** 0.085*** 0.115** 0.089* 0.104*** 0.073* 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
 
      Leverage -0.092 -0.143 -0.179 -0.217 -0.374 -0.458 
 
(0.25) (0.26) (0.41) (0.41) (0.38) (0.39) 
 
      ROA -0.487 -0.413 0.513 0.846 -0.976 -0.937 
 
(0.36) (0.35) (0.77) (0.78) (0.61) (0.61) 
 
      B/M 0.008 0.010 -0.006 -0.018 0.018 0.016 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
      Tangibles -0.223 -0.222 -0.651** -0.656** 0.046 0.005 
 
(0.19) (0.19) (0.31) (0.31) (0.28) (0.29) 
 
      Dividends 10.211** 9.262** 22.529*** 21.654*** -6.720 -8.291 
 
(4.65) (4.58) (7.79) (7.62) (7.48) (7.58) 
 
      Term Spread -0.933 -0.939 -0.600 -0.653 -1.490** -1.815** 
 
(12.39) (12.39) (8.36) (8.51) (0.73) (0.76) 
       
Credit Spread 7.999 8.105 -0.825 -0.097 32.819** 41.034** 
 
(29.96) (29.97) (20.94) (21.31) (15.52) (16.52) 
 
      Intercept -3.482 -4.077 4.462 2.751 -27.345 -35.148* 
 
(14.65) (14.59) (10.15) (10.13) (18.97) (19.68) 
       
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R
2
 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.10 
N 4,021 4,021 1,899 1,899 2,122 2122 
              
 
 




Table 2.8: Summary of Results When Class Action is Settled 
Table 2.8 presents a summary of the results of the impact a SCA have on loan characteristics.  The dependent variables are one of seven loan characteristics, using equation 
(2.5).  These loan characteristics include loan: spread, size, maturity, collateral, number of covenants, syndicate size and percentage held by the lead arranger. The results 
reported are for the class actions that were settled. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses.  Variable definitions can be found in Table 
2.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 






    
 
          






PostFiling PostFiling PreRel 
Expected  
PreRel*PostFiling PreRel*PostFiling 
                  
         
Loan Spread + 0.302*** 
 












 Loan Size - 0.092 
 












 Loan Maturity - -0.089** 
 












 Loan Collateral + 0.346 
 












 Loan Covenants + -0.007 
 












 Syndicate Size - -0.050 
 












 Lead Allocation + 0.026 
 















Table 2.9: Impact a Relationship with a Bank has on Loan Spread 
Table 2.9 reports OLS regression estimates for the effect the filing of a class action has on loan spread, using 
equation (2.5).  The dependent variable in these regressions is the natural log of the all-in drawn spread.  
Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses.  Variable definitions can be 
found in Table 2.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, 
respectively. 
 




            
       
 
All Dismissed Settled 
              
       
PostFiling 0.209*** 0.369*** 0.132*** -0.014 0.302*** 0.885*** 
 
(0.03) (0.10) (0.04) (0.11) (0.04) (0.16) 
 




























      Size -0.296*** -0.296*** -0.330*** -0.332*** -0.251*** -0.249*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
      Leverage 0.861*** 0.865*** 0.851*** 0.849*** 0.736*** 0.755*** 
 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.12) (0.12) (0.09) (0.09) 
 
      ROA 0.155 0.154 -0.506** -0.479* 0.244*** 0.252*** 
 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.25) (0.25) (0.08) (0.08) 
 
      B/M -0.052*** -0.052*** -0.093*** -0.094*** -0.044*** -0.043*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
      Tangibles -0.245*** -0.244*** -0.052 -0.051 -0.219*** -0.218*** 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06) 
 
      Dividends -5.388*** -5.373*** -3.400** -3.408** -13.630*** -13.603*** 
 
(2.04) (2.04) (1.71) (1.71) (1.44) (1.43) 
 
      Term Spread 0.137 0.155 0.645** 0.626** -0.923** -0.848** 
 
(0.24) (0.24) (0.27) (0.27) (0.45) (0.41) 
 
      Credit Spread 0.604 0.612 1.842** 1.774* -0.589 -1.336 
 
(0.84) (0.84) (0.91) (0.91) (1.60) (1.56) 
 
      Intercept 6.651*** 6.575*** 4.598*** 4.716*** 9.669*** 10.193*** 
 
(1.32) (1.32) (1.46) (1.46) (2.50) (2.48) 
 
      Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.58 0.58 0.60 0.60 0.62 0.62 
N 3,191 3,191 1,452 1,452 1,739 1,739 








Table 2.10: Impact a Relationship with a Bank has on Loan Size 
Table 2.10 reports OLS regression estimates for the effect the filing of a class action has on loan size, using 
equation (2.5).  The dependent variable in these regressions is the natural log of the size of the loan.  Robust 
standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses.  Variable definitions can be found in 
Table 2.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, 
respectively. 
 




            
       
 
All Dismissed Settled 
              
       
PostFiling 0.129*** 0.050 0.076 0.068 0.092 -0.362 
 
(0.05) (0.14) (0.06) (0.19) (0.07) (0.24) 
 




























      Size 0.368*** 0.362*** 0.409*** 0.403*** 0.379*** 0.370*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
      Leverage 0.170 0.164 0.106 0.105 0.268 0.257 
 
(0.12) (0.12) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.17) 
 
      ROA -0.109 -0.099 -0.274 -0.212 -0.139 -0.138 
 
(0.13) (0.13) (0.33) (0.34) (0.15) (0.15) 
 
      B/M 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.069*** 0.063*** 0.064*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
      Tangibles 0.254*** 0.254*** 0.233* 0.235* 0.160 0.150 
 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) 
 
      Dividends 4.273*** 4.198*** 0.383 0.377 13.599*** 13.382*** 
 
(1.35) (1.34) (0.72) (0.72) (3.15) (3.15) 
 
      Term Spread 0.597 0.572 0.026 0.018 2.290*** 2.154*** 
 
(0.37) (0.37) (0.41) (0.41) (0.74) (0.76) 
 
      Credit Spread 1.407 1.402 0.677 0.631 2.084 2.776 
 
(1.39) (1.38) (1.50) (1.50) (2.98) (3.01) 
 
      Intercept 13.721*** 13.622*** 15.541*** 15.467*** 9.178* 8.740* 
 
(2.19) (2.18) (2.39) (2.39) (4.72) (4.67) 
 
      Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.27 0.27 0.36 0.36 0.29 0.30 
N 4,019 4,019 1,898 1,898 2,121 2,121 








Table 2.11: Impact a Relationship with a Bank has on Loan Maturity 
Table 2.11 reports OLS regression estimates for the effect the filing of a class action has on loan maturity, 
using equation (2.5).  The dependent variable in these regressions is the natural log of the number of months 
until maturity of the loan.  Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses.  
Variable definitions can be found in Table 2.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 
percent significance levels, respectively. 
 




            
       
 
All Dismissed Settled 
              
       
PostFiling -0.080*** -0.079 -0.036 -0.011 -0.089** -0.119 
 
(0.03) (0.10) (0.04) (0.12) (0.04) (0.16) 
 




























      Size -0.087*** -0.089*** -0.111*** -0.111*** -0.074*** -0.079*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
      Leverage 0.563*** 0.562*** 0.494*** 0.494*** 0.697*** 0.699*** 
 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) 
 
      ROA 0.377*** 0.378*** 0.694*** 0.695*** 0.327*** 0.329*** 
 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.21) (0.21) (0.09) (0.09) 
 
      B/M -0.008 -0.008 0.007 0.007 -0.008 -0.008 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
      Tangibles -0.020 -0.020 0.020 0.020 -0.031 -0.034 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) 
 
      Dividends -2.275** -2.288** -1.553* -1.552* -3.055 -3.148 
 
(0.89) (0.89) (0.84) (0.84) (1.93) (1.93) 
 
      Term Spread -0.323* -0.328** -0.285 -0.283 -0.134 -0.160 
 
(0.17) (0.17) (0.19) (0.19) (0.32) (0.34) 
 
      Credit Spread -1.562** -1.562** -1.807** -1.803** -2.019* -1.863 
 
(0.62) (0.62) (0.77) (0.77) (1.13) (1.17) 
 
      Intercept 7.057*** 7.012*** 7.571*** 7.546*** 6.558*** 6.378*** 
 
(1.00) (1.00) (1.22) (1.23) (1.81) (1.82) 
 
      Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.22 0.22 0.26 0.26 0.22 0.22 
N 3,792 3,792 1,817 1,817 1,975 1,975 








Table 2.12: Impact a Relationship with a Bank has on Loan Collateral 
Table 2.12 reports logit regression estimates for the effect the filing of a class action has on loan collateral, 
using equation (2.5).  The dependent variable in these regressions takes the value of one if the loan requires 
collateral and is equal to zero otherwise. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in 
parentheses.  Variable definitions can be found in Table 2.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 
10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 




            
       
 
All Dismissed Settled 
              
       
PostFiling 0.160 0.065 0.149 0.178 0.346 0.424 
 
(0.14) (0.57) (0.22) (0.84) (0.21) (1.29) 
 




























      Size -0.888*** -0.892*** -0.895** -0.926*** -0.926*** -0.918*** 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) 
 
      Leverage 3.293*** 3.287*** 2.528*** 2.494*** 4.312*** 4.335*** 
 
(0.40) (0.40) (0.61) (0.61) (0.66) (0.66) 
 
      ROA -0.570 -0.576 0.586 0.364 -0.701 -0.756 
 
(0.82) (0.82) (1.38) (1.40) (1.20) (1.21) 
 
      B/M -0.100** -0.099** 0.032 -0.008 -0.129** -0.134** 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.12) (0.12) (0.05) (0.06) 
 
      Tangibles -0.592** -0.598** 0.675 0.655 -1.223*** -1.226*** 
 
(0.29) (0.29) (0.46) (0.47) (0.43) (0.43) 
 
      Dividends -34.415*** -34.197*** -35.514*** -32.092*** -60.794*** -60.238*** 
 
(7.18) (7.16) (9.53) (9.78) (14.08) (14.09) 
 
      Term Spread -0.344 -0.353 0.475 0.611 -8.210 -8.253 
 
(0.99) (0.99) (1.23) (1.25) (122.08) (122.87) 
 
      Credit Spread -2.214 -2.284 -3.346 -2.993 15.281 14.985 
 
(3.78) (3.79) (4.78) (4.81) (290.01) (291.88) 
 
      Intercept 10.545 10.534 9.474 7.929 11.372 11.995 
 
(26.86) (26.84) (24.73) (24.47) (29.99) (30.04) 
 
      Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R
2
 0.38 0.38 0.41 0.42 0.44 0.44 
N 2,156 2,156 961 961 1,195 1,195 








Table 2.13: Impact a Relationship with a Bank has on Loan Covenants 
Table 2.13 reports poisson regression estimates for the effect the filing of a class action has on loan 
covenants, using equation (2.5).  The dependent variable in these regressions is the number of covenants in 
the loan contract.  Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses.  Variable 
definitions can be found in Table 2.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent 
significance levels, respectively. 
 
              
 
Number of Covenants 
 
            
       
 
All Dismissed Settled 
              
       
PostFiling -0.009 -0.025 -0.036 0.053 -0.007 -0.188 
 
(0.04) (0.14) (0.06) (0.18) (0.05) (0.26) 
 




























      Size -0.121*** -0.124*** -0.138*** -0.140*** -0.096*** -0.098*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
      Leverage 0.203** 0.200** 0.129 0.124 0.294** 0.284** 
 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.16) (0.16) (0.14) (0.14) 
 
      ROA 0.009* 0.004* -0.026 -0.031 0.020 0.013 
 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.29) (0.30) (0.10) (0.10) 
 
      B/M -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.046 -0.045 -0.044** -0.044** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
      Tangibles -0.176*** -0.178*** -0.087 -0.081 -0.201** -0.207** 
 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) 
 
      Dividends -1.478 -1.469 -0.957 -0.934 -5.274* -5.265* 
 
(1.04) (1.04) (1.07) (1.07) (3.14) (3.15) 
 
      Term Spread 0.314 0.317 0.422 0.460 0.296 0.279 
 
(0.32) (0.32) (0.40) (0.40) (0.60) (0.60) 
 
      Credit Spread -0.032 -0.010 -0.234 -0.196 1.272 1.534 
 
(1.28) (1.28) (1.52) (1.52) (2.63) (2.64) 
 
      Intercept 1.007 0.941 1.149 0.922 -0.756 -0.963 
 
(1.98) (1.98) (2.34) (2.34) (4.06) (4.06) 
 
      Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R
2
 0.39 0.39 0.52 0.53 0.36 0.37 
N 1,714 1,714 767 767 947 947 
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Table 2.14: Impact a Relationship with a Bank has on Syndicate Size 
Table 2.14 reports negative binomial regression estimates for the effect the filing of a class action has on 
syndicate size, using equation (2.5).  The dependent variable in these regressions is the number of 
participants in the loan syndicate.  Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in 
parentheses.  Variable definitions can be found in Table 2.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 
10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 




            
       
 
All Dismissed Settled 
              
       
PostFiling 0.009 -0.131 0.095 -0.022 -0.050 -0.229 
 
(0.03) (0.14) (0.05) (0.19) (0.05) (0.21) 
 




























      Size 0.191*** 0.187*** 0.184*** 0.181*** 0.200*** 0.195*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
      Leverage 0.108* 0.105* -0.110 -0.110 0.189 0.187 
 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) 
 
      ROA -0.202** -0.199** -0.028 -0.009 -0.225* -0.224* 
 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.29) (0.29) (0.12) (0.12) 
 
      B/M 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.006 0.005 0.020*** 0.020*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
      Tangibles 0.163** 0.162** 0.000 -0.001 0.130 0.128 
 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.11) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) 
 
      Dividends 0.901 0.816 0.534 0.525 1.095 0.822 
 
(0.83) (0.82) (0.88) (0.87) (2.04) (2.04) 
 
      Term Spread 0.538** 0.522** 0.521* 0.506 1.020** 0.973* 
 
(0.26) (0.26) (0.31) (0.31) (0.51) (0.52) 
 
      Credit Spread 2.157** 2.155** 2.925** 2.890** -0.146 0.117 
 
(1.03) (1.03) (1.20) (1.20) (1.91) (1.92) 
 
      Intercept -3.080* -3.112* -3.905** -3.845** -1.504 -1.730 
 
(1.61) (1.61) (1.89) (1.90) (2.88) (2.88) 
 
      Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R
2
 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.16 0.17 
N 4,021 4,021 1,899 1,899 2,122 2,122 









Table 2.15: Impact a Relationship with a Bank has on Lead Allocation 
Table 2.15 reports Tobit regression estimates for the effect the filing of a class action has on lead allocation, 
using equation (2.5).  The dependent variable in these regressions is the percentage of the loan retained by 
the lead arranger.  Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses.  Variable 
definitions can be found in Table 2.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent 
significance levels, respectively. 
 




            
       
 
All Dismissed Settled 
              
       
PostFiling 0.026* 0.020 0.030* 0.147 0.026 -0.088 
 
(0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.10) (0.02) (0.12) 
 




























      Size -0.053*** -0.053*** -0.060*** -0.059*** -0.047*** -0.047*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
      Leverage 0.121*** 0.122*** 0.176** 0.171** 0.125* 0.122* 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
 
      ROA 0.032 0.030 -0.118 -0.124 0.074 0.074 
 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.11) (0.11) (0.06) (0.06) 
 
      B/M -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.015 -0.014 -0.010*** -0.010*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
      Tangibles -0.066** -0.067** -0.005 -0.002 -0.012 -0.008 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) 
 
      Dividends -0.453 -0.454 -0.226 -0.240 0.747 0.636 
 
(0.37) (0.37) (0.45) (0.45) (1.08) (1.08) 
 
      Term Spread -0.069 -0.068 -0.038 -0.034 -0.391** -0.422** 
 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.14) (0.14) (0.18) (0.19) 
 
      Credit Spread -0.384 -0.380 -0.463 -0.408 -0.981 -0.906 
 
(0.48) (0.48) (0.62) (0.62) (0.79) (0.79) 
 
      Intercept 1.269* 1.277* 1.249 1.147 2.620** 2.648** 
 
(0.75) (0.75) (0.96) (0.97) (1.19) (1.19) 
 
      Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R
2
 0.22 0.22 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.31 
N 1,116 1,116 510 510 606 606 









Table 2.16: Impact of Class Action on Relationship with Lender – Diff-in-Diff-in-Diff 
Table 2.16 reports logit regression estimates for the effect the filing of a class action has on whether a loan is 
obtained from a lender that the firm has a relationship with, using equation (2.6).  The dependent variable in 
these regressions takes the value of one if the loan was obtained from a lender that the firm has previously 
borrowed from and is equal to zero otherwise.  Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported 
in parentheses.  Variable definitions can be found in Table 2.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from zero at 
the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 
              
 
Dependent Variable: Relationship with Lender 
       
 
            
 
All Dismissed Settled 
              
       
Sued 0.044 -0.135 -0.126 -0.624** 0.196** 0.266 
 
(0.06) (0.17) (0.09) (0.26) (0.09) (0.24) 
       
PostFiling 0.034 -0.429*** -0.010 -0.255* 0.077 -0.557*** 
 
(0.03) (0.10) (0.05) (0.15) (0.05) (0.14) 
 














      PostFiling * Sued -0.027* -0.031** -0.020 -0.021 -0.034** -0.044** 
 
(0.09) (0.01) (0.13) (0.02) (0.13) (0.02) 
 















     















     














      Size 0.138*** 0.114*** 0.141*** 0.113*** 0.140*** 0.119*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
      Leverage 0.177** 0.141* 0.463*** 0.428*** -0.033 -0.064 
 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.13) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) 
 
      ROA 0.518*** 0.575*** 0.930*** 1.004*** 0.356** 0.406** 
 
(0.15) (0.15) (0.27) (0.27) (0.18) (0.18) 
 
      B/M 0.003* 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.002 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
      Tangibles -0.220*** -0.217*** -0.134 -0.127 -0.286*** -0.293*** 
 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) 
 
      Dividends 11.208*** 10.578*** 11.649*** 11.076*** 10.662*** 10.061*** 
 
(1.30) (1.30) (1.88) (1.88) (1.81) (1.80) 
 
      Term Spread 0.857*** 0.885*** 1.137*** 1.157*** 0.091 0.066 
 
(0.20) (0.20) (0.26) (0.26) (3.59) (3.59) 
 
      Credit Spread -8.017*** -8.279*** -10.785*** -11.161*** -2.927 -2.232 
 
(2.51) (2.53) (3.19) (3.20) (9.43) (9.46) 
 
      Intercept 7.618*** 7.615*** 9.562*** 9.618*** 4.245 3.443 
 
(2.92) (2.93) (2.83) (2.84) (8.89) (8.91) 
 
      Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.05 
N 33,444 33,444 16,100 16,100 17,344 17,344 
              
 
 




Table 2.17: Summary of Results When Class Action is Settled – Diff-in-Diff-in-Diff 
Table 2.17 presents a summary of the results of the impact a SCA have on loan characteristics.  The dependent variables are one of seven loan characteristics, using equation 
(2.7).  These loan characteristics include loan: spread, size, maturity, collateral, number of covenants, syndicate size and percentage held by the lead arranger. The results 
reported are for the class actions that were settled.  Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses.  Variable definitions can be found in Table 
2.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 
                    
Dependent Variable 





Sued PreRel*Sued PreRel*PostFiling 
Expected  PreRel 
* PostFiling * 
Sued 
PreRel * Post-
Filing * Sued 
 (A) (B) (C) 
 
(D)  (E)  (F)  
 
(G)  
  0                 
          
Loan Spread -0.078 -0.054 -0.127*** + 0.727*** 0.226*** 0.079* - -0.588*** 
 
(0.08) (0.04) (0.03) 
 




   
 
   
 
 Loan Size -0.009 -0.123 -0.026 - -0.200 -0.154 0.157** + 0.302 
 
(0.11) (0.08) (0.04) 
 




   
 
   
 
 Loan Maturity -0.107 -0.121** -0.044 - -0.009 0.187** 0.144*** + -0.080 
 
(0.08) (0.05) (0.03) 
 




   
 
   
 
 Loan Collateral -0.026 -0.433* -0.352** + 0.057 -0.128 0.049 - -0.291** 
 
(0.94) (0.05) (0.01) 
 




   
 
   
 
 Loan Covenants 0.007 -0.045 0.000 + -0.060 0.053 0.047 - 0.006 
 
(0.94) (0.42) (1.00) 
 




   
 
   
 
 Syndicate Size 0.078 0.137*** 0.082** - -0.591*** -0.005 -0.117** + 0.448** 
 
(0.37) (0.01) (0.01) 
 




   
 
   
 
 Lead Allocation -0.099** 0.004 -0.076*** + 0.117 0.073* -0.012 - -0.038 
 
(0.02) (0.87) (0.00) 
 
(0.26) (0.09) (0.65) 
 
(0.71) 









Chapter 3  
 




Corporations play an important role in the political process through lobbying.  Firms that 
lobby extensively can gain access and influence the policy-making process, giving them 
additional and, some may argue, undue power.  Further, this influence is likely to extend 
well beyond the political landscape.  Economic agents may be unwilling to oppose these 
powerful firms for fear of repercussions (i.e.  coercive power) or as a result of their ‘soft 
power’ which alters the preferences of economic agents in the interest of the firm through 
appeal and attraction.
28
  This chapter examines whether tacit power, be it coercive or soft 
in nature, signalled by lobbying is related to the time it takes to uncover violation of 
securities laws before and after the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). 
Various economic agents are responsible for revealing corporate misconduct.  Fraud-
detecting agents include analysts, auditors and employees (Dyck et al., 2010).  These 
agents face retaliatory consequences if they try to reveal illegal corporate activities or may 
be swayed by soft power into believing these powerful lobbying firms are unlikely to 
commit fraud.  A good example of both tacit coercive and tacit soft power is Enron, which 
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 The concept of soft power has been used in the international relations literature (Nye, 1990) for some time, 
but a derivative of it has recently been used in the corporate finance context by Khanna et al. (2015), who 
discuss the ‘soft influence’ of CEOs and its role in facilitating fraud. 
 




spent millions on lobbying and was a very politically influential company.  Soft power 
may have led analysts and auditors to be less suspicious about Enron’s activities since 
prior to its fall from grace, it was seen as a leading innovator, as exemplified by six 
consecutive awards between 1996 and 2001 from Forbes as the ‘Most Innovative 
Company in America’.  Furthermore, consistent with the notion of soft power, Enron 
experienced very little negativity before declaring bankruptcy.  One exception that also 
serves an example of coercive tacit power is the case of John Olson, an outspoken Merrill 
Lynch analyst.  Olson was critical of Enron and was replaced after giving Enron a 
“neutral” rating.  Olson’s replacement upgraded the Enron rating in an alleged effort to 
win more investment banking business (Oppel, 2002).  While Enron did not directly 
influence the decision to replace John Olson, his dismissal was allegedly made to appease 
manager dissatisfaction.  The Enron case characterises how high tacit power, as reflected 
in lobbying activity, can influence economic agents’ behaviour.  Economic agents will not 
be as willing or as likely to voluntarily investigate potential corrupt corporate activities in 
firms with high tacit power, thereby perpetuating managerial misconduct. 
The expectation that corporate fraud and lobbying are positively associated is 
confirmed in a study by Yu and Yu (2011).  They find that lobbying firms commit fraud 
for 117 days longer.  The association found by Yu and Yu (2011) between lobbying and 
the length of the class period has gained considerable traction in the financial press (The 
Economist, 2015) and popular business books (Drutman, 2015).  Yet it is unclear whether 
this relationship still holds following efforts to clean up corporate America after a host of 
corporate scandals around the turn of the century.
29
  Most prominently, SOX was enacted 
in response to these high-profile cases of fraud and misconduct that came to light during 
2001 and 2002.  The bill was produced to combat fraud by improving accountability and 
overall accounting quality.  SOX also likely impacts the amount of tacit power held by 
lobbying firms.  SOX introduced severe penalties to top executives if evidence of 
fraudulent activity is discovered.  By design, these penalties make managers more 
accountable, reducing the incentive to commit fraud as well as curbing unethical 
managerial behaviour.  SOX also improved the incentives and ability for auditors, 
employees and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to reveal corporate 
misconduct.  These changes encourage agents to reveal evidence of corrupt corporate 
activities within firms generally but their effect is likely more pronounced in the cases of 
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 The most notable of these scandals were the discovery of the fraud committed by Enron and WorldCom. 
 




firms with high tacit power (i.e. the measures mitigated the tacit power of lobbying firms 
in particular). 
This chapter examines whether lobbying is related to the time it takes to uncover 
managerial misconduct before and after the implementation of SOX.  First, the length of 
the period investors claim the alleged misconduct took place is analysed.  Second, this 
chapter investigates the impact of lobbying on the probability of a case being settled for 
the pre- and post-SOX periods.  Finally, the extent of the damages caused by the 
managerial malfeasance is examined in relation to the firms’ lobbying activities by looking 
at the losses investors accrued and the size of the settlement both before and after SOX. 
To summarise, this chapter addresses the following research questions: 
1) Are firms that lobby able to get away with their misconduct for longer? 
2) Are firms that lobby more likely to settle a SCA? 
3) Do lobbying firms that are sued cause more damage and face greater 
reputational penalties? 
In doing so, it extends the study by Yu and Yu (2011) that analyses whether lobbying 
affects the time it takes to detect fraud for a sample period from 1998 to 2004.  This 
chapter makes several contributions to the existing literature.  First, it shows that after 
2004, lobbying firms are not able to get away with their misconduct for longer.  Second, it 
helps to explain Yu and Yu’s (2011) findings by clearly articulating reasons as to why 
lobbying firms were able to evade detection for longer before 2004.  Third, it analyses the 
impact of political connections on the probability of a settlement and the damages that 
managers subject to SCAs have caused.  Finally, this study provides insight into the impact 
SOX has had on the discovery of corporate misconduct.  The empirical analysis indicates 
that SOX has had a positive impact on uncovering misconduct for firms that lobby. 
A summary of the empirical results are as follows.  Up to 2004, lobbying is positively 
related to class period length and has a marginally negative effect on the probability of a 
case being settled.  These results are consistent with managers of lobbying firms being able 
to get away with their misconduct for longer and being less likely to have to settle a class 
action filed against them.  The most likely reason for these findings is the tacit power 
wielded by the lobbying firms, making economic agents unwilling to speak out against 
them.  As a result, it is more difficult to detect and obtain proof that managers have 
violated securities laws. 
 




From 2005 onwards, no evidence is found to suggest that lobbying is related to the 
length of the class period or the probability of the class action being settled.  This is most 
probably due to the enactment of SOX.  As a result of the new regulatory controls, the tacit 
power of lobbying firms has decreased, thereby improving the incentives for economic 
agents to reveal corporate misconduct. 
Overall, the results suggest that prior to SOX, lobbying firms held a substantial amount 
of tacit power that hindered the process through which managerial misconduct is revealed.  
SOX appears to have reduced the tacit power of lobbying firms and improved the 
incentives for economic agents to reveal corporate misconduct.  As such, SOX appears to 
have improved the discovery of corporate malfeasance, making it more difficult for 
powerful firms to get away with breaking the law. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows.  Section 3.2 provides an 
overview of the existing literature and develops three hypotheses for this chapter.  Section 
3.3 provides an overview of the method and data employed.  Section 3.4 presents and 
discusses the empirical results.  Section 3.5 contains the concluding remarks. 
 
3.2 Hypothesis Development 
Various economic agents can uncover corporate misconduct.  Dyck et al. (2010) perform 
an in-depth analysis of the different incentives and potential conflicts that these agents 
face.  The agents identified by Dyck et al. (2010) include analysts, the media, employees, 
auditors and the SEC. 
Lobbying is typically targeted at government entities or politicians.  It is unlikely to 
directly impact any of the fraud-detecting agents identified by Dyck et al. (2010), with the 
possible exception of the SEC.  The literature suggests that politically connected firms 
may be able to influence political decisions (see Duchin and Sosyura, 2012; Goldman et 
al., 2013; Blau et al., 2013) and in so doing wield a substantial amount of tacit power.  The 
influence and power imbalance between politically connected firms and fraud-detecting 
agents discourages action that opposes these firms for fear of potential repercussions.  
Each of the key agents identified by Dyck et al. (2010) faces substantial disincentives 
against revealing corporate misconduct.  The repercussions are likely to be worse for more 
influential firms. 
 




Analysts and journalists face the threat of job loss if their accusations of corporate 
misconduct conflict with their employers.  Analysts may be less likely to bring misconduct 
to light if it interferes with the investment banking services offered by the analyst’s 
company (Michaely and Womack, 1999).  For example, John Olson, who was an analyst 
of Enron, said, “There was a strong mandate, unwritten, unspoken, at Enron that if you the 
investment banking house ever wanted to do business with Enron, your analyst had to have 
a strong buy on the stock” (Schwartz, 2002).  Analysts’ incentives to reveal misconduct 
may also be affected by their tendency to herd.  In effect, analysts “share the blame” facing 
lower penalties if they are not the only one making an incorrect recommendation 
(Scharfstein and Stein, 1990). 
Journalists may face similar pressure to not reveal misconduct for fear that it could 
alienate potential or actual advertisers.  For example, Enron tried to influence the media 
before a negative article was published about them.  Enron put a substantial amount of 
pressure on the editors of Fortune by flying three executives to New York in an effort to 
convince them not to publish the critical article (Barringer, 2002).  These instances 
highlight how analysts and journalists can face significant pressures when attempting to 
reveal corporate misconduct. 
Dyck et al. (2010) find that the most successful analysts and journalists that are 
employed by the more prestigious media outlets are more likely to be whistle-blowers.  It 
seems that only the most powerful and successful members of the media or analysts bring 
misconduct to light.  This suggests that the potential repercussions faced by most analysts 
and journalists outweigh the incentives to blow the whistle.  This would also suggest that 
the more powerful a firm is, the greater the disincentives to reveal corporate misconduct.  
Since lobbying firms are more likely to wield greater tacit power, analysts and journalists 
may be less willing to accuse lobbying firms of wrongdoing for fear of more severe 
repercussions. 
Employee whistle-blowers also face significant repercussions after they reveal 
corporate misconduct.  Dyck et al. (2010) find that the majority of employee whistle-
blowers subsequently lost their jobs, and many faced harassment which forced them to 
move industry and often move to another town.  As such, employee whistle-blowers face 
severe penalties for revealing misconduct.  The harassment that employee whistle-blowers 
face is likely to be greater for larger and more powerful firms because the accusation of 
misconduct is likely to adversely affect more people.  Typically, lobbying firms are very 
 




large, and as such the harassment faced by employee whistle-blowers is likely to be more 
substantial. 
Auditors should play an important role in the revelation of fraud because of their access 
to internal and external information.  However, they may be hesitant to reveal evidence of 
fraudulent activities for fear of losing business.  This fear is likely to be worse for lobbying 
firms, since they are typically larger in size and account for a substantial amount of 
business.  Before the implementation of SOX, the firm’s management typically appointed 
auditors as opposed to an independent audit committee.  Auditors, therefore, lacked 
independence and may have been friendlier to maintain loyalty with the firm’s 
management. 
The SEC is one of the few fraud-detecting agents identified by Dyck et al. (2010) that 
could be directly affected by lobbying activities.  Consistent with lobbying being able to 
influence the SEC, Correia (2014) finds that politically connected firms face fewer SEC 
enforcement actions and lower penalties.  They also report lower potential enforcement 
costs when lobbyists have an SEC employment history and the SEC is lobbied directly.  
Similarly, Fulmer et al. (2012) find that CEOs receive less severe penalties from the SEC 
if they make political contributions.  These results suggest that lobbying may negatively 
impact the effectiveness of the SEC as a regulatory entity. 
Overall, agents that blow the whistle on corporate misconduct face severe 
disincentives, which are likely to be worse for politically influential companies.  
Alternatively, agents may be unwilling to reveal misconduct as a result of lobbying firms’ 
soft power.  Soft power alters the preferences of economic agents in the interest of the firm 
through appeal and attraction.  As a result, lobbying firms may be able to get away with 
their misconduct for longer because the fraud-detecting agents are less willing to bring 
misconduct to light.  Consistent with this expectation, Yu and Yu (2011) find that 
fraudulent firms that lobby evade detection for 117 days longer than non-lobbying firms.  
This leads to Hypothesis 1a. 
Hypothesis 1a: Lobbying allows firms to conceal their misconduct longer before SOX. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was the legislative response to the numerous high-
profile cases of fraud and misconduct that came to light in late 2001 and early 2002.  The 
bill was aimed at improving overall accounting quality and accountability.  SOX 
introduced numerous requirements targeted at disincentivising fraud, and these 
 




requirements have likely impacted the tacit power of all firms but in particular the tacit 
power of firms with the most influence, namely lobbying firms. 
Under the new SOX requirements, the CEO and CFO must certify all financial 
statements.  The submission of inaccurate financial statements puts the CEO and CFO at 
risk of significant criminal penalties.
30
  Along with these criminal penalties, the top 
executive could also face other fiscal penalties arising from a SCA.  The greater 
accountability has given managers stronger incentives to be mindful of misconduct, 
ensuring it does not occur. 
The greater criminal penalties for top executives make them more vulnerable.  As a 
consequence, the tacit power exercised by executives is likely to be reduced post-SOX.  
The loss of power is likely to be more substantial for lobbying firms.  The potential 
consequences of whistleblowing may also have been reduced substantially, which creates 
incentives for economic agents to uncover and reveal corporate misconduct. 
SOX also enhanced the role of auditors, making them a more important agent in the 
discovery of misconduct.  As a result, auditors face an increased workload due to the new 
disclosure requirements associated with SOX, and this has resulted in an increase in audit 
fees from 74% to 86% (Raghunandan and Rama, 2006).  Griffin and Lont (2007) show 
that there has been an increase in audit risk post-SOX that can be attributed to an increase 
in the liability auditors face if financial fraud is uncovered.  Auditors now have a greater 
incentive to reveal fraudulent activity because of the increased exposure to liability.  The 
collapse of Arthur Andersen, following the Enron scandal, also served as a cautionary 
example and created incentives for auditors to bring misconduct to light.  Consistent with 
this expectation, Dyck et al. (2010) find that auditors are significantly more likely to detect 
fraud post-SOX.  Post-SOX auditors detect misconduct for 23.7% of cases and pre-SOX 
they account for 6.1% of cases.  The liability auditor’s face will be more substantial for 
very large firms, such as lobbying firms. 
SOX also provided protection for employee whistle-blowers.  The provisions require 
the establishment of a confidential anonymous submission process for concerns about 
questionable accounting or auditing issues.  The provisions also protect employees from 
being fired or other retaliatory actions by firms.  These changes have also improved the 
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 If the company mistakenly submits inaccurate financial statements, then the CEO and CFO could be 
subject to a fine of up to $1 million and 10 years in prison. If the company purposely submits inaccurate 
financial statements, then the penalties could be a fine of up to $5 million and 20 years in prison.  
 




incentives for employees to reveal corporate misconduct.  The retaliation and harassment 
that employee whistle-blowers face are likely to be more substantial if the company is 
large and powerful, such as lobbying firms.  As a result, employees who blow the whistle 
on lobbying firms are more likely to face a severe backlash.  Dyck et al. (2010) find that 
many employee whistle-blowers have been forced to move because of the personal 
harassment they faced.  The employee protections mandated by SOX help employee 
whistle-blowers feel safer and more willing to speak out against powerful lobbying 
companies. 
Finally, the SEC likely plays a larger role as a detector of misconduct post-SOX.  SOX 
provided additional funding to the SEC and required more frequent reviews of financial 
statements to be conducted.  The SEC is expected to be more likely to go after lobbying 
firm’s post-SOX because any political protection that may have existed prior to SOX has 
been diminished.  Cox and Thomas (2006) observe that the SEC is targeting larger firms 
post-SOX.  Since lobbying firms are typically larger in size, they are included in the group 
of firms that face greater scrutiny from the SEC. 
Theory suggests that mandatory disclosures are useful in combatting fraudulent 
activities and improving confidence in the market (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1984; 
Mahoney, 1995).  As such, the greater disclosure requirements imposed by SOX should be 
useful in combatting fraud.  Furthermore, better disclosures also make it more difficult for 
a firm to influence a court or judge compared to when there are no specific disclosure 
requirements (Shleifer, 2005).  As a result, better connected and more powerful firms may 
find it more difficult to influence the course of justice after the implementation of 
regulations requiring stricter disclosures, such as SOX. 
Overall, it is likely that SOX has had an impact on the detection of misconduct.  
Executives of lobbying firms are likely to hold less tacit power as a result, which means 
that economic agents are more willing to speak up about corporate misconduct.  SOX has 
also improved the incentives for auditors, employees and the SEC to bring managerial 
misconduct to light, particularly against lobbying firms.  Consequently, lobbying firms 
should be less likely to get away with their misconduct for longer after the enactment of 
SOX.  This expectation leads to Hypothesis 1b. 
Hypothesis 1b: Lobbying firm’s ability to conceal their misconduct declines after 
SOX. 
 




There are two primary outcomes to a SCA: (1) dismissed in favour of the firm or (2) an 
out-of-court settlement.  Very few cases ever go to trial.  In a SCA, the onus is on the 
plaintiff to prove that any managerial wrongdoing has actually occurred.  To receive a 
settlement payout, investors need to prove that managers have actually violated securities 
laws. 
Pre-SOX economic agents will be less willing to blow the whistle on firms because of 
the risk of potential backlash due to the tacit power that lobbying firms wield.  The fear of 
repercussions may also make it more difficult to collect evidence proving that managers 
have violated securities laws.  This could mean that parties are less willing to assist 
investors in their lawsuit by not testifying or providing documentation of managerial 
wrongdoing.  Consequently, investors may find it more difficult to win a class action 
against a firm that lobbies pre-SOX.  This leads to Hypothesis 2a. 
Hypothesis 2a: Lobbying firms are less likely to settle class actions before SOX. 
As noted earlier, SOX has made top executives more vulnerable to severe penalties if 
they do commit corporate misconduct.  The tacit power exercised by managers has been 
reduced since the implementation of SOX.  In the same vein, the fear of repercussions has 
also lessened, making people more willing to help investors by providing evidence of 
managerial wrongdoing.  The greater protection post-SOX for employee whistle-blowers 
suggests that employees are more willing to assist investors in their class actions.  These 
changes mean that it would be easier for investors to gather evidence to prove that 
corporate misconduct has occurred and managers of lobbying firms will be more likely to 
settle a SCA during the post-SOX period, relative to the pre-SOX period.  This expectation 
leads to Hypothesis 2b. 
Hypothesis 2b: Lobbying firms are more likely to settle class actions after SOX. 
It is important to note that not all SCAs are meritorious.  Numerous class actions are 
frivolous in nature where the plaintiffs attempt to regain losses unrelated to illegal 
activities.  Firms may settle frivolous or nuisance class actions to avoid potential negative 
publicity or the costs of litigation.  Since directors’ and officers’ (D&O) insurance 
generally covers these settlements, settling can be an attractive way of getting rid of a 
frivolous case.  Therefore, settled cases can either be meritorious or frivolous in nature. 
 




Hypothesis 1a predicts that pre-SOX managers of lobbying firms are able to evade 
detection for longer.  The longer detection time gives delinquent managers more 
opportunities to commit misconduct, destroying investors’ wealth.  Pre-SOX lobbying 
firms have more time for impropriety, accrue greater losses to the firm and therefore 
should face harsher penalties. 
Prior research has found that the size of the settlement is related to the provable loss 
and the length of the period the misconduct occurred, both of which can be seen as a 
measure of the extent or complexity of the violation (Karpoff et al., 2007; Cox and 
Thomas, 2006).  This result indicates that the greater the damage due to manager 
misconduct, the more severe the penalties are in terms of the settlement size.  Lobbying 
firms are expected to accrue greater losses as a result of being able to evade detection for 
longer.  Therefore, they should end up having to pay larger settlements when they are 
sued.  This leads to Hypothesis 3a. 
Hypothesis 3a: Lobbying firms cause more damage and face a larger settlement before 
SOX. 
Post-SOX, it is expected that lobbying firms will not be able to evade detection for 
longer, nor will they have the same opportunities to destroy investor wealth as they did in 
the pre-SOX period.  Based on these expectations, the losses accrued and the settlement 
amount should be similar in size for lobbying and non-lobbying firms post-SOX.  This 
expectation leads to Hypothesis 3b. 
Hypothesis 3b: Lobbying firms cause less damage and face smaller settlements after 
SOX. 
On the whole, evidence consistent with Hypothesis 1a would confirm Yu and Yu 
(2011) and evidence consistent with Hypothesis 1b would confirm evidence provided by 
Dyck et al. (2010) that auditors are more aggressive post-SOX and whistle-blowers are 
more motivated by rewards and less intimidated by executives post-SOX.  Findings in 
support of Hypotheses 2a and 3a would also confirm Yu and Yu (2011) and the main 
contribution comes from Hypotheses 2b and 3b.  In particular, after SOX, this chapter 
examines whether lobbying firms are more likely to settle class action suits filed against 
them and whether both the detected damages and settlement awards are likely to be 
smaller. 
 






3.3.1 Length of the Class Period 
Hypotheses 1a and 1b predict lobbying firms will be able to evade detection for longer in 
the pre-SOX period but not in the post-SOX period.  A firm’s ability to evade detection is 
measured by the length of the class period.  The class period is defined as the length of 
time the alleged misconduct occurred over, which is specified by the investors in the SCA.  
While this is an imperfect measure, it gives a good indication of the length of time 
managers were able to avoid detection.
31
  
Equation (3.1) is estimated to determine if the class period is longer for firms that 
lobby. 
 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑛𝐶𝑃 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑏𝑏𝑦 + 𝛴𝛽 · 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀 (3.1) 




In this analysis, Lobby represents one of two measures for the extent of lobbying a firm 
conducts.  The first measure is a dichotomous variable taking a value of one if the firm has 
undertaken lobbying at any point in time during the two years prior to the filing year and 
zero otherwise.  The second lobbying measure is the log of the total dollar value of 
lobbying expenses undertaken in the two years prior to the filing year.
33
  These two 
measures of lobbying will be used throughout the analysis.  There are two reasons for 
using this two-year period.  First, two years should be an adequate amount of time for a 
political relationship to have been developed.  Second, the length from the beginning of 
the class period, when the accusation of malfeasance is made, to the filing date can be 
quite significant.  The average length of the class period is 424 days and the filing delay 
has an average length of 141 days in the sample.
34
  Since the primary focus is on whether 
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 The length of the class period is defined by investors, so it may not precisely measure the actual time 
period of the misconduct, if any misconduct even occurred. 
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 For a full list of variables used in this study and how they were calculated, see Table 3.1. 
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 Rerunning the analysis using the total dollar value of lobbying expenses scaled by the total value of assets 
provides quantitatively similar results. 
34
 The filing delay is the period between the end of the class period and the filing of the class action. 
 




lobbying facilitates misconduct, two years should be an adequate amount of time to 
effectively capture this effect.
35
 
Hypotheses 1a and 1b examine the impact lobbying has on the duration of the class 
period, based on whether the class action relates to the pre-SOX or post-SOX eras.  To test 
these hypotheses, the sample is divided into two based on the implementation of SOX.  
The pre-SOX period is defined as any class action that was filed in or earlier than 2004 and 
the post-SOX period includes any class actions filed in 2005 or later.  The reason for using 
2004 rather than July 2002, when SOX was signed, relates to the distinction and time 
elapsed between the commencement of the class period and the filing of the class action.  
The average number of days between the beginning of the class period and the filing is 565 
days.  It is expected that the majority of firms that are being sued in 2004 will have begun 
committing the alleged misconduct prior to the implementation of SOX, as such manager’s 
actions are likely to be reflected in the pre-SOX era. 
The definition of the pre-SOX period extending up to the end of 2004 is also consistent 
with the Yu and Yu (2011) sample period.  Throughout the rest of the analysis, the same 
2004 definition of the pre-SOX and post-SOX periods will be used.  The empirical 
analysis was also conducted using 2002 or 2003 as the cut-off for the pre-SOX period, and 
it yields analytically equivalent results. 
Hypothesis 1a states that the class period will be longer for firms that lobby in the 
period before SOX.  If this hypothesis is accepted, the Lobby coefficient in equation (3.1) 
will be positive and statistically significant.  On the other hand, Hypothesis 1b states that 
post-SOX firms that lobby will not be able to evade detection for longer.  If this hypothesis 
is accepted, the Lobby coefficient in equation (3.1) will be insignificant. 
A series of control variables are also included in this model.  Three variables, Settled, 
ProvableLoss and DaystoFile, are used to control for the extent or the complexity of the 
misconduct.  Settled is a dichotomous variable taking the value of one if the class action is 
settled in favour of the firm and zero otherwise.  ProvableLoss is the percentage change in 
the firms’ market capitalisation from the beginning of the class period to the end of the 
class period.  DaystoFile represents the number of days between the end of the class period 
and the filing day. 
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 Yu and Yu (2011) define a firm as a lobbying firm if they have lobbied at any point during their sample 
period, irrespective of when the firm was sued. Using information on firm lobbying activities in the two 
years before the filing of a class action will better reflect the influence that they held during the period of 
alleged misconduct. 
 




The model also incorporates four firm characteristics.  Size is the firm size measured as 
the natural log of the firm’s market capitalisation.  Leverage is the ratio of total debt to 
assets.  ROA is the firm’s net income divided by the beginning-of-year total assets.  B/M is 
the ratio of book value of the equity-to-market value of equity.  All firm financial 
characteristics used in the regressions throughout the analysis are calculated for the year 
ending prior to the year the class action was filed.  Forty-eight industry dummy variables, 
as specified by Fama and French (1997), are included to control for industry effects.  
Yearly dummy variables are also included to control for time and market-related effects. 
 
3.3.2 Probability of Settlement 
Hypotheses 2a and 2b state that firms that lobby will be less likely to settle a class action 
filed against them in the pre-SOX period and will be equally likely to settle after the 
enactment of SOX. 
A logit regression is used to test this hypothesis.  The model stated in equation (3.2) is 
estimated for all firms that are being sued.  The dependent variable, Settled, takes the value 
of one if the case is settled and is zero otherwise. 
 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑑 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑏𝑏𝑦 +  𝛴𝛽 · 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 +  𝜀 (3.2) 
Once again, the primary variable of interest is Lobby.  Hypothesis 2a states that firms 
that lobby in the pre-SOX period will be less likely to settle a class action filed against 
them.  If this hypothesis is accepted, the Lobby coefficient in equation (3.2) will be 
negative and statistically significant. 
Hypothesis 2b, on the other hand, states that post-SOX lobbying will make no 
difference to the likelihood of a firm settling a class action.  If this hypothesis is accepted, 
the Lobby coefficient in equation (3.2) will be insignificant. 
The control variables in this model are very similar to those implemented by Karpoff et 
al. (2007) and Cheng et al. (2010) and are very similar to those defined in equation (3.1). 
 
3.3.3 Settlement Size 
Hypothesis 3a states that lobbying in the pre-SOX period will provide managers with 
greater opportunities to accrue more substantial losses and will face greater penalties as a 
 




result.  On the other hand, Hypothesis 3b states that in the post-SOX period there will be 
no difference in terms of the losses and the size of the settlement between lobbying and 
non-lobbying firms.   
These hypotheses are tested using two different measures of the damages caused by the 
managerial misconduct: (1) the losses associated with the class actions and (2) the size of 
the settlement.
36
  The first regression will be run on all firms with a class action filed 
against them as specified in equation (3.3) below. 
 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑏𝑏𝑦 +  𝛴𝛽 · 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 +  𝜀 (3.3) 
In this model, the dependent variable is the provable loss.  ProvableLoss is measured as 
the percentage change in the firms’ market capitalisation from the beginning of the class 
period to the end of the class period.  This measure is similar to that used by Karpoff et al. 
(2008a).
37
  The authors find that their measure of provable loss more closely tracks 
regulators’ estimates of damages than alternative measures. 
If Hypothesis 3a is accepted so that lobbying allows managers to cause more 
significant damage, then the coefficient for the Lobby variable should be negative and 
significant. 
An OLS regression is estimated over all class actions that were settled using the size of 
the settlement as the dependent variable.  The model is specified in equation (3.4) below. 
 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑏𝑏𝑦 +  𝛴𝛽 · 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 +  𝜀 (3.4) 
Settlement in this model is the log of the cash settlement amount.  Hypothesis 3a states 
that firms that lobby will pay larger settlements as a result of causing more damage.  If this 
hypothesis is correct, then the Lobby coefficient will be positive and significant.   The 
results from model (3.4) should be consistent with model (3.3). 
Hypothesis 3b states that post-SOX firms will not be able to cause as much damage 
and will therefore not face larger settlements.  If this hypothesis is accepted, the Lobby 
variable will be insignificant in models (3.3) and (3.4). 
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 Karpoff et al. (2007) show that these two measures are related and should provide consistent results. 
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 Karpoff et al. (2008b) define their provable loss measure as the percentage change in the firms’ market 
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3.3.4.1 Sample Selection 
As in Chapter 2 (see Section 2.3.4.1) data for SCAs in the US is obtained from the 
Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse (SCAC).
38
  All class actions listed 
between 2000 and 2012 are used for this analysis.  The Stanford SCAC provides 
information on the filing date of the suit, the class period, ticker symbol and SIC code for 
all class actions filed after the institution of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
(PSLRA).  The outcome of the case has also been collected by reading through the case 
reports provided by the Stanford SCAC, and a dataset of settlement amounts has been 
compiled. 
Individual firm financial data up to the end of 2012 is obtained from the 
CRSP/Compustat merged database.  All firms with available data listed on the NYSE, 
NASDAQ or AMEX are included in the primary sample.  Firms incorporated outside of 
the US are excluded from the sample due to possible differences in reporting standards. 
The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (LDA) requires any organisation whose 
lobbying expenses exceed $20,000 semi-annually to file with the Senate Office of Public 
Records (SOPR) and the clerk of the House of Representatives.  The Centre for 
Responsive Politics (CRP) maintains a database of the quarterly reports filed at SOPR 
since 1998.
39
  One of the drawbacks of this database is that there is no breakdown as to 
how much is spent on lobbying particular agencies, since firms are not required to disclose 
this information.  To calculate the lobbying variables that are used in the study, two years 
of prior data are required.  In particular, lobbying firms are firms that have undertaken 
lobbying activities at any point in time during the two years prior to the filing year.  Since 
lobbying information is only publicly available from 1998, this means that after calculating 
the lobbying variables there is sufficient data available to conduct the analysis from the 
year 2000 onwards. 
 




 CRP maintains this database at https://www.opensecrets.org/. 
 




3.3.4.2 Sample Statistics 
Table 3.2 shows a comparison of characteristics between firms that lobby and those that do 
not.
40
  The most obvious difference is that lobbying firms are significantly larger in size 
based on total assets and market capitalisation.  The significant size disparity is consistent 
with prior research that has examined the determinants of lobbying (see Jin-Hyuk, 2008; 
Hill et al., 2013; Mathur et al., 2013).  Almost all of the significant differences in this table 
can be attributed to the difference in size. 
Table 3.3 presents summary statistics of key variables for lobbying and non-lobbying 
sued firms of the full sample period (2000 to 2012).  Once again, lobbying firms are 
significantly larger in size.  The average size for the sued firms is also larger for both 
lobbying and non-lobbying firms when compared to the full sample.  The difference in size 
is consistent with the deep pockets theory, which posits that sued firms are typically larger 
in size because they are more attractive targets to extract settlements. 
Class actions filed against lobbying firms are also significantly less likely to be settled.  
This result can also be attributed to the deep pockets theory and indicates that lobbying 
firms are more likely to have frivolous cases filed against them.  This shows that it is 
important to control for the merits of the case throughout the analysis.  It is also interesting 
to note that there is no significant difference in the number of days in the class period for 
the full sample period. 
Table 3.4 shows the sample composition of sued firms by year and industry.  In Panel 
A, for non-lobbying firms, there are a proportionally large number of class actions filed in 
2001.  This can be credited to the bursting of the tech bubble.  These tech firms were 
generally start-up companies without resources to expend on lobbying, which explains 
why this increase in filings is exclusively for non-lobbying firms.  As for lobbying firms, 
the number of class actions filed varies between 15 in 2011 to 55 in 2002. 
Panel B of Table 3.4 shows a relatively consistent distribution of filings across 
industries for lobbying and non-lobbying firms.  The most obvious differences are the 
proportionally higher number of sued lobbying firms in the finance and transportation 
industries and the proportionally lower number of sued lobbying firms in the service 
industry.  These slight differences can be attributed to the differing need for lobbying 
across various industries.  The sample analysed throughout this chapter includes firms in 
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the financial and utilities industries.  Dropping firms from these industries does not 
materially affect the reported findings (see Appendix F). 
Table 3.5 presents Spearman correlation coefficients between the independent variables 
used in the analysis.   In general, the correlations are relatively low and the variance 
inflation factors (VIFs) are also very small.  A high level of correlation is also evident 
between the settled and settlement size variables.  The high correlation between these 
variables means that they will not be used in the same regression together as independent 
variables to avoid the issue of multicollinearity. 
Figure 3.1 presents the mean and median amount spent on lobbying each year for sued 
and non-sued firms.  The average amount spent on lobbying has generally been increasing 
over the sample period.  The average amount spent on lobbying each year by sued firms is 
more than non-sued firms, which is consistent with sued firms being generally larger firms.  
The distribution of lobbying is positively skewed.  There has also been a positive trend in 
the total amount spent on lobbying (see Figure 3.2).  Based on these two figures, the 
lobbying being undertaken does not appear to differ substantially between sued and non-
sued firms.  It should also be noted that the amount spent on lobbying by sued and non-
sued firms is highly correlated (0.95). 
 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Length of Class Period 
In the first part of the analysis, the relationship between lobbying and the length of the 
class period during the pre- and post-SOX periods are examined.  Hypothesis 1a states that 
lobbying firms will be able to get away with their misconduct for longer during the pre-
SOX period.  Post-SOX, however, it is conjectured that lobbying will have no impact on 
the time it takes to detect misconduct (Hypothesis 1b). 
The hypotheses are tested using a univariate analysis across the pre- and post-SOX 
subsamples.  The results of these tests can be found in Table 3.6.  Panel A presents 
statistics for the full sample period (2000–2012).  Panels B and C report class action 
statistics for the pre-SOX (2000–2004) and post-SOX periods (2005–2012), respectively.  
Panel B shows that the average number of days in the class period for firms that lobby is 
93 days longer than non-lobbying firms.  This difference is highly significant and is 
 




consistent with the results obtained by Yu and Yu (2011).  Interestingly, when the analysis 
is restricted to the post-SOX period in Panel C, the length of the class period is not 
significantly different between lobbying and non-lobbying firms.  These two results are 
consistent with Hypotheses 1a and 1b, suggesting that lobbying firms were able to get 
away with their misconduct for longer before SOX but not after its implementation. 
To more formally test whether lobbying has any impact on the length of the class 
period, equation (3.1) was estimated to control for the complexity of misconduct, firm 
characteristics and industry and time fixed effects.  The results of these regressions are 
reported in Table 3.7.  Models (1) and (2) in Table 3.7 report the results for the pre-SOX 
period.  The primary variables of interest in these models are Lobby Dummy and Lobby 
Amount, both of which have positive coefficients and are highly significant.  Consistent 
with Hypothesis 1a and Yu and Yu (2011), these results confirm that the class period is 
significantly longer for lobbying firms in the pre-SOX period.
41,42
 
Models (3) and (4) in Table 3.7 report the regressions estimated for the post-SOX 
period.   In these two models, neither Lobby Dummy nor Lobby Amount is significant.  The 
results are consistent with Hypothesis 1b and suggest that post-SOX lobbying firms are not 
able to get away with corporate misconduct for longer.
43
  
The main finding here is that pre-SOX lobbying firms were able to evade detection for 
longer.  This can be attributed to the lobbying firms’ tacit power.  In the pre-SOX period, 
economic agents that are most likely to detect fraud may be fearful of potential 
repercussions and as such not willing to reveal corporate misconduct.  This unwillingness 
to bring evidence of illegal corporate activities to light is likely to be worse for lobbying 
firms, since the penalties for opposing them would be much more severe because they are 
more powerful.  As a result, lobbying firms were able to get away with their misconduct 
for longer. 
SOX’s requirement that top executives certify financial statements is expected to have 
curbed management’s behaviour and has made them more vulnerable to the threat of being 
found guilty of corporate misconduct.  This increased vulnerability to top executives from 
the threat of exposure increases the willingness of economic agents to report fraud and 
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other illegal activities.  Moreover, SOX has also improved the incentives and the ability 
for employees, auditors and the SEC to bring corporate misconduct to light.  As a result, 
managers of lobbying firms are no longer able to get away with their misconduct for 
longer in the post-SOX period. 
SOX might not be the only factor driving the results.  It is possible that investors may 
have also become more vigilant over time.  Some very high-profile cases of misconduct 
came to light during the early 2000s, including Enron and WorldCom.  These companies 
also spent millions of dollars each year on lobbying and made significant political 
contributions.  The bankruptcies of these companies may have made investors more wary 
and cautious of potential political corruption associated with the large-scale political 
strategies these companies undertook.   Investor cautiousness concerning lobbying 
expenditures may have prompted more monitoring to ensure that managers were not taking 
advantage of the political connections they had developed. 
Lobbying may also have become less effective over time as a result of an increase in 
the number of entities lobbying and the amount of money being spent on lobbying.  The 
Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 placed restrictions on lobbying 
activities, which would also limit the effectiveness of lobbying.  In recent years, the US 
Congress has been at a near-constant gridlock and has been highly ineffective.  As such, 
the benefits associated with lobbying for specific pieces of legislation could be more 
limited.  If lobbying has become less effective at influencing political decisions over time, 
then it is also likely that lobbying firms will have seen a loss of their tacit power, which 
would support the results found so far. 
SOX may not be the only reason for the change in the length of the class period for 
lobbying firms.  The possible increase in investor vigilance and reduction in the benefits 
associated with lobbying may have adversely affected managers’ ability to get away with 
their misconduct for longer.  However, SOX is most likely to have had the largest effect on 
managers’ ability to get away with corporate misconduct as a result of the loss of tacit 
power. 
The evidence so far suggests that pre-SOX managers that lobbied were able to get 
away with their misconduct for longer.  Post-SOX lobbying is no longer related to the 
length of the class period.  These results indicate that changes surrounding the 
implementation of SOX have limited the opportunities for mangers to commit more severe 
misconduct. 
 





3.4.2 Probability of Settlement 
In this section, the relationship between lobbying and the probability of settlement is 
examined.  Hypothesis 2a states that pre-SOX firms that lobby will be less likely to settle a 
class action. 
To do this, a logit regression is estimated as in equation (3.2).  The dependent variable 
in these regressions takes a value of one if the class action is settled and is equal to zero if 
it is dismissed.  The results from these regressions are presented in Table 3.8.  The 
regressions estimated for the pre-SOX period are presented in columns (1) and (2).  The 
negative coefficients for the lobby variables indicate that firms that lobby in the pre-SOX 
period are less likely to have settled a case filed against them, which is consistent with 
Hypothesis 2a. 
This result suggests that during the pre-SOX period it is more difficult to prove the 
occurrence of any illegal activities.  The burden of proof in SCAs is on the plaintiff.  As 
such, the investor class needs to prove that managers have violated securities laws.  
Collecting evidence to prove misconduct has occurred requires the cooperation of others, 
such as employees of the firm being sued.  This cooperation is likely made more difficult if 
there is a fear of repercussion.  It is expected that lobbying firms hold more tacit power 
and the fear of potential backlash is greater.  As a result, people will be less likely to assist 
investors in their lawsuit, making the collection of evidence to prove managerial guilt 
more difficult if the firm lobbies.  This result is only marginally significant, at the 10% 
level, so the impact of lobbying on whether the case was settled may be minimal. 
Post-SOX, the tacit power that lobbying firms hold is expected to have been reduced 
and, as a result, the fear of repercussions is also expected to have fallen.  Investors that are 
suing a lobbying firm should find it easier to collect evidence of misconduct because 
people will be more willing to cooperate.  Based on this expectation, Hypothesis 2b 
predicts that after the implementation of SOX, lobbying will not have any impact on the 
probability of a class action being settled. 
Models (3) and (4) in Table 3.8 present the regression results to examine whether 
lobbying has any influence on the probability of the class action being settled in the post-
SOX period.  Consistent with Hypothesis 2b, the results indicate that neither Lobby 
 




Dummy nor Lobby Amount variables are significant.  This result confirms that lobbying 
does not impact the outcome of class actions that were filed post-SOX. 
These results suggest that SOX has had an impact on whether a class action is settled 
for lobbying firms.  Pre-SOX lobbying firms were marginally less likely to settle a class 
action filed against them.  However, post-SOX lobbying no longer appears to have an 
impact on the outcome of the case.  The findings suggest that identifying the culpability of 
managers for lobbying firms that are subject to SCAs has improved following the 
enactment of SOX. 
 
3.4.3 Settlement Size 
In this section, the relationship between lobbying and the damages caused by the alleged 
misconduct is examined.  Hypothesis 3a states that pre-SOX lobbying firms will cause 
more damage because they are able to get away with their misconduct for longer, thereby 
giving managers more opportunities to destroy investors’ wealth.  These outcomes also 
imply that lobbying firms will be more likely to face larger settlements. 
Equation (3.3) is estimated to test this hypothesis.  Provable loss is defined as the 
percentage change in the firm’s market capitalisation from the beginning of the class 
period to the end of the class period.  It is a measure of the dollar amount of damage 
managers have done to the value of the firm through their misdeeds.  The regression 
results are presented in Table 3.9.   If Hypothesis 3a is correct, the Lobby variables 
coefficients will be negative and statistically significant.  The pre-SOX regressions, 
reported in models (1) and (2) show that the Lobby Dummy and Lobby Amount coefficients 
are both insignificant.  There is no evidence that managers of lobbying firms cause more 
damage before the implementation of SOX. 
There are a couple of possible explanations why lobbying may not have any impact on 
the amount of damage being done.  First, any damage being done may be offset by 
performance enhancements that come from lobbying.  Prior research has found firms that 
lobby typically perform better in the long run (Jin-Hyuk, 2008; Hill et al., 2013; Chen et 
al., 2015).  The better performance may offset any extra damage due to managers’ actions.  
Alternatively, firms that lobby may evade detection for longer but they may not take 
advantage of this opportunity. 
 




To further examine whether lobbying is related to the severity of the misconduct, 
regressions were estimated with settlement size as the dependent variable, as given by 
equation (3.4).  The results from these regressions are presented in Table 3.10.  The pre-
SOX regressions (models (1) and (2)) show that lobbying is not significantly related to the 
size of the settlement.  This result is consistent with the findings for the provable loss and 
suggests managers of firms that lobby in the pre-SOX period do not cause more damage 
and, as a result, do not face greater penalties. 
So far the results have shown that post-SOX firms that lobby are not able to evade 
detection for longer.  As a result, it is expected that managers of lobbying firms would not 
be able to cause more damage after the implementation of SOX.  This hypothesis is tested 
estimating the regressions during the post-SOX period to examine whether lobbying has 
any impact on the size of the provable loss or the settlement.  The post-SOX regression 
models are reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.9 and Table 3.10, respectively.  The 
results show that lobbying is not significantly related to the provable loss or the settlement 
size after the implementation of SOX, which is consistent with Hypothesis 3b. 
Overall, SOX appears to have limited the impact of lobbying on managers’ ability to 
get away with corporate misconduct.  Pre-SOX firms that lobbied were able to get away 
with corporate misconduct for longer and were marginally less likely to have to settle a 
SCA.  Although managers of the lobbying firms were able to evade detection for longer, 
they do not appear to have done more damage during this time period. 
Post-SOX lobbying is no longer related to either the length of the class period or the 
probability of a case being settled.  This change can most likely be attributed to a loss in 
the tacit power that lobbying firms once held.  Based on this evidence, SOX appears to 
have been beneficial in reducing the potentially harmful effects that political connections 
can have on the detection of corporate misconduct. 
 
3.4.4 Robustness 
The results documented so far in this chapter are consistent with SOX reducing the tacit 
power of lobbying firms.  As already mentioned above, an alternative explanation is that 
investors became warier of large powerful firms after high-profile cases of misconduct, 
such as Enron and WorldCom, came to light.  As a result of this distrust, investors may 
increase monitoring activities and be more watchful for evidence of misconduct.  It is 
 




likely that this effect, if it does indeed drive the results, is temporary, since investors tend 
to have a short memory. 
To examine this, the post-SOX period is split into two subsamples.  The first sub-
period is from 2005 to 2008 and the second sub-period is from 2009 to 2012.  If investor 
wariness is indeed driving the results, the lobbying activities should not be related to the 
number of days in the class period from 2005 to 2008.  In the 2009 to 2012 period, when 
investor wariness declined, lobbying firms should once again be able to evade detection 
for longer.  The results from these regressions can be found in Table 3.11.  For both sub-
periods, lobbying is not significantly related to the length of the class period.  This 
indicates that more vigilant investors are unlikely to be the reason for the results found and 
the most likely explanation is SOX. 
Notwithstanding the above, it remains a possibility that a third factor has caused the 
change in the relationship over time, and as such one should be cautious about interpreting 
the results beyond SOX being the ‘most likely cause’ of the change.  The fundamental 
point in this chapter is that the relationship identified by Yu and Yu (2011) between 
lobbying and the length of fraud no longer holds after 2004. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter examines the relationship between lobbying and SCAs.  It is found that up to 
2004, lobbying is positively related to the length of the class period and marginally 
negatively related to the probability of a class action being settled.  The results are 
consistent with lobbying firms wielding a substantial amount of tacit power, making 
economic agents less willing to reveal misconduct for fear of the potential repercussions.  
The fear of repercussions also makes it more difficult for the investor class to collect 
evidence to prove that managers have violated securities laws because parties will be less 
willing to cooperate. 
From 2005 onwards, lobbying is no longer related to the length of the class period and 
the probability of a settlement.  The most likely reason for the change in this relationship is 
SOX.  SOX introduced severe penalties for top executives if a firm is found to have 
committed fraudulent activities, reducing the amount of tacit power lobbying firms held.  
SOX also improved the incentives and the ability for employees, auditors and the SEC to 
reveal corporate misconduct.  As a result, economic agents should be more willing to 
 




identify corporate misconduct and assist investors in their class action against firms that 
lobby post-SOX.   
This chapter also examines whether managers of lobbying firms have more 
opportunities to cause significant damage to investors.  The size of the loss to investors 
and the cash settlement are not affected by whether the firm lobbies.  It is possible that up 
to 2004 managers of lobbying firms may be able to get away with corporate misconduct 
for longer and cause more damage, but these extra losses are being offset by the enhanced 
performance that is associated with lobbying activities. 
It should be noted that lobbying is just one form of political connection, aimed at 
influencing legislative decisions.  Other common forms of political connections examined 
in the literature include Political Action Committee (PAC) donations, as well as 
relationships between managers and politicians.  Accounting for these other forms of 
political relationships would provide a more complete view of how political connectedness 
or tacit power could impact the detection of misconduct.  However, an examination of 
these other forms of political connection is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
The results indicate that the longer class period for lobbying firms identified by Yu and 
Yu (2011) is only evident up to 2004.  Lobbying firms are not able to get away with their 
misconduct for longer after 2005.   The most likely reason for this change is the loss of 
tacit power stemming from the enactment of SOX.  As such, SOX appears to have been 
beneficial in restricting the power of large politically influential companies. 
 
 




Table 3.1: Variable Definitions 
 
    
Panel (A): Lobbying Variables 
    
  
Variable Definition 




Dummy variable equal to one if the firm has lobbied over the prior two years and zero 
otherwise. Source: CRP. 
Lobby 
Amount 
Natural log of the total dollar value of lobbying expenses undertaken over the prior two years. 
Source: CRP. 
    
    
Panel (B): Measures of the Extent of and Complexity of the Violation 
    
    
Settled Dummy variable equal to one if the class action was settled and zero otherwise. Source: 
Stanford SCAC. 
Settlement The log of the cash settlement. Source: Stanford SCAC 
Provable 
Loss 
The percentage change in the firm’s market capitalisation from the beginning of the class 
period to the end of the class period. Source: CRSP. 
Days in CP The number of days in the class period. Source: Stanford SCAC. 
Days to File The number of days between the end of the class period and the filing date. Source: Stanford 
SCAC 
    
    
Panel (C): Other Variables 
    
    
Size Natural log of the firm's market capitalisation. Source: Compustat. 
Leverage Ratio of total book value of current and long term debt (#34 + #39) to assets (#6). Source: 
Compustat. 
ROA Ratio of net income (#172) to beginning of year assets (#6). Source: Compustat. 
B/M Ratio of book value of equity (#60) to market capitalisation. Source: Compustat. 
Ind 48 industry dummy variables in accordance with Fama and French (1997). Source: 
Compustat. 
Year Dummy variables equal to one for a particular year and zero otherwise. 








Table 3.2: Comparison Lobby and Non-Lobby 
Table 3.2 reports descriptive statistics for lobbying and non-lobbying firm-year observations between 2000 and 2012. The table includes the mean and number of 




 percentiles to remove the effect of outliers. The difference between the two samples are 
calculated as the mean of the lobbying firms variable less the mean of the non-lobbying firms variable and these are shown in the last column with significance calculated 
using a paired t-test. Variables definitions can be found in Table 3.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 







    
 
    
 




Mean N  Difference (Lobby-Non-Lobby) 
              
       
Firm Values 
      Assets  20,550.62 11,262 
 
1,290.26 48,766 19,260.36*** 
Market Cap 11,214.31 11,262 
 
785.91 48,766 10,428.39*** 
Debt 5,514.52 11,213 
 
294.96 48,562 5,219.56*** 
Leverage 0.25 11,213 
 
0.19 48,562 0.06*** 
PPE/Assets 0.50 10,769 
 
0.45 40,743 0.04*** 
EBIT 1,171.27 11,238 
 
66.42 48,173 1,104.85*** 
ROA -0.01 11,260 
 
-0.07 48,718 0.07*** 
B/M 0.55 11,261 
 
0.81 48,762 -0.26*** 
CAPEX/Assets 0.05 11,100 
 
0.04 45,790 0.00*** 
Sales 8,549.99 11,260 
 
687.59 48,718 7,862.41*** 
Cash/Assets 0.11 11,084 
 
0.14 48,362 -0.03*** 
Dividends/Assets 0.01 11,219 
 







      Percent Outsiders 0.75 6,377 
 
0.69 10,288 0.06*** 
Board Size 10.32 6,377 
 
8.77 10,288 1.55*** 
CEO Dual 0.77 6,377 
 
0.67 10,288 0.10*** 
Entrenchment Index 2.26 5,111 
 
2.14 8,132 0.12*** 
 
 
     
Lobby Data 
      Lobby Amount 895,140.88 11,262 
    








Table 3.3: Comparison Sued Lobby and Sued Non-Lobby 
Table 3.3 reports descriptive statistics for sued lobbying and sued non-lobbying firm-year observations between 2000 and 2012. The table includes the mean and number of 




 percentiles to remove the effect of outliers. The difference between the two samples are 
calculated as the mean of the sued lobbying firms variable less the mean of the sued non-lobbying firms variable and these are shown in the last column with significance 
calculated using a paired t-test. Variables definitions can be found in Table 3.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, 
respectively. 
 







    
 
    
 




Mean N  Difference (Lobby-Non-Lobby) 
              
       
Firm Values 
      Assets  57,621.31 362 
 
4,235.23 825 53,386.08*** 
Market Cap 16,002.72 372 
 
1,139.75 850 14,862.97*** 
Debt 20,640.59 370 
 
2,492.79 848 18,147.80*** 
Leverage 0.27 360 
 
0.19 823 0.08*** 
PPE/Assets 0.43 338 
 
0.32 793 0.12*** 
EBIT 1,597.35 362 
 
138.92 820 1,458.43*** 
ROA -0.11 372 
 
-0.38 849 0.28*** 
B/M 0.47 372 
 
0.69 850 -0.22 
CAPEX/Assets 0.05 356 
 
0.05 810 0.00 
Sales 13,006.19 362 
 
1,101.50 824 11,904.68*** 
Cash/Assets 0.12 358 
 
0.20 815 -0.09*** 
Dividends/Assets 0.01 360 
 







      Settled 0.48 372 
 
0.65 850 -0.17*** 
Days in CP 453.60 372 
 
411.23 849 42.37 
Days to File 134.41 372 
 
143.23 849   -8.82 
Settlement (millions) 113.30 155 
 
22.79 330 90.51* 
 
 
     
Lobby Data (Prior 2 Years) 
      Lobby Amount 2,154,966.49 372 
    
              
 
 




Table 3.4: Comparison Sued Lobby and Sued Non-Lobby Distribution 
Table 3.4 reports the number of SCAs filed each year and in each industry for the sample of class actions 
filed during the period of 2000 to 2012 obtained from the Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse. 
Panel A displays the number and percentage of SCAs filed each year for lobby and non-lobby firms. Panel B 
reports the frequency of class actions by industry for lobby and non-lobby firms. 
 
            
Panel A: Distribution of Sample across Years 
            
      
Year 
 
Non-Lobby Percentage Lobby Percentage 
            
      
2000 
 
73 8.6% 35 9.4% 
2001 
 
256 30.1% 35 9.4% 
2002 
 
58 6.8% 55 14.8% 
2003 
 
62 7.3% 27 7.3% 
2004 
 
77 9.1% 26 7.0% 
2005 
 
65 7.6% 27 7.3% 
2006 
 
37 4.4% 20 5.4% 
2007 
 
49 5.8% 23 6.2% 
2008 
 
47 5.5% 42 11.3% 
2009 
 
35 4.1% 24 6.5% 
2010 
 
36 4.2% 27 7.3% 
2011 
 
37 4.4% 15 4.0% 
2012 
 
18 2.1% 16 4.3% 
      
Total 
 
850 100.0% 372 100.0% 
            
      
Panel B: Distribution of Class Actions across Industries 
            
      
Industry 
 
Non-Lobby Percentage Lobby Percentage 
            
      
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Mining 11 1.3% 9 2.4% 
Construction 9 1.1% 1 0.3% 
Manufacturing 325 38.2% 138 37.1% 
Transportation 50 5.9% 61 16.4% 
Wholesale Trade 29 3.4% 4 1.1% 
Retail Trade 49 5.8% 13 3.5% 
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 71 8.4% 63 16.9% 
Services  299 35.2% 82 22.0% 
Public Administration 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Other 7 0.8% 1 0.3% 
      
Total 
 
850 100.0% 372 100.0% 








Table 3.5: Correlations 
Table 3.5 shows the matrix of Spearman correlation coefficients for the independent variables. Correlations are calculated based on the full sample of sued firms that are 
analysed. Variance inflation factors (VIFs) are also presented. Variable definitions can be found in Table 3.1. 
 

















































































                          
             
Lobby Dummy 1.00 
          
1.38 
Lobby Amount 0.99 1.00 
          Settlement -0.06 -0.06 1.00 
         Settled -0.15 -0.15 0.99 1.00 
       
1.06 
Provable Loss 0.02 0.01 -0.10 -0.13 1.00 
      
1.04 
Days in Class Period 0.04 0.04 0.11 0.12 -0.03 1.00 
     
1.03 
Days to File -0.05 -0.04 -0.13 0.01 -0.06 0.08 1.00 
    
1.06 
Size 0.50 0.55 -0.04 -0.17 0.03 -0.03 -0.18 1.00 
   
1.59 
Leverage 0.16 0.17 0.07 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.06 0.11 1.00 
  
1.04 
ROA 0.11 0.12 -0.01 -0.09 0.11 0.00 -0.11 0.27 0.00 1.00 
 
1.10 
B/M -0.06 -0.06 -0.03 0.05 -0.09 0.11 0.13 -0.27 -0.06 -0.09 1.00 1.12 








Table 3.6: Comparison Sued Lobby and Sued Non-Lobby Over the Different Analysis Periods 
Table 3.6 reports descriptive statistics for sued lobbying and sued non-lobbying firms.  Panel A presents the mean and the number of observations for the selected variables 
for the full period, which ranges from 2000 to 2012. Panel B presents the mean and the number of observations for the selected variables for the pre-SOX period, from 2000 





 percentiles to remove the effect of outliers. The difference between the two samples are calculated as the mean of the sued lobbying firms variable less the mean of 
the sued non-lobbying firms variable and these statistics are shown in the last column with significance calculated using a paired t-test.  Variables definitions can be found in 
Table 3.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 
            
Panel A: Class Action Statistics for the Full Period (2000 to 2012) 
            
            
 
Lobby Non-Lobby Difference (Lobby-Non-Lobby) 
            
      
Days in CP 453.60 372 411.23 850 42.37 
Settled 0.48 372 0.65 850 -0.17*** 
Days to File 134.41 372 143.23 850 -8.82 
Settlement (millions) 113.30 155 22.79 330 90.51* 
   
  
 
Lobby Amount (Prior 2 Years) 2,154,966.49 372 
   
            
      
Panel B: Class Action Statistics for the Pre-SOX Period (2000 to 2004) 
            
      
 
Lobby Non-Lobby Difference (Lobby-Non-Lobby) 
            
      
Days in CP 480.58 178 387.53 526 93.05*** 
Settled 0.60 178 0.75 526 -0.16*** 
Days to File 128.48 178 167.48 526 -38.99** 
Settlement (millions) 159.39 85 29.36 184 130.03 
      
Lobby Amount (Prior 2 Years) 1,930,544.43 178 
   
            
      
Panel C: Class Action Statistics for the Post-SOX Period (2005 to 2012) 
            
      
 
Lobby Non-Lobby Difference (Lobby-Non-Lobby) 
            
      
Days in CP 428.86 194 449.64 324 -20.78 
Settled 0.38 194 0.49 324 -0.11** 
Days to File 139.85 194 103.94 324 35.92* 
Settlement (millions) 57.34 70 14.51 146 42.83** 
      
Lobby Amount (Prior 2 Years) 2,360,879.52 194 
   
            
 
 




Table 3.7: Regressions with Days in Class Period as the Dependent Variable 
Table 3.7 reports OLS regression estimates for the effect the lobbying has on the number of days in the class 
period, using equation (3.1). The dependent variable in these regressions is the natural log of the number of 
days in the class period. The first two columns present the regressions estimated for the pre-SOX period, 
from 2000 to 2004. The last two columns present the regressions estimated for the post-SOX period, from 
2005 to 2012. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Variables definitions can be found in Table 3.1. *, 
**, *** Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 
            
 
Dependent Variable: Log of Days in Class Period 
 
          
      
 
Pre-SOX: 2000 to 2004 
 





            
      

















      







      







      







      







      







      







      







      







      
R
2
 0.05 0.05 
 
0.02 0.02 
N 677 677 
 
458 458 








Table 3.8: Regressions with Settled Dummy as the Dependent Variable 
Table 3.8 reports logit regression estimates for the effect the lobbying has on the whether the class action 
was settled, using equation (3.2). The dependent variable in these regressions takes the value of one if the 
class action is settled and is equal to zero if it is dismissed. The first two columns present the regressions 
estimated for the pre-SOX period, from 2000 to 2004. The last two columns present the regressions 
estimated for the post-SOX period, from 2005 to 2012. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Variables 
definitions can be found in Table 3.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent 
significance levels, respectively. 
 
            
 
Dependent Variable: Settled Dummy Variable 
 
          
 
     
 
Pre-SOX: 2000 to 2004 
 





            









































































      Pseudo R
2
 0.07 0.07 
 
0.05 0.05 
N 677 677 
 
458 458 








Table 3.9: Regressions with Provable Loss as the Dependent Variable 
Table 3.9 reports OLS regression estimates for the effect the lobbying has on the size of the provable loss, 
using equation (3.3). The dependent variable in these regressions is the percentage change in the firm’s 
market capitalization from the beginning of the class period to the end of the class period. The first two 
columns present the regressions estimated for the pre-SOX period, from 2000 to 2004. The last two columns 
present the regressions estimated for the post-SOX period, from 2005 to 2012. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. Variables definitions can be found in Table 3.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 
10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 
            
 
Dependent Variable: Provable Loss 
 
          
     
 
Pre-SOX: 2000 to 2004 
 





            
      

















      







      







      







      







      







      







      







      







      
R
2
 0.11 0.11 
 
0.02 0.02 
N 677 677 
 
458 458 








Table 3.10: Regressions with Settlement Size as the Dependent Variable 
Table 3.10 reports OLS regression estimates for the effect the lobbying has on the size of the settlement, 
using equation (3.4). The dependent variable in these is the natural log of the cash settlement. Only those 
class actions that were settled with available data on cash settlement are used in these regressions. The first 
two columns present the regressions estimated for the pre-SOX period, from 2000 to 2004. The last two 
columns present the regressions estimated for the post-SOX period, from 2005 to 2012. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. Variables definitions can be found in Table 3.1. *, **, *** Statistically different 
from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 
            
 
Dependent Variable: Log of Cash Settlement 
 
          
     
 
Pre-SOX: 2000 to 2004 
 





            
      

















      







      







      







      







      







      







      







      







      
R
2
 0.41 0.41 
 
0.48 0.48 
N 259 259 
 
205 205 








Table 3.11: Regressions with Days in Class Period as the Dependent Variable 
Table 3.11 reports OLS regression estimates for the effect the lobbying has on the number of days in the 
class period, using equation (3.1). The dependent variable in these regressions is the natural log of the 
number of days in the class period. The first two columns present the regressions estimated for the period 
from 2005 to 2008. The last two columns present the regressions estimated for the period from 2009 to 2012. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Variables definitions can be found in Table 3.1. *, **, *** 
Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 
            
 
Dependent Variable: Log of Days in Class Period 
 
          
      
 
Post-SOX: 2005 to 2008 
 





            
      

















      







      







      







      







      







      







      







      







      
R
2
 0.03 0.03 
 
0.04 0.03 
N 300 300 
 
158 158 










Figure 3.1: Mean and Median Amount Spent on Lobbying by Year 
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Figure 3.2: Total Amount Spent on Lobbying by Year 
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Chapter 4  
 
Securities Class Actions and Innovation 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Innovation is essential for firms to remain competitive in international markets (Porter, 
1992).  To effectively motivate corporate innovation requires stakeholders to have a 
significant tolerance for failure (Manso, 2011).  Consistent with this, firms are more 
innovative when managers have greater freedom and face fewer consequences for taking 
risks.  However, fostering innovation by providing managers with greater freedom could 
also result in inadequate external oversight.  This deficiency in oversight may provide 
managers with the opportunity to commit corporate misconduct.  Despite this paradox, no 
research has examined whether managers take advantage of these opportunities.  This 
chapter fills this gap in the literature by examining the relationship between securities class 
actions (SCAs) and a firm’s innovative activities.  This chapter also investigates how 
corporate innovation is impacted by the filing of a class action. 
Under the fraud triangle framework, three conditions are evident when fraud occurs.  
These conditions are: rationalisations, opportunities and pressures (Cressey, 1953).  
Corporate innovation could impact one of these conditions by providing managers with 
more opportunities to violate securities laws.  As discussed, greater managerial freedom 
can facilitate corporate innovation but could also inadvertently provide managers with 
greater opportunities to commit corporate misconduct.  Furthermore, in order to maintain a 
competitive advantage, firms are naturally very secretive about their innovative activities.  
 




The relative scarcity of disclosures surrounding innovative projects leads to a lack of 
transparency, which may provide further opportunities for managers to commit 
malfeasance. 
Innovation could also influence the pressures to commit misconduct, another tenet of 
the fraud triangle framework.  Innovation is a long and risky process with a high 
probability of failure (Holmstrom, 1989).  To maintain a competitive advantage, firms 
have to continue to innovate successfully relative to their peers.  A pressure to commit 
corporate misconduct may, therefore, arise when firms are unable to innovate successfully. 
It is expected that a firm’s innovative activities will not only impact the likelihood of 
misconduct occurring but also be affected by the filing of a SCA.  Prior research has 
examined the impact that the litigation of patents (Lerner, 2010) and certain laws have on 
the innovative process (Acharya et al., 2014; Smeets, 2014).  However, the existing 
literature has not investigated the effect of securities litigation on firm innovation.  Firms 
face reputational penalties following shareholder litigation.  These penalties may come in 
the form of higher cost of capital (see Chapter 2; Chava et al., 2010; Deng et al., 2014; 
Yuan and Zhang, 2015), which could adversely impact a firm’s ability to fund innovative 
projects.  As a result, it is expected that firms will invest more efficiently in innovation 
after the filing of a SCA. 
This chapter makes several contributions to the growing body of research on the causes 
and consequences of SCA.  This is the first empirical work that explicitly examines 
whether corporate innovative activities are associated with the probability of misconduct.  
The relationship is investigated in two ways.  First, this chapter examines whether firms 
that are involved in some form of innovation are more likely to be sued.  Second, among 
innovating firms, whether a firm’s innovative success impacts the likelihood of 
shareholder litigation is analysed.  As such, this chapter enhances the current 
understanding of the occurrence of corporate misconduct.  The findings are, therefore, 
useful in improving market participant’s ability to detect and potentially prevent the 
incidence of misconduct.  This chapter also contributes to the extensive body of research 
on the impact of SCAs.  Specifically, this chapter examines the impact the filing of a class 
action has on innovative inputs (R&D), outputs (Patents), the quality of outputs (Patent 
 




Citations), the economic value of patents and firm innovative efficiency.
44
  The results of 
this analysis further the understanding of the effectiveness of SCAs as an ex-post 
disciplinary mechanism. 
To summarise, this chapter addresses the following research questions:   
1) Are firms that innovate more likely to be subject to a SCA than firms that do not 
innovate? 
2) Amongst firms that innovate, are firms that are relatively less innovatively 
successful more likely to be sued? 
3) Does innovative efficiency improve after the filing of a SCA? 
The key findings from the analysis are as follows.  With respect to the first research 
question and consistent with expectations, firms are found to be more likely to be sued if 
they are innovating.  The increased likelihood of being sued is primarily driven by whether 
firms are actively investing in innovation and not on whether firms have had some form of 
innovative success.  This finding is consistent with innovative firms having greater 
opportunities to commit misconduct. 
The analysis addressing the second research question, conducted among innovating 
firms only, shows that the level of innovative success is inversely related to the probability 
of a SCA.  Furthermore, the change and relative change in value added by a firm’s patents 
are also negatively associated with the probability of litigation.  These results indicate that 
firms that are relatively unsuccessful innovators are more likely to be sued, which is 
consistent with these firms facing greater pressures. 
The third research question explores the post-filing effects of SCAs on innovation.  It is 
found that after the filing of a SCA, investment in innovation declines in the short-term.  
This appears to result in a drop in the quantity of the patents being produced.  However, 
the quality of patents being produced, as measured by patent citations and the economic 
value added, appears to be relatively unaffected.  Despite the impact on innovative inputs 
and outputs, the overall innovative efficiency is unaffected by the filing of a class action. 
                                                 
44
 Innovative efficiency is measured as the number of patents or citations scaled by R&D capital or 
expenditures (see section 4.3.1.3 for details).  A full discussion of all of the innovation measures used and 
how they were calculated can be found in section 4.3.1. 
 




The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows.  Section 4.2 develops the 
hypotheses that are tested.  Section 4.3 describes the methodologies and data used.  Section 
4.4 presents the empirical results and a discussion.  Section 4.5 concludes. 
 
4.2 Hypothesis Development 
The fraud triangle is a framework that can be used to explain the occurrence of fraud.  The 
fraud triangle is comprised of three factors: rationalisations, opportunities and pressures 
(Cressey, 1953).  Consistent with this framework, prior research indicates that firms 
subject to a SCA are more likely to have inadequate oversight (McTier and Wald, 2011).  
This lack of oversight may provide managers with the opportunity to commit corporate 
misconduct. 
Innovating firms may have more opportunities to commit fraud as a result of the 
secretive nature of the innovative process.  Disclosures by innovative firms are likely to be 
less informative as any disclosed information may reveal the likelihood and timing of any 
innovations (Bhattacharya and Ritter, 1983), which may negatively impact a firm’s 
competitive advantage.  As such, innovative firms have an incentive to not disclose any 
non-essential information, which adversely impacts firm transparency.  Unsurprisingly, 
R&D intensive firms exhibit higher information asymmetry (Aboody and Lev, 2000).  As 
a result, it is more difficult for stakeholders to provide effective oversight, thereby 
providing managers with more opportunities to break the law. 
To effectively motivate and nurture innovation, there needs to be a tolerance for failure 
(Manso, 2011).  Consistent with this argument, Chemmanur et al. (2014) and Tian and 
Wang (2014) find that more failure tolerant venture capital backed firms are more 
innovatively successful. 
Similar studies have found that innovation is more likely to occur with lower external 
pressures.  For example, Fang et al. (2014) find that greater stock liquidity is associated 
with less innovation, which they argue could be caused by an increase in hostile takeover 
activity.  Similarly, prior research has found that antitakeover laws established by states 
and more antitakeover defences at the firm level can lead to more innovation (Atanassov, 
2013; Chemmanur and Tian, 2017). 
Further, He and Tian (2013) examine the impact analysts have on innovation.  Their 
findings show that firms produce fewer patents and receive fewer patent citations when 
 




they are covered by a large number of analysts.  They argue that this finding is consistent 
with analysts exerting too much pressure on managers to meet short-term goals.  Similarly, 
Chy and Hope (2016) find that greater auditor conservatism negatively impacts innovative 
outputs.  Overall, the literature indicates that firms are more innovative when managers 
have greater freedom and face fewer consequences from taking risks.  However, fostering 
innovation by providing managers with this freedom may result in agency issues stemming 
from inadequate external oversight. 
Innovative firms and sued firms also share a number of other characteristics.  
Innovation is more likely to occur under the guidance of an overconfident manager 
(Hirshleifer et al., 2012).  Research also indicates that firms are more likely to face 
shareholder litigation with an overconfident CEO (Banerjee et al., 2017).  Furthermore, 
innovative firms and sued firms use stock options incentives more extensively (Dusin et 
al., 2006; Lerner and Wulf, 2007; Peng and Roell 2008).  These findings highlight the 
similarities in characteristics exhibited by both innovative firms and firms that face 
shareholder litigation. 
As a result of the greater freedom and opacity, as well as the similarities between sued 
and innovative firms, it is expected that managers of innovative firms will have more 
opportunities to commit corporate misconduct.  This expectation leads to the first 
hypothesis, which tackles the first research question of this chapter. 
Hypothesis 1: Firms that innovate are more likely to be sued than firms that do not 
innovate due to having more opportunities to commit misconduct. 
One of the other important factors of the fraud triangle is pressure.  Finnerty et al. 
(2016) find that firms with a sustained period of good performance are more likely to 
commit fraud following a negative shock.  This finding is consistent with performance 
related pressures leading to fraudulent behaviour.  Firms that are innovating are doing so to 
remain competitive.  As such, the more successful a firm is at innovating, the less pressure 
they will face to commit misconduct.  Innovative firms will, however, face pressure to 
commit misconduct if they are not innovating successfully. 
Innovation is a long and arduous process plagued with a significant amount of 
uncertainty and a high probability of failure (Holmstrom, 1989).  An incentive for 
managers to commit corporate misconduct and conceal their failure arises when innovative 
projects do not come to fruition.  The pressure on managers to achieve short-term earnings 
 




targets will also motivate impropriety when they are unable to continue to innovate 
successfully.  Therefore, it is expected that managers will be more likely to commit 
corporate misconduct when they are unable to achieve innovative success.  This leads to 
the second hypothesis, which addresses the second research question 
Hypothesis 2: Among firms that invest in innovation, firms that are struggling to 
innovate are more likely to commit misconduct due to the associated pressures to deliver 
on innovation investments. 
Following the filing of a SCA, firms often face numerous reputational penalties.  These 
penalties include an increase in the cost of debt (see Chapter 2; Deng et al., 2014; Yuan 
and Zhang, 2015) and an increase in the cost of equity (Chava et al., 2010).  As a result of 
the increase in the cost of capital, firms will need to be more selective in the innovative 
projects that are pursued after the filing of a SCA. 
Consistent with this, Autore et al. (2014) and Yuan and Zhang (2014) find that firms 
are less likely to seek external financing after being sued.  They also find that R&D and 
capital expenditures decline significantly following the filing of a class action.  Evidence 
also suggests that firms are more likely to be overinvesting before the filing of a class 
action (McTier and Wald, 2011).  As such, the decline in investing observed by Autore et 
al. (2014) and Yuan and Zhang (2014) may be a result of managers cutting wasteful 
spending and focussing only on value additive projects. 
Therefore, it is expected that while the total amount spent on innovation may decline 
after the filing, managers will invest in less risky projects that are relatively more likely to 
be successful.  As such, it is expected that although the number of patents obtained may be 
unaffected or fall slightly, the firm’s innovative efficiency will improve post-filing.
45
  This 
leads to the third hypothesis, which in turn, addresses the third research question. 
Hypothesis 3: Innovative efficiency will improve after the filing of a class action. 
 
                                                 
45
 See section 4.3.1.3 for details on how innovative efficiency is measured. 
 





4.3.1 Innovation Measures 
The focus of this study is on whether a firm’s innovative activity is associated with the 
probability of managerial misconduct and how that innovation is impacted following the 
filing of a class action.  In this chapter, measures of innovative input, output and efficiency 
are used. 
 
4.3.1.1 Innovative Input 
The measure of innovative input used in this chapter is R&D expenditures scaled by firm 
assets.  Although R&D has been used in the literature as a measure of innovation (e.g. 
Lerner and Wulf, 2007), there are several drawbacks to using it as a proxy for innovative 
inputs.  First, R&D expenditures are often missing from financial statements.  A blank 
R&D field could indicate a firm’s decision to capitalise rather than expense or it could 
stem from the firm’s decision to not separate R&D expenses from other expenses, such as 
expense shifting (McVay, 2006). 
The other main drawback of using R&D expenditures as a measure of innovative input 
is that firms with zero or missing R&D may still receive patents.  Koh and Reeb (2015) 
find that 10.5% firms with missing R&D receive patents.  They also find that the missing 
R&D firms’ patenting activity corresponds to the bottom 90
th
 percentile of positive R&D 
firms patenting activity.  Although R&D is an imperfect measure, it is one of the few 
directly observable inputs in the innovation process.  As such, it will provide a good 
indication of the amount a firm is investing in its innovative activities. 
 
4.3.1.2 Patenting Activities 
Firm patenting activities are used as a proxy for innovative outputs.  Two main measures 
of a firms’ patenting activity are used throughout the analysis.  The first measure is the 
total number of granted patents.  The patent application year is used as opposed to the 
grant year because the application year more accurately reflects the actual completion of 
the innovation (Griliches et al., 1986).   
 




The second measure of patenting activity is the quality of patents being produced as 
measured by the average number of citations per patent.  The number of patents gives an 
indication as to the extent of a firm’s innovative activities, whereas the number of citations 
provides insight into the importance or the value of a firm’s innovative activity.  Prior 
research has found that citations are a good measure of the value of innovations (Hall et 
al., 2005; Kogan et al., 2017). 
There are two types of truncation problems associated with patent data.  The first 
truncation problem is caused by the lag between patent application and the eventual 
granting of the patent.  Hall et al. (2001) find that this lag is about two years on average.  
Patent data up to the end of 2010 from Kogan et al. (2017) is used throughout the analysis.  
To mitigate the first truncation problem, the final two years of patent data are excluded 
from the sample.  Therefore, patenting activities were analysed up to the end of 2008. 
The second truncation problem is associated with the number of citations a patent 
receives.  Patents receive citations over long periods of time (up to 50 years after being 
granted), however, citations are only observed up to the end of 2010.  Hall et al. (2001) 
suggest two methods for correcting for this bias: (1) the fixed effects method and (2) the 
quasi-structural method.  The fixed effects method involves scaling the number of citations 
a patent receives by the average number of citations received by patents in the same year 
and/or technology subcategory.  The quasi-structural approach involves estimating the 
distribution of the citation lag.  Based on this distribution, adjustment factors are calculated 
to scale up the observed citations.  The adjustment factors provided by the NBER patent 
database are for a sample concluding in 2006.  Since the sample being analysed has been 
extended by four years (up to 2010), following Gu et al. (2014), the NBER adjustment 
factors are shifted forward four years.  These methods of adjusting for truncation citation 
provides noisy estimates for the first few years after the patent is granted (Hall et al., 2001, 
2005).  However, excluding the final two years of patent data will help to mitigate some of 
the noise associated with these truncation adjustments. 
Based on the approaches suggested by Hall et al. (2001), two measures of citations are 
calculated.  Citations (Fixed) is the number of citations per patent adjusted for year and 
technology class fixed effects.  Citations (Quasi) is the number of citations per patent 
where the citations are adjusted using the quasi-structural approach.  Due to the skewed 
nature of the underlying distributions, the natural log of one plus the number of patents and 
citations per patents are used throughout the analysis. 
 




The number of citations received by a patent serves as a proxy for the underlying value.  
Kogan et al. (2017) develop a measure of the value added by a patent based on the stock 
market response to the issuance of a patent.  Kogan et al. (2017) have provided their 
estimates of the value added by each patent.
46
  Since prior research has found that the 
number of citations is positively associated with the value of a patent (see Hall et al., 2005; 
Kogan et al., 2017), the Kogan et al. (2017) measure of the economic value added by a 
patent is expected to provide similar results to the citation measures.  Value Added is 
calculated as the natural log of one plus the average economic value added by patents 
produced in year t.  This Value Added variable is useful for assessing the robustness of the 
results. 
 
4.3.1.3 Innovative Efficiency 
Hypothesis 3 predicts that innovative efficiency will improve after the filing of a class 
action. To test this, two innovative efficiency measures are calculated that take into 
consideration both the inputs and outputs of the innovative process.  Following Hirshleifer 
et al. (2013), the first measure of innovative efficiency is the number of patents granted 




𝐼𝐸𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠,𝑡 =  𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡/(𝑅&𝐷𝑡 + 0.8 ∗ 𝑅&𝐷𝑡−1 + 0.6 ∗ 𝑅&𝐷𝑡−2
+ 0.4 ∗ 𝑅&𝐷𝑡−3 + 0.2 ∗ 𝑅&𝐷𝑡−4) (4.1) 
The second measure of innovative efficiency is a measure of patent citations scaled by 
R&D expenses, which is similar to the measures used by Hirshleifer et al. (2013), Gu 
(2005) and Pandit et al. (2011).  Specifically, it is the number of citations received for 
patents that were applied for in the prior five years scaled by the R&D expenses accrued 
between year t-1 and year t-5. 
 
𝐼𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠,𝑡 = ∑ 𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡−𝑗
5
𝑗=1
/(𝑅&𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝑅&𝐷𝑡−2 + 𝑅&𝐷𝑡−3
+ 𝑅&𝐷𝑡−4 + 𝑅&𝐷𝑡−5) (4.2) 
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 R&D capital is the 5 year cumulative R&D expenses assuming an annual depreciation rate of 20%. 
 




Two variations of the innovative efficiency measure (IE Citations (Fixed) and IE 
Citations (Quasi)) are calculated based on the two adjustments for citation truncation 
outlined in the previous section.  These innovative efficiency measures are set up with a 
lag of five years to effectively capture the length of a development cycle and the associated 
benefits (Lev and Sougiannis, 1996).  The natural log of one plus the innovative efficiency 
measures is calculated and used throughout the analysis. 
Overall, a total of eight measures of innovation are used in this chapter.  They include 
one measure of innovative inputs (R&D/Assets), one measure of innovative outputs 
(Patents), two measures of the quality of patents (Citations (Fixed) and Citations (Quasi)), 
one measure of the economic value of patents (Value Added) and three measures of 
innovative efficiency (IE Patents, IE Citations (Fixed) and IE Citations (Quasi)).  These 
various measures of innovative activities have been used throughout the analysis to give a 
full understanding of the relationship between innovation and misconduct. 
 
4.3.2 Innovation and SCA Probability 
The first hypothesis predicts that firms that innovate, relative to those that do not innovate, 
will be more likely to be sued as a result of having more opportunities to commit 
misconduct.  To test this supposition, the following logit regression was estimated for all 
firms with available data. 
 𝑆𝑢𝑒𝑑𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑡−1,𝑡−3 + 𝛴𝛽 · 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡−1 +  𝜀𝑡 (4.3) 
The dependent variable (Sued) equals one if a firm was sued in year t and is equal to 
zero otherwise.  As in Chapter 2, the filing of a SCA was selected as the date used for the 
analysis undertaken in this chapter for several reasons (see section 2.3.1.1).  First, using 
the filing of a SCA as the key analytical date has the advantage that it is an easily 
identifiable exogenous event, which represents an accusation of misconduct.  Second, the 
other events associated with the discovery of misconduct typically occur only shortly 
before the filing of a class action.  Finally, using the filing of a class action to analyse the 
occurrence of misconduct and surrounding changes is a standard approach used in the 
literature (e.g. McTier and Wald, 2011; Humphery-Jenner, 2012). 
The key independent variable of interest is InnovDum which is a dummy variable that 
is equal to one if a firm had undertaken some form of innovative activity in the prior three 
 




years (between t-1 and t-3).  A dummy variable is used for this part of the analysis since 
the primary focus is on whether, in general, innovative firms are more likely to be sued.  
The second part of the analysis takes into account the level of a firm’s innovative success. 
The InnovDum dummy variable is a measure of innovative input and output.  
Specifically for innovative input, the InnovDum is equal to one if a firm spent any amount 
on R&D in the prior three years.  The measure of innovative outputs is equal to one if a 
firm received at least one patent in the preceding three year period.  The three year window 
was selected to effectively capture whether a firm was innovating from the beginning of 
the class period through to the filing of the SCA.
48
  If Hypothesis 1 is correct then the 
coefficient for the InnovDum will be positive, which would indicate that firms are more 
likely to be sued if they are innovating. 
The control variables that were used in this model are similar to those that have been 
used in prior research (e.g. McTier and Wald, 2011; Kim and Skinner, 2012).  The controls 
include: Size, Leverage, ROA, Return, book-to-market (B/M), proportion of assets that are 
tangible (Tangibles), Dividends, standard deviation of the daily returns (Std Ret), the beta 
of the daily returns from the market model (Beta) and the skewness of returns (Skew).  The 
control variables are all lagged by one year relative to the dependent variable to alleviate 
endogeneity concerns.  Industry and year fixed effects are also controlled for throughout 
the analysis.
49
  See Table 4.1 for an overview of the variables used and how they were 
calculated. 
 
4.3.3 Innovative Success and SCA Probability 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that, among firms that innovate, firms that are innovating less 
successfully will be more likely to commit misconduct, as a result of facing greater 




 𝑆𝑢𝑒𝑑𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−1,𝑡−3 + 𝛴𝛽 · 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡−1 +  𝜀𝑡 (4.4) 
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 In the sample used for this analysis the average time between the beginning of the class period and the 
filing of the SCA is approximately 513 days (Days in CP plus Days to File reported in Table 4.2). 
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 Fama and French (1997) definitions of 48 industries were used to control for industry fixed effects. 
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 Firms are defined as innovating firms if they have spent any amount on R&D or received at least one 
patent in the prior three years. 
 




This is a similar setup to equation (4.3), but differs by looking at whether the level of 
innovation is associated with the likelihood of being sued, among firms that are 
innovating.  In equation (4.4) the key independent variable is Innovation. Innovation is one 
of eight measures of a firm’s innovative activity.
51
  The first measure is an estimate of the 
amount being invested in innovation.  It is the total amount spent on R&D in the prior 
three years scaled by the firm’s assets at the beginning of year t-3. 
The other measures of innovation are based on firm patenting activities and the 
innovative efficiency.  Firm patenting activity is measured by: the number of patents 
(Patents), the average number of citations per patent (Citations (Fixed), Citations (Quasi)) 
and the average economic value added per patent (Value Added) in the prior three years.  
Finally, the average of the three innovative efficiency measures (IE Patents, IE Citations 
(Fixed) and IE Citations (Quasi)) are calculated for the preceding three year period (t-1 to 
t-3) and used in equation (4.4). 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that less innovative firms are more likely to commit corporate 
misconduct.  If this hypothesis is correct then the coefficient for the Innovation variable 
will be negative for the measures of innovative output and efficiency. 
The control variables used in this model are the same as those that were used in 
equation (4.3). 
 
4.3.4 Innovation Post-Filing 
Hypothesis 3 predicts that innovative efficiency will improve after the filing of a class 
action.  Specifically, it is expected that innovative efficiency will improve in the five years 
following the filing.  For this analysis, a sample of control firms was selected using 
propensity score matching (PSM) method.
52
  The propensity score is the probability of a 
class action being filed based on observable characteristics.  The sample of matched firms 
is obtained by selecting five non-sued firms with the closest propensity scores within the 
same two digit SIC industry.
53
  Firm-year observations for both sued (treatment) and non-
sued (control) firms are then retained for the eleven year window around the filing year 
(from t-5 to t+5). 
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 See section 4.3.1 for the full details on the innovation measures and how they were calculated.  
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 The PSM method implemented in this chapter is the same approach that was used in the robustness tests in 
Chapter 2 (see Section 2.4.4). 
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 Using a one to one matched sample provides quantitatively similar results. 
 




To test hypothesis 3, the following OLS regression (equation (4.5)) was estimated on 
the sued and corresponding matched firms for the five years before and after the filing. 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡+1 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑢𝑒𝑑
+ 𝛽4𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒 ∗ 𝑆𝑢𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑢𝑒𝑑 + 𝛴𝛽 · 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡
+  𝜀𝑡 (4.5) 
The dependent variable (Innovation) is one of the eight measures of innovative activity 
outlined in section 4.3.1.  The diff-in-diff approach used in equation (4.5) is helpful in 
assessing causality.  Immediate is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm-year 
observation occurs in the filing year or up to two years after the filing (year t to t+2).  Post 
is a dummy that equals one if a firm-year observation falls between three to five years after 
the filing (year t+3 to t+5).  The omitted group in this model is the pre-filing period (i.e. 
year t-5 to t-1).  The two key independent variables are the interaction terms 
Immediate*Sued and Post*Sued. 
The filing of a class action is likely to have an immediate impact on a firm’s 
investment in its innovative activity (R&D/Assets) (see Autore et al., 2014; Yuan and 
Zhang, 2014).  As such, if the filing of a class action drives innovative investment 
decisions this will be evident in the Immediate*Sued interaction term. 
Due to the long development cycles associated with innovative projects, it is expected 
that any impact on innovative outputs or efficiency is unlikely to be evident in the period 
immediately following the filing of a class action.  Therefore if the filing of a class action 
does have an impact on outputs or efficiency, this will be evident in the Post*Sued 
interaction term.  If Hypothesis 3 is correct and innovative efficiency improves after a firm 
is sued then the Post*Sued interaction term will have a positive coefficient, when the 
efficiency measures are analysed 
The control variables that are used in this part of the analysis are similar to those that 
have been used in the literature (see Atanassov, 2013; Fang et al., 2014).  The controls 
include: Size, Leverage, ROA, B/M, Tangibles, and R&D/Assets.  Prior research has found 
that competition is associated with the level of firm innovation (see Aghion et al., 2005; 
Balakrishnan and Darendeli, 2017).  As such, industry concentration is also controlled for 
using the Herfindahl index (H-Index).  Nonlinear effects of industry concentration are also 
controlled for with the square of the Herfindahl index (H-Index
2
).  Finally, firm and year 
fixed effects are also used to control for firm and year level variation. 
 






4.3.5.1 Sample Selection 
The patent data set used in this analysis was assembled by Kogan et al. (2017).
54
  Kogan et 
al. collected U.S. patent documents from Google Patents and constructed a database 
consisting of all successfully granted patents up to the end of 2010.  The Kogan et al. 
(2017) patent data set includes information on the filing date, grant date, citations and 
value added for all granted patents.  The final two years of patent data (2009 and 2010) are 
excluded from the sample to help mitigate issues associated with truncation (see section 
4.3.1.2).  The citation lag distribution based truncation adjustment factor was also obtained 
from the NBER patent database, which was assembled by Hall et al. (2001). 
As was the case in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, the data for SCAs that were filed in the 
United States have been obtained from the Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse 
(SCAC).
55
  All class actions filed between 1996 and 2007 are used, which allows at least 
one year of data post-filing.  To be included in the sample, firm financial data needs to be 
available for the year preceding and the year following the filing of a class action.  After 
excluding firms in the financial sector (SIC codes 6000 to 6799) and utilities (SIC codes 
4900 to 4949), a sample of 1,168 SCAs remains.  All firm financial data has been obtained 
from the CRSP/Compustat merged database. 
 
4.3.5.2 Sample Statistics 
Table 4.2 provides a comparison of the sample of sued firms and non-sued firms for the 
period of 1996 to 2007.  Consistent with Hypothesis 1, sued firms are significantly more 
likely to be involved in the innovative process than non-sued firms.  Fifty percent of sued 
firms received at least one patent in the prior three years, whereas only 33% of non-sued 
firms received at least one patent during the same period.  Consistent with sued firms 
being more innovative, the proportion of tangible assets is significantly lower for sued 
firms (0.33) than non-sued firms (0.48).  This difference also suggests that sued firms have 
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higher information asymmetry, which may provide more opportunities to commit 
misconduct. 
Sued firms also produce significantly more patents than non-sued firms.  Interestingly, 
the two citation measures (Citations (Fixed) and Citations (Quasi)) and the Value Added 
measure are significantly higher for sued firms indicating they are producing more 
valuable patents, on average.  However, two of the innovative efficiency measures (i.e. IE 
Patents and IE Citations (Fixed)) are significantly lower for sued firms relative to non-
sued firms.  This finding indicates that sued firms have poorer innovative efficiency in the 
period before the filing, which is consistent with Hypothesis 2. 
Table 4.3 compares firm and class action characteristics for sued firms that received at 
least one patent in the three years prior to the filing and for sued firms that did not receive 
a patent in the same pre-filing period.  Sued firms that had a patent granted are larger in 
size, have fewer tangible assets and invest more in R&D than sued firms without a patent.  
Sued firms that received at least one patent in the three years prior to filing are also 
significantly less likely to have to settle a class action filed against them.  The lower 
probability of settlement can most likely be explained by higher information asymmetry, 
as indicated by the lower proportion of tangible assets, which makes it relatively more 
difficult to prove misconduct has occurred. 
Table 4.4 provides a breakdown of the sample of sued firms by year and industry.  The 
number of class actions filed in each year is relatively stable over the sample period.  
There was a slight increase in class actions filed in the early 2000’s coinciding with the 
tech bubble and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX).  Panel B of Table 4.4 shows the number 
of class actions in the sample by industry.  The proportion of sued firms that received at 
least one patent in the three years prior to filing within each industry is approximately 
50%.  Sued firms within the business equipment or manufacturing industries are relatively 
more likely to have obtained a patent (64.5% and 65.8% respectively) whereas sued firms 
in the retail and wholesale industry or others are relatively less likely to have obtained a 
patent (23.7% and 25.2%).
56
 
Table 4.5 reports a Spearman correlation matrix and variance inflation factors (VIFs) 
for the primary independent variables that are used throughout the analysis.  Most of the 
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mines, construction, transportation, hotels and entertainment. 
 




correlation coefficients and VIFs are relatively small indicating that multicollinearity is 
unlikely to be an issue. 
 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Innovation and SCA Probability 
The first hypothesis predicts that firms that are involved in innovative activities are more 
likely to commit misconduct as a result of having more opportunities.  To test this 
conjecture, a logit regression was estimated using equation (4.3), where the dependent 
variable equals one if a firm was sued in year t and is zero otherwise.  Table 4.6 presents 
the results obtained from these regressions. 
The primary variables of interest are the dummy variables for patenting activity 
(Dummy Patent (3 Year) and Dummy Patent (5 Year)) and investment in innovation 
(Dummy R&D (3 Year)).  These variables are equal to one if a firm has either received a 
patent or have an R&D expenditure in the prior three or five years.   The coefficient for the 
R&D dummy is positive and statistically significant.  This indicates that firms that are 
involved in the innovative process are more likely to be sued, which is consistent with 
expectations. 
The dummy variable for patenting activity in the prior three years (Dummy Patent (3 
Year)) is also positive and significant, although only marginally.  This finding is also 
consistent with innovative firms having a higher probability of facing litigation.  However, 
this result no longer holds when the time period for categorising the dummy variable is 
extended from three to five years (Dummy Patent (5 Year)). 
Overall, the results are consistent with Hypothesis 1 and suggest that firms that are 
investing in the innovative process are more likely to be sued.  The most likely reason for 
this finding is the relatively higher level of information asymmetry associated with firms 
that are innovating (Aboody and Lev, 2000), which may provide more opportunities to 
commit misconduct.  The likelihood of being sued is only marginally positively associated 
with whether a firm obtained a patent in the prior three years, which can be seen as a basic 








4.4.2 Innovative Success and SCA Probability 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that among firms that are innovating there will be an inverse 
relationship between innovative success and the probability of being sued.  This 
expectation is based on firms that are failing to innovate facing greater pressures to 
commit misconduct.  To test this, another series of logit regressions were estimated on 
innovating firms, as in equation (4.4). 
The results from these regressions are reported in Table 4.7.  The innovative input 
measure (R&D/Assets) has a significant and negative regression coefficient.  This finding 
suggests that as a firm’s R&D expenditures increase relative to its assets the probability of 
facing a class action declines.  This result is particularly interesting when taken together 
with the findings from the previous section (Table 4.6).  Firms appear to be more likely to 
be sued if they have some form of R&D expenditure.  However, as R&D expenditures 
increase, the probability of being sued declines.  This result may be driven, in part, by 
firms achieving greater innovative success the more they invest in R&D. 
The results also indicate that as the number of patents (Patents) increases the likelihood 
of facing a SCA declines.  This is consistent with Hypothesis 2 and suggests that as 
innovative success improves the chance of managerial misconduct decreases.  This result 
is also supported by the negative coefficient for the Value Added variable, which suggests 
that the probability of being sued falls as the average value of patents being produced 
increases. 
However, the two citation measures (Citations (Fixed) and Citations (Quasi)) are not 
associated with the probability of being sued.  This is in contrast to the findings of the 
value added measure, as the number of citations is typically used as a proxy for the 
economic value of a patent.  Prior research has found that citations are positively 
associated with firm value (see Hall et al., 2005; Kogan et al., 2017).  This positive 
association is also evident in the correlation matrix (Table 4.5) where the correlation 
between Value Added and the two citation measures are both significantly positive (0.61 
and 0.67).  Since the correlations are not perfectly positive the two citation measures and 
the Value Added measure appear to be capturing slightly different factors, which would 
explain the differences in the results reported in Table 4.7. 
Finally, none of the three innovative efficiency measures are significantly associated 
with the probability of litigation.  These results indicate that the level of innovative outputs 
 




(Patents) is associated with the likelihood of being sued but not with how efficient a firm 
is at producing those outputs.  Overall, these findings are partially consistent with 
Hypothesis 2 and suggest that innovative firms may face greater pressures to commit 
misconduct when they are unable to innovate successfully. 
At this point the results indicate that firms that are more innovative will be less likely 
to commit misconduct.  However, this analysis doesn’t take into consideration a firm’s 
innovative success relative to its peers.  To account for this, the results were re-estimated 
using the level of innovation over the prior 3 years (t-3 to t-1) for firm i less the industry 
average level of innovation during the same period as the independent variables.  The 
results from these regressions are presented in Table 4.8.  Using this relative measure of 
innovation provides quantitatively similar results to those reported in Table 4.7.  The 
industry adjusted measures of innovative inputs (R&D/Assets), innovative outputs 
(Patents) and estimated average value added by patents (Value Added) are all negatively 
related with the probability of being sued.  The other industry relative measures of 
innovation are either unrelated or are marginally positively related (Citations (Fixed) and 
IE Patents) to the likelihood of a SCA.  These positive relations suggest that the higher the 
average number of citations or the more innovatively efficient firms are at producing 
patents, the more likely the firms are to be sued, which conflicts with Hypothesis 2.  
However, considering the marginal significance of these findings it is difficult to read too 
much into these findings. 
It is also possible that the pressure to commit misconduct will be more prevalent if a 
firm is struggling to innovate relative to its past innovative success.  To account for this, 
the results were re-estimated using the change in the innovation measures over the prior 
three years (change from t-3 to t-1) and the change in innovation relative to the industry 
average change over the same period.  The results for these two setups can be found in 
Appendix C.1 and Appendix C.2.  The only innovation variable that is significant in both 
of these models is the Value Added measure.  These findings suggest that as the relative 
average economic value of patents increases, firms are less likely to face a class action.  
Alternatively, if firms are struggling to continue to produce valuable innovations they are 
more likely to be sued.  This higher probability of litigation could stem from managers 
facing greater pressures, which results in the violation of securities laws.  Although the 
Value Added measure is the only variable that is significant, these findings are consistent 
with Hypothesis 2 as well as the results reported in Table 4.7. 
 




Overall, the results reported so far indicate that firms that are innovating are more 
likely to be sued.  However, as innovative success improves the incidence of managerial 
misconduct declines.  These findings suggest that a firm’s innovative activities can have an 
impact on the likelihood of corporate misconduct occurring. 
 
4.4.3 Innovation Post-Filing 
The final hypothesis predicts that innovative efficiency will improve post-filing.  To test 
this conjecture, a sample of control firms was selected using propensity score matching.  
For each sued firm a sample of five non-sued firms was selected with the closest 
propensity scores in the same two digit SIC industry.  A comparison of the two samples 
characteristics in the year prior to the filing (t-1) is reported in Table 4.9.  With the 
exception of Value Added, which is only marginally significant, the firm characteristics 
and the measures of innovation are quantitatively similar between the treatment and 
control firms. 
To assess the impact of the filing of a class action on firm innovation, diff-in-diff 
regressions were estimated, as in equation (4.5).  The results from these regressions are 
presented in Tables 4.10 to 4.17.  Each table presents estimates obtained from regressions 
estimated for one of the eight innovation measures.  For brevity and ease of interpretation, 
the regressions reported are for cases that were settled.
57
  The two interaction terms 
(Immediate*Sued and Post*Sued) are the primary variables of interest and provide an 
understanding of both the short- and long-term effects that the filing of a class action has 
on a firm’s innovative activities. 
Three separate regressions are reported in each table.  The first column (All) presents 
regressions that were estimated for all sued cases that were settled and the corresponding 
sample of matched firms.  This sample was then split into two based on whether the sued 
firm was involved in any innovative activity in the three years prior to the filing.
58
  Two 
models were then estimated for the subsample of sued firms that had obtained a patent 
(Patent Pre-Filing) and for those that had not obtained a patent (No-Patent Pre-Filing) 
before being sued.  These two models were estimated using the sued firms that fell into 
                                                 
57
 A full breakdown of regressions estimated on all class actions, as well as dismissed and settled cases can 
be found in Appendix D.1 to Appendix D.8. 
58
 Specifically, if a firm had obtained at least one patent in the three years prior to the filing they fall into the 
Patent Pre-Filing category. 
 




each category as well as the corresponding matched firms.  By splitting the sample based 
on innovative activities pre-filing, a better understanding of managers’ response to the 
filing can be ascertained. 
Table 4.10 presents results obtained when the ratio of R&D to assets was the dependent 
variable.  The Immediate*Sued term is negative and significant for the regressions 
estimated on all settled cases (All) and for the subsample that had obtained a patent pre-
filing (Patent Pre-Filing).  R&D is a measure of innovative input, and as such, this finding 
suggests that immediately following the filing of a class action, sued firms are investing 
significantly less in innovation.  This finding is consistent with expectations as well as 
prior research (Autore et al., 2014; Yuan and Zhang, 2014).  Unsurprisingly, for the 
subsample of firms that had not obtained a patent before being sued (No-Patent Pre-
Filing), the Immediate*Sued is not significantly associated with the amount spent on R&D.  
The coefficient for the Post*Sued term is not significant in any of the models.  This 
suggests that any impact that the filing of a class action has on the amount invested in 
innovation is likely to be only short-term. 
The next innovation measure that was analysed was the number of patents (Table 
4.11).  For regressions that were estimated for all settled class actions (All), neither the 
Immediate*Sued nor the Post*Sued are statistically significant.  For sued firms that had 
obtained a patent pre-filing (Patent Pre-Filing), a significant negative coefficient is found 
for Post*Sued interaction term but the Immediate*Sued term is insignificant.  This 
indicates that sued firms produce fewer patents between three to five years after the filing 
of a class action but patenting activity is unaffected immediately following the filing.  This 
reduction in the number of patents is also consistent with the drop in R&D as observed in 
Table 4.10.  As such, it appears that investment in innovation declines immediately 
following the filing and subsequently there is a decline in the number of patents obtained, 
which coincides with the length of a development cycle (see Section 4.3.1.3). 
Interestingly, for the sued firms that had not obtained a patent pre-filing (No-Patent 
Pre-Filing), both Post*Sued and Immediate*Sued interaction terms are significantly 
positively related to the number of patents.  This indicates that the number of patents 
obtained by a firm increases after being sued.  One possible explanation for this finding is 
that these sued firms were struggling to innovate before being sued but have a number of 
innovative projects come to fruition after the filing.  In this scenario, the observed increase 
in the number of patents is not causally related to the filing and just reflects the nature of 
 




the innovative development process.  Alternatively, it may reflect a more concerted effort 
by the managers to obtain patents.  However, the subsample of sued firms without a patent 
pre-filing (No-Patent Pre-Filing) do not appear to be investing more in innovative 
activities post-filing.  As such, the increase in patenting may stem from the discipline 
being imposed by the filing of a class action. 
Table 4.12 and Table 4.13 report the results when the dependent variable is one of the 
two measures of citations (Citations (Fixed) and Citations (Quasi)).  For the full sample of 
settled class actions, the filing of a class action does not appear to have a significant impact 
on the number of citations.  For the sued firms that had obtained a patent pre-filing (Patent 
Pre-Filing) sample, Immediate*Sued and Post*Sued interaction terms are significantly 
negatively related to the Citations (Quasi) measure but not to Citations (Fixed).  The 
coefficient is more significantly negative for the Post*Sued variable (-0.256) as compared 
to the Immediate*Sued (-0.148) when Citations (Quasi) is the dependent variable.  This 
would indicate that after being sued the average quality of patents obtained by sued firms 
declines.  It is likely that managers are taking fewer risks with their innovative activities 
post-filing.  As such, firms may be focusing more on safer projects.  However, this 
association is only evident for Citations (Quasi) and not Citations (Fixed). 
For both measures of citations, the two interaction terms are positive and significant for 
the No-Patent Pre-Filing regressions.  As previously mentioned for the analysis of the 
number of patents, there are two possible explanations for this finding.  It could be a result 
of the nature of development process or it could reflect improved discipline.  Appendices 
D.2 to D.4 report full results where the dependent variable is the number of patents and the 
two citation measures for the full sample of class actions as well as the dismissed and 
settled subsamples.  The Immediate*Sued and Post*Sued terms for the sued firms without 
a patent pre-filing (No-Patent Pre-Filing) dismissed sample have similar coefficients and 
levels of significance with the settled cases.  This indicates that the merits of the case do 
not matter and the same trend is observed irrespective of whether managers have 
committed misconduct.  Hence, the observed positive relation is unlikely to be a result of 
improved discipline being imposed by the filing of a class action. 
When Value Added is the dependent variable, the two interaction terms are not 
significant for the model estimated on all settled cases and the sample that had obtained a 
patent pre-filing (Patent Pre-Filing).  The Post*Sued term is negative and marginally 
significant for the sample of sued firms that had not obtained a patent pre-filing filing (No-
 




Patent Pre-Filing).  However, due to the marginal significance of the result and the 
evidence already reported, this finding is difficult to interpret.  Overall, the filing of a class 
action does not appear to have a significant impact on the average quality of patents. 
Finally, the impact of the filing of a class action on the three measures of innovative 
efficiency was analysed.  The results of these regressions are reported in Tables 4.15 to 
4.17.  Both Immediate*Sued and Post*Sued interaction terms are not significant in any of 
the models reported in these tables.  Contrary to expectations, the results suggest that 
innovative efficiency is unaffected by the filing of a SCA. 
One possible reason for not finding a significant relationship could be the substantial 
number of lagged years used to calculate the innovative efficiency measures.  However, re-
estimating the models using innovative efficiency measures using three years of lagged 




Overall, the findings indicate that if a firm was innovating successfully before being 
sued, the filing of a class action has an immediate impact on the amount invested in 
innovation.  However, the decrease in R&D expenditures is only evident for up to two 
years following the filing.  The results also indicate that the quantity of patents received 
declines between three to five years following the filing of a class action.  The impact the 
class action has on the quality of the patents is less clear.  The overall quality of innovation 
appears to be either unaffected or to decline post-filing.  Finally, innovative efficiency 
appears to be unaffected by shareholder litigation.  The filing of a class action, therefore, 
appears to cause changes in a firm’s innovative activities.  From this analysis, it is unclear 
whether these changes are a negative side effect stemming from the disruption caused by a 
SCA or a benefit as a result of improved discipline post-filing.  As such, future research 




This chapter examines the relationship between corporate innovation and SCAs.  The 
results reported indicate that firms involved in innovative activities are more likely to be 
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 Results are not reported. 
 




sued.  The higher propensity for being sued is primarily related to whether firms are 
actively investing in innovative activities.  It is argued that greater information asymmetry 
provides more opportunities to managers of innovative firms to commit misconduct. 
Among firms that innovate, more innovatively successful firms are found to be less 
likely to face a SCA.  Alternatively, firms that are struggling to innovate are more likely to 
be accused of corporate misconduct.  This finding is consistent with managers of 
innovative firms facing greater pressures to violate securities laws if they are unable to 
remain innovatively competitive.  These findings extend the current understanding of the 
causes of SCAs.  Market participants, therefore, need to be wary of this potential negative 
consequence of the innovative process.  As such, the results will be useful for future 
detection and the possible prevention of corporate misconduct 
After being sued, firms that had obtained at least one patent pre-filing decrease the 
amount invested in innovative projects in the short-term, which results in a decline in 
innovative outputs several years later.  The overall quality of patents being produced by 
sued firms appears to be similar or slightly worse post-filing.  However, innovative 
efficiency does not appear to be impacted. 
This research is the first to explicitly examine the association between innovation and 
corporate misconduct.  The evidence reported suggests that innovative activities impact 
both the opportunities and the pressures to violate securities laws.  The filing of a class 
action appears to have a tangible impact on innovative activities although whether these 
changes are beneficial remains unclear.  Overall, this study highlights two important facets 
of innovating firms that stakeholders and regulators need to be aware of: (1) the higher risk 








Table 4.1: Variable Definitions 
 
    
Panel (A): Innovation Related Variables 
    
  
Variable Definition 
    
  
R&D/Assets Ratio of R&D expenditures to the firms total assets. 
Patents Natural log of one plus the number of patents. 
Citations (Fixed) Natural log of one plus the number of citations per patent scaled by the average 
number of citations received by patents granted in the same year and technology 
subcategory. 
Citations (Quasi) Natural log of one plus the number of citations per patent is multiplied by an 
adjustment factor based on the citation lag distribution. 
Value Added Natural log of one plus the average value added by patents granted in year t (value 
added measure has been obtained from the Kogan et al. (2017) data set). 
IE Patents A measure of Innovative Efficiency developed by Hirshleifer et al. (2013) calculated 
as the number of patents granted scaled by its R&D capital at the end of year t.  
Where the R&D capital is the five year cumulative R&D expenses assuming an 
annual rate of depreciation of 20%. 
IE Citations (Fixed) A measure of Innovative Efficiency calculated as the sum of the Citations (Fixed) 
for patents that were granted over the prior five years scaled by R&D expenses 
accrued between t-1 and t-5. 
IE Citations (Quasi) A measure of Innovative Efficiency calculated as the sum of the Citations (Quasi) 
for patents that were granted over the prior five years scaled by R&D expenses 
accrued between t-1 and t-5. 
    
    
Panel (B): Other Variables 
    
    
Immediate A dummy variable equal to one if the firm-year is between the year a class action 
was filed and up to two years after the filing of a class action (year t to t+2). 
Post A dummy variable equal to one if the firm-year is between three to five years after 
the filing of a class action (year t+3 to t+5). 
Sued A dummy variable equal to one if the firm was sued. 
Size Natural log of the firm's market capitalisation. 
Leverage Ratio of total book value of current and long term debt to market capitalisation. 
ROA Ratio of net income to assets.  
Return Annual return on the firm's stock.  
B/M Ratio of common equity to market capitalisation.  
Tangibles Ratio of the gross plant property and equipment (PPE) to total assets.  
Dividends Ratio of total ordinary share dividends paid to total assets.  
Std Ret Standard deviation of the firm's daily stock returns.  
Beta The beta for the market model obtained by regressing the firm's daily stock returns 
against the returns of the CRSP value weighted index.  
Skew Skewness of the firm's daily stock returns.  
H-Index Herfindahl Index based on the annual sales within each 4 digit SIC industry.  
H-Index
2
 The square of the H-Index.  
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Table 4.2: Comparison of Sued and Non-Sued Firms 
Table 4.2 reports descriptive statistics for sued and non-sued firm-year observations between 1996 and 2007.  The table includes the mean and number of observations for the 




 percentiles.  The difference between the two samples are calculated as the mean of the sued firms variable less 
the mean of the non-sued firms variable and these are shown in the last column with significance calculated using a paired t-test.  Variables definitions can be found in Table 
4.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 







    
 
    
 




Mean N Difference (Sued-NonSued) 
              
       
Firm Characteristics 
      Market Cap 4,966.27 1,168 
 
1,476.66 67,640 3,489.61*** 
Assets 3,736.63 1,168 
 
2,404.67 67,640  1,331.95 
Leverage 0.19 1,168 
 
0.22 67,640 -0.03*** 
PPE/Assets 0.33 1,168 
 
0.48 67,640 -0.15*** 
B/M 0.65 1,168 
 
1.83 67,640 -1.18 
ROA -0.08 1,168 
 
-0.06 67,640 -0.02 
Return 0.18 1,168 
 
0.17 67,640 0.02 
R&D/Assets 0.10 840 
 
0.10 37,821 0.01 
       
SCA Info 
      Settled 0.65 1,168 
    Days In CP 397.72 1,167 
    Days to File 115.45 1,167 
    Days to Outcome 1,369.84 1,168 
    
       
Innovation(Prior 3 Years) 





Patents 1.34 1,168 
 
0.77 67,640 0.57*** 
Citations (Fixed) 0.40 1,168 
 
0.22 67,640 0.19*** 
Citations (Quasi) 1.57 1,168 
 
0.91 67,636 0.66*** 
Value Added 1.88 584 
 
1.40 22,508 0.48*** 
IE Patents 0.37 513 
 
0.44 18,896 -0.07*** 
IE Citations (Fixed) 0.71 521 
 
0.77 19,464 -0.07* 
IE Citations (Quasi) 2.79 521 
 
2.82 19,461 -0.03 
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Table 4.3: Comparison of Sued Firms with a Patent and Sued Firms without a Patent 
Table 4.3 reports descriptive statistics for sued firms split by innovative activities.  If a firm obtained at least one patent in the three years prior to the filing of a class action 





percentiles.  The difference between the two samples are calculated as the mean of the sued innovator firms variable less the mean of the sued non-innovator firms variable 
and these are shown in the last column with significance calculated using a paired t-test.  Variables definitions can be found in Table 4.1.  *, **, *** Statistically different 
from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 




No Patent Pre-Filing 
 
 
    
 
    
 




Mean N Difference (Patent-NoPatent) 
              
       
Firm Values 
      Market Cap 8,740.54 584 
 
1,510.87 584 7,229.67*** 
Assets 5,867.49 584 
 
1,657.28 584 4,210.21*** 
Leverage 0.17 584 
 
0.22 584 -0.06*** 
PPE/Assets 0.31 584 
 
0.35 584 -0.04*** 
B/M 0.58 584 
 
0.71 584 -0.14 
ROA -0.10 584 
 
-0.06 584 -0.04* 
Return 0.19 584 
 
0.17 584 0.02 
R&D/Assets 0.13 513 
 
0.07 327 0.06*** 
       
SCA Info 
      Settled 0.61 584 
 
0.68 584 -0.07** 
Days In CP 396.54 583 
 
398.92 584 -2.38 
Days to File 114.58 583 
 
116.18 584 -1.61 
Days to Outcome 1,386.61 584 
 
1,352.85 584 33.76 
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Table 4.4: Sued Firms by Year and Industry 
Table 4.4 reports the number of SCAs filed each year and in each industry for the sample of 1168 class 
actions filed during the period of 1996 to 2007 obtained from the Stanford SCA Clearinghouse.  Panel A 
displays the number and percentage of SCAs filed each year.  Panel B reports the frequency of class actions 
and the number of sued firms that received at least one patent in the three years before the filing by industry. 
 
          
Panel A: Distribution of Sample across Years 
          






          


































































          
     
Panel B: Distribution of Class Actions across Industries 
          
     
  
N N (Patent Pre) %Patent Pre 
          
     
Consumer NonDurables 51 21 41.2% 
Consumer Durables 27 17 63.0% 
Manufacturing 73 48 65.8% 
Energy 23 7 30.4% 
Chemicals and Allied 16 9 56.3% 
Business Equipment 437 282 64.5% 
Telecom 63 19 30.2% 
Retail and Wholesale 139 33 23.7% 
Healthcare 176 107 60.8% 
Other 163 41 25.2% 





          
 
 
Chapter 4. Securities Class Actions and Innovation 122 
 
 
Table 4.5: Correlations 
Table 4.5 shows the matrix of Spearman correlation coefficients for the independent variables.  Correlations are calculated based on the full sample of sued and non-sued 
firms analysed.  Variance inflation factors (VIFs) are also presented for the independent variables used in equation (4.4).  Variables definitions can be found in Table 4.1. 
 




























































































































































                                        
                    
R&D/Assetst-3,t-1 1.00 
                  Patentst-3,t-1 0.64 1.00 
                 Citations (Fixed)t-3,t-1 0.72 0.94 1.00 
                Citations (Quasi)t-3,t-1 0.71 0.61 0.67 1.00 
               Value Addedt-3,t-1 0.06 0.13 0.12 0.02 1.00 
              IE (Patents)t-3,t-1 0.12 0.02 0.09 -0.19 -0.13 1.00 
             IE (Citations (Fixed))t-3,t-1 0.18 0.31 0.30 -0.06 -0.08 0.72 1.00 
            IE (Citations (Quasi))t-3,t-1 0.25 0.35 0.41 -0.02 -0.08 0.63 0.91 1.00 
           Size 0.40 0.24 0.25 0.55 -0.12 -0.21 -0.12 -0.10 1.00 
         
1.30 
Leverage -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.06 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 1.00 
        
1.07 
ROA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 -0.11 1.00 
       
1.12 
Return 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 -0.10 -0.02 0.00 0.02 0.12 -0.08 0.01 1.00 
      
1.02 
B/M 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.07 -0.01 0.01 0.00 1.00 
     
1.01 
Tangibles -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.02 -0.05 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.72 -0.03 -0.10 0.01 1.00 
    
1.03 
Dividends 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
   
1.04 
Std Ret -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 0.06 0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.10 0.00 0.00 -0.22 0.00 0.00 -0.01 1.00 
  
1.07 
Beta 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 1.00 
 
1.01 
Skew -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.03 -0.13 -0.01 -0.07 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.15 0.00 1.00 1.06 
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Table 4.6: Probability of Being Sued if Firm Innovates 
Table 4.6 reports logit regression estimates for the probability of a firm being sued, using equation (4.3).  
The dependent variable in these regressions is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is sued in year t.  
Dummy R&D (3 Year) is equal to one if the firm spend any amount on R&D in the preceding three years.  
Dummy Patents (3 Year) is equal to one if the firm received at least one patent in the prior three years.  
Dummy Patents (5 Year) is equal to one if the firm received at least one patent in the prior five years.  Robust 
standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses.  Variables definitions can be found in 
Table 4.1.. *, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, 
respectively. 
 
        
 
Dependent Variable: Sued 
        
    














   Dummy Patent (5 Year) 
  
0.081 
   
(0.06) 
 
   Size 0.336*** 0.332*** 0.334*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
   Leverage -0.016 -0.050 -0.052 
 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
 
   ROA -0.095*** -0.103*** -0.103*** 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
   Return -0.022** -0.022** -0.022** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
   B/M 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
   Tangibles -1.498*** -1.515*** -1.515*** 
 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
 
   Dividends 0.072 0.073 0.074 
 
(0.13) (0.14) (0.14) 
 
   Std Ret 0.019** 0.019** 0.019** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
   Beta 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
   Skew -0.162*** -0.161*** -0.161*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
   Intercept -5.645*** -5.484*** -5.488*** 
 
(0.12) (0.11) (0.11) 
 
   Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.14 0.14 0.14 
N 73,429 73,429 73,429 
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Table 4.7: Probability of Being Sued by Amount of Innovation 
Table 4.7 reports logit regression estimates for the probability of a firm being sued, using equation (4.4).  The dependent variable in these regressions is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the firm is sued in year t.  The eight innovation measures (R&D/Assets, Patents, Citations (Fixed), Citations (Quasi), Value Added, IE Patents, IE Citations 
(Fixed) and IE Citations (Quasi)) are calculated based on the level of innovative activity being undertaken in the preceding three years. Robust standard errors clustered at the 
firm level are reported in parentheses. Variables definitions can be found in Table 4.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance 
levels, respectively. 
 
                  
 
Dependent Variable: Sued 
                  
         
R&D/Assetsi t-1,t-3 -0.224** 
       
 
(0.09) 
       
 
        Patentsi t-1,t-3 
 
-0.080*** 
      
  
(0.02) 
      
 
        Citations (Fixed)i t-1,t-3 
  
0.107 
     
   
(0.07) 
     
 
        Citations (Quasi)i t-1,t-3 
   
0.025 
    
    
(0.02) 
    
 
        Value Addedi t-1,t-3 
    
-0.196*** 
   
     
(0.04) 
   
 
        IE Patentsi t-1,t-3 
     
0.151 
  




        IE Citations (Fixed)i t-1,t-3 
      
0.030 
 




        IE Citations (Quasi)i t-1,t-3 
       
0.018 
        
(0.03) 
 
        Size 0.331*** 0.384*** 0.327*** 0.328*** 0.428*** 0.301*** 0.320*** 0.320*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
        Leverage -0.013 -0.004 0.011 0.006 0.009 -0.036 0.131 0.132 
 
(0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.22) (0.21) (0.21) 
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ROA -0.247*** -0.219*** -0.199*** -0.200*** -0.217*** -0.227*** -0.218*** -0.218*** 
 
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
 
        Return -0.031*** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.031*** -0.108** -0.054 -0.054 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
 
        B/M -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.011* -0.010 -0.010 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
        Tangibles -1.799*** -1.713*** -1.806*** -1.815*** -1.770*** -1.704*** -1.372*** -1.373*** 
 
(0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) 
 
        Dividends -1.980 -1.800 -1.593 -1.640 -1.843 -2.418 -5.447* -5.443* 
 
(1.62) (1.56) (1.54) (1.55) (1.58) (2.58) (3.21) (3.21) 
 
        Std Ret 0.022** 0.023** 0.023** 0.023** 0.025** 0.031* 0.042*** 0.042*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
        Beta 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
        Skew -0.157*** -0.155*** -0.156*** -0.156*** -0.155*** -0.165*** -0.170*** -0.170*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
     
   
Intercept -6.820 -7.018 -6.884 -6.884 -7.198 -7.980 -8.581 -8.599 
 
(39.47) (25.15) (39.60) (39.55) (24.69) (99.25) (60.67) (60.65) 
 
        Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R
2
 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.14 
N 32,028 32,028 32,028 32,024 32,028 19,012 19,402 19,399 
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Table 4.8: Probability of Being Sued by Amount of Innovation Relative to the Industry 
Table 4.8 reports logit regression estimates for the probability of a firm being sued, using equation (4.4).  The dependent variable in these regressions is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the firm is sued in year t.  The eight innovation measures (R&D/Assets, Patents, Citations (Fixed), Citations (Quasi), Value Added, IE Patents, IE Citations 
(Fixed) and IE Citations (Quasi)) are calculated as the level of innovative activity being undertaken in the preceding three years by firm i less the industry average level of 
innovative activity in the preceding three years. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses.  Variables definitions can be found in Table 4.1. 
*, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 
                  
 
Dependent Variable: Sued 
                  
         
R&D/Assetsi t-1,t-3 - R&D/Assetsind t-1,t-3 -0.164* 
       
 
(0.09) 
       
 
        Patentsi t-1,t-3 - Patentsind t-1,t-3 
 
-0.074*** 
      
  
(0.02) 
      
 
        Citations (Fixed)i t-1,t-3 - Citations (Fixed)ind t-1,t-3 
  
0.115* 
     
   
(0.07) 
     
 
        Citations (Quasi)i t-1,t-3 - Citations (Quasi)ind t-1,t-3 
   
0.031 
    
    
(0.02) 
    
 
        Value Addedi t-1,t-3 - Value Addedind t-1,t-3 
    
-0.185*** 
   
     
(0.04) 
   
 
        IE Patentsi t-1,t-3 - IE Patentsind t-1,t-3 
     
0.187* 
  




        IE Citations (Fixed)i t-1,t-3 - IE Citations (Fixed)ind t-1,t-3 
      
0.049 
 




        IE Citations (Quasi)i t-1,t-3 - IE Citations (Quasi)ind t-1,t-3 
       
0.021 
        
(0.03) 
 
        Size 0.332*** 0.380*** 0.326*** 0.326*** 0.422*** 0.301*** 0.321*** 0.320*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
        Leverage -0.010 -0.004 0.012 0.008 0.008 -0.035 0.132 0.132 
 
(0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
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ROA -0.236*** -0.218*** -0.199*** -0.199*** -0.217*** -0.227*** -0.218*** -0.218*** 
 
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
 
        Return -0.031*** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.031*** -0.108** -0.054 -0.054 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
 
        B/M -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.011* -0.010 -0.010 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
        Tangibles -1.803*** -1.720*** -1.806*** -1.816*** -1.773*** -1.703*** -1.372*** -1.373*** 
 
(0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22) 
 
        Dividends -1.912 -1.803 -1.579 -1.614 -1.837 -2.407 -5.378* -5.423* 
 
(1.61) (1.56) (1.54) (1.55) (1.58) (2.57) (3.21) (3.21) 
 
        Std Ret 0.022** 0.023** 0.023** 0.023** 0.024** 0.031* 0.042*** 0.042*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
        Beta 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
        Skew -0.156*** -0.155*** -0.156*** -0.156*** -0.155*** -0.165*** -0.170*** -0.170*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
     
   
Intercept -6.867 -7.066 -6.859 -6.854 -7.270 -7.920 -8.560 -8.553 
 
(39.47) (25.27) (39.61) (39.59) (24.66) (99.28) (60.66) (60.65) 
 
        Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R
2
 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.14 
N 32,028 32,028 32,028 32,024 32,028 19,012 19,402 19,399 
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Table 4.9: Comparison of Sued and Matched Sample 
Table 4.9 reports descriptive statistics for sued and matched firm-year observations.  The table includes the 





percentiles.  The difference between the two samples are calculated as the mean of the sued firms variable 
less the mean of the matched firms variable and these are shown in the last column with significance 
calculated using a paired t-test.  Variables definitions can be found in Table 4.1. *, **, *** Statistically 
different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 







            
      
Firm Values 
     Size 6.48 1,168 6.46 5,830 0.02 
Leverage 0.19 1,168 0.18 5,830 0.01 
ROA -0.08 1,168 -0.02 5,830 -0.06 
Return 0.18 1,168 0.19 5,830 -0.01 
B/M 0.65 1,168 0.66 5,830 -0.02 
Tangibles 0.33 1,168 0.33 5,830 0.00 
Dividends/Assets 0.00 1,168 0.01 5,830 0.00 
Std Ret 0.05 1,168 0.11 5,830 -0.06 
Beta 1.32 1,168 1.10 5,830 0.21 
Skew 0.23 1,168 0.25 5,830 -0.02 
      
Innovation 
     Patents 0.90 1,168 0.90 5,830 0.00 
Citations (Fixed) 0.30 1,168 0.29 5,830 0.01 
Citations (Quasi) 1.15 1,168 1.11 5,830 0.04 
Value Added 1.91 455 2.04 2,264 -0.12* 
R&D/Assets 0.10 840 0.10 4,058 0.01 
IE Patents 0.14 415 0.14 2,082 0.01 
IE Citations (Fixed) 0.40 515 0.35 2,560 0.05 
IE Citations (Quasi) 2.02 515 1.88 2,560 0.14 
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Table 4.10: Impact of the Filing of a Class Action on R&D – Settled Cases 
Table 4.10 reports OLS regression estimates for the effect the filing of a class action that was settled has on R&D 
expenditures.  The dependent variable in this regression is the ratio of R&D/Assets.  The regressions were 
estimated for a sample of sued and propensity score matching sample of non-sued firms.  R&D was analysed for a 
window of up to five years before and after the filing of a SCA.  The first column (All) presents results obtained 
for regressions estimated on all sued and matched firms.  The second column (Patent Pre-Filing) reports 
regression estimates for the sample of sued firms that obtained at least one patent in the three years before the 
filing and the corresponding matched firm.  The second column (No-Patent Pre-Filing) reports regression 
estimates for the sample of sued firms that did not obtain a patent in the three years before the filing and the 
corresponding matched firms.  Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses.  
Variables definitions can be found in Table 4.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 
percent significance levels, respectively. 
 
        
 
Dependent Variable: R&D/Assets 
    
 
      
 
All Patent Pre-Filing No-Patent Pre-Filing 
        
    
Immediate 0.002 0.000 0.006 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
   Post -0.006 -0.012* 0.006 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
   Sued 0.010** 0.026*** -0.019*** 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
   Immediate * Sued -0.026*** -0.031*** -0.016 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
   Post * Sued -0.010 -0.008 -0.018 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
   Size -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.008*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
   Leverage -0.055*** -0.040*** -0.081*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
   ROA -0.168*** -0.171*** -0.163*** 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
 
   Return -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
   B/M 0.000 0.000 0.000** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
   Tangibles -0.015*** -0.031*** 0.004 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
   Dividends 0.012 0.018 0.009 
 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05) 
 
   H-Index -0.037 -0.154*** 0.063* 
 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.03) 
 
   H-Index2 0.027 0.132** -0.065* 
 
(0.03) (0.06) (0.04) 
 
   High-Tech 0.086*** 0.059*** 0.105*** 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
 
   Intercept 0.166*** 0.235*** 0.099*** 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
 
   Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.20 0.15 0.31 
N 21,350 12,500 8,850 
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Table 4.11: Impact of the Filing of a Class Action on the Number of Patents – Settled 
Cases 
Table 4.11 reports OLS regression estimates for the effect the filing of a class action that was settled has on the 
number of patents.  The dependent variable in this regression is the log of one plus the number of patents.  The 
regressions were estimated for a sample of sued and propensity score matching sample of non-sued firms.  The 
number of patents were analysed for a window of up to five years before and after the filing of a SCA.  The first 
column (All) presents results obtained for regressions estimated on all sued and matched firms.  The second 
column (Patent Pre-Filing) reports regression estimates for the sample of sued firms that obtained at least one 
patent in the three years before the filing and the corresponding matched firm.  The second column (No-Patent 
Pre-Filing) reports regression estimates for the sample of sued firms that did not obtain a patent in the three years 
before the filing and the corresponding matched firms.  Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are 
reported in parentheses.  Variables definitions can be found in Table 4.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from 
zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 
        
 
Dependent Variable: Patents 
    
 
      
 
All Patent Pre-Filing No-Patent Pre-Filing 
        
    
Immediate -0.060** -0.024 -0.144*** 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
   Post -0.004 0.090** -0.203*** 
 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
 
   Sued 0.029 0.273*** -0.557*** 
 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
 
   Immediate * Sued -0.028 -0.081 0.162** 
 
(0.05) (0.07) (0.06) 
 
   Post * Sued -0.022 -0.238** 0.270*** 
 
(0.07) (0.10) (0.09) 
 
   Size 0.444*** 0.526*** 0.229*** 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
   Leverage 0.256*** 0.218*** 0.177*** 
 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05) 
 
   ROA 0.092*** 0.117*** 0.040 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
 
   Return -0.084*** -0.086*** -0.051*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
   B/M 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.014*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
   Tangibles 0.642*** 1.219*** 0.169*** 
 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
 
   R&D 0.845*** 0.945*** 0.503*** 
 
(0.07) (0.10) (0.08) 
 
   Dividends 1.033*** 0.593 0.507* 
 
(0.25) (0.37) (0.27) 
 
   H-Index 3.689*** 4.101*** 1.789*** 
 
(0.21) (0.33) (0.22) 
 
   H-Index2 -3.174*** -3.328*** -1.465*** 
 
(0.23) (0.37) (0.23) 
 
   High-Tech 0.937*** 0.842*** 0.625*** 
 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.03) 
 
   Intercept -3.606*** -4.321*** -1.572*** 
 
(0.07) (0.11) (0.08) 
 
   Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.35 0.40 0.22 
N 21,530 12,583 8,947 
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Table 4.12: Impact of the Filing of a Class Action on the Number of Citations (Fixed) 
– Settled Cases 
Table 4.12 reports OLS regression estimates for the effect the filing of a class action that was settled has on the 
number of citations.  The dependent variable in this regression is the log of one plus the number of citations per 
patent scaled by the average number of citations received by patents granted in the same year and in the same 
technology subcategory.  The regressions were estimated for a sample of sued and propensity score matching 
sample of non-sued firms.  The number of citations were analysed for a window of up to five years before and 
after the filing of a SCA.  The first column (All) presents results obtained for regressions estimated on all sued and 
matched firms.  The second column (Patent Pre-Filing) reports regression estimates for the sample of sued firms 
that obtained at least one patent in the three years before the filing and the corresponding matched firm.  The 
second column (No-Patent Pre-Filing) reports regression estimates for the sample of sued firms that did not obtain 
a patent in the three years before the filing and the corresponding matched firms.  Robust standard errors clustered 
at the firm level are reported in parentheses.  Variables definitions can be found in Table 4.1. *, **, *** 
Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 
        
 
Dependent Variable: Citations (Fixed) 
    
 
      
 
All Patent Pre-Filing No-Patent Pre-Filing 
        
    
Immediate -0.030*** -0.033*** -0.024** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
   Post -0.041*** -0.032** -0.050*** 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
   Sued 0.028** 0.149*** -0.214*** 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
   Immediate * Sued 0.007 -0.013 0.074*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
 
   Post * Sued 0.028 -0.043 0.137*** 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) 
 
   Size 0.072*** 0.069*** 0.056*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
   Leverage -0.026* -0.049** -0.003 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
   ROA 0.031*** 0.023 0.022* 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
   Return -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
   B/M 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.001** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
   Tangibles 0.021* 0.047*** -0.007 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
   R&D 0.255*** 0.229*** 0.186*** 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
   Dividends -0.152* -0.360*** -0.023 
 
(0.09) (0.12) (0.11) 
 
   H-Index 0.498*** 0.300*** 0.312*** 
 
(0.07) (0.11) (0.09) 
 
   H-Index2 -0.380*** -0.148 -0.231** 
 
(0.08) (0.13) (0.09) 
 
   High-Tech 0.240*** 0.163*** 0.220*** 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
 
   Intercept -0.491*** -0.404*** -0.342*** 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
 
   Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.14 0.12 0.14 
N 21,530 12,583 8,947 
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Table 4.13: Impact of the Filing of a Class Action on the Number of Citations (Quasi) 
– Settled Cases 
Table 4.13 reports OLS regression estimates for the effect the filing of a class action that was settled has on the 
number of citations.  The dependent variable in this regression is the log of one plus the number of citations per 
patent multiplied by an adjustment factor obtained from the citation lag distribution.  The regressions were 
estimated for a sample of sued and propensity score matching sample of non-sued firms.  The number of citations 
were analysed for a window of up to five years before and after the filing of a SCA.  The first column (All) 
presents results obtained for regressions estimated on all sued and matched firms.  The second column (Patent 
Pre-Filing) reports regression estimates for the sample of sued firms that obtained at least one patent in the three 
years before the filing and the corresponding matched firm.  The second column (No-Patent Pre-Filing) reports 
regression estimates for the sample of sued firms that did not obtain a patent in the three years before the filing and 
the corresponding matched firms.  Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses.  
Variables definitions can be found in Table 4.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 
percent significance levels, respectively. 
 
        
 
Dependent Variable: Citations (Quasi) 
    
 
      
 
All Patent Pre-Filing No-Patent Pre-Filing 
        
    
Immediate -0.088*** -0.068* -0.109*** 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
 
   Post -0.112*** -0.047 -0.191*** 
 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
 
   Sued 0.146*** 0.623*** -0.817*** 
 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) 
 
   Immediate * Sued -0.027 -0.148* 0.310*** 
 
(0.06) (0.08) (0.08) 
 
   Post * Sued 0.053 -0.256** 0.550*** 
 
(0.08) (0.10) (0.12) 
 
   Size 0.277*** 0.272*** 0.198*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
   Leverage -0.106** -0.154** -0.067 
 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07) 
 
   ROA 0.137*** 0.124*** 0.089** 
 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
 
   Return -0.022*** -0.013 -0.024* 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
   B/M 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.006*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
   Tangibles 0.254*** 0.416*** 0.068 
 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05) 
 
   R&D 0.836*** 0.710*** 0.610*** 
 
(0.08) (0.10) (0.10) 
 
   Dividends -0.063 -0.759* 0.239 
 
(0.27) (0.39) (0.35) 
 
   H-Index 2.750*** 2.175*** 1.629*** 
 
(0.23) (0.35) (0.29) 
 
   H-Index2 -2.250*** -1.521*** -1.299*** 
 
(0.25) (0.39) (0.31) 
 
   High-Tech 0.973*** 0.701*** 0.822*** 
 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
 
   Intercept -2.219*** -2.024*** -1.356*** 
 
(0.08) (0.11) (0.11) 
 
   Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.20 0.21 0.17 
N 21,530 12,583 8,947 
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Table 4.14: Impact of the Filing of a Class Action on the Value Added by Patents – 
Settled Cases 
Table 4.14 reports OLS regression estimates for the effect the filing of a class action that was settled has on the 
value added by patents.  The dependent variable in this regression is the log of one plus the average value added 
per patent.  The regressions were estimated for a sample of sued and propensity score matching sample of non-
sued firms.  The value added was analysed for a window of up to five years before and after the filing of a SCA.  
The first column (All) presents results obtained for regressions estimated on all sued and matched firms.  The 
second column (Patent Pre-Filing) reports regression estimates for the sample of sued firms that obtained at least 
one patent in the three years before the filing and the corresponding matched firm.  The second column (No-Patent 
Pre-Filing) reports regression estimates for the sample of sued firms that did not obtain a patent in the three years 
before the filing and the corresponding matched firms.  Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are 
reported in parentheses.  Variables definitions can be found in Table 4.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from 
zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 
        
 
Dependent Variable: Value Added 
    
 
      
 
All Patent Pre-Filing No-Patent Pre-Filing 
        
    
Immediate -0.041** -0.050** -0.005 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
 
   Post -0.092*** -0.103*** -0.042 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) 
 
   Sued 0.060** 0.047 0.306 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.21) 
 
   Immediate * Sued -0.032 -0.002 -0.220 
 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.24) 
 
   Post * Sued 0.035 0.102 -0.485* 
 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.28) 
 
   Size 0.488*** 0.476*** 0.512*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
 
   Leverage 0.275*** 0.288*** 0.243*** 
 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.07) 
 
   ROA 0.000 0.099*** -0.154*** 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
 
   Return -0.012** -0.016** 0.003 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
   B/M 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
   Tangibles -0.033 -0.174*** 0.268*** 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) 
 
   R&D 0.364*** 0.541*** -0.020 
 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.11) 
 
   Dividends -0.351 0.100 -0.788** 
 
(0.22) (0.29) (0.31) 
 
   H-Index -1.158*** -1.214*** -1.076*** 
 
(0.19) (0.23) (0.32) 
 
   H-Index2 1.200*** 1.290*** 0.981*** 
 
(0.20) (0.26) (0.33) 
 
   High-Tech 0.060** 0.040 0.111** 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) 
 
   Intercept -1.863*** -1.762*** -2.096*** 
 
(0.07) (0.08) (0.13) 
 
   Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.65 0.64 0.67 
N 10,131 7,607 2,524 
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Table 4.15: Impact of the Filing of a Class Action on Innovative Efficiency (Patents) – 
Settled Cases 
Table 4.15 reports OLS regression estimates for the effect the filing of a class action that was settled has on 
innovative efficiency of patenting.  The dependent variable in this regression is the log of one plus IE Patents.  The 
regressions were estimated for a sample of sued and propensity score matching sample of non-sued firms.  
Innovative efficiency was analysed for a window of up to five years before and after the filing of a SCA.  The first 
column (All) presents results obtained for regressions estimated on all sued and matched firms.  The second 
column (Patent Pre-Filing) reports regression estimates for the sample of sued firms that obtained at least one 
patent in the three years before the filing and the corresponding matched firm.  The second column (No-Patent 
Pre-Filing) reports regression estimates for the sample of sued firms that did not obtain a patent in the three years 
before the filing and the corresponding matched firms.  Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are 
reported in parentheses.  Variables definitions can be found in Table 4.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from 
zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 
        
 
Dependent Variable: IE Patents 
    
 
      
 
All Patent Pre-Filing No-Patent Pre-Filing 
        
    
Immediate -0.011* -0.018** 0.000 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
   Post -0.012 -0.013 -0.018 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
 
   Sued 0.012 0.010 0.065 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.08) 
 
   Immediate * Sued 0.012 0.015 -0.093 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.09) 
 
   Post * Sued 0.021 0.010 -0.009 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.11) 
 
   Size -0.031*** -0.027*** -0.039*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
   Leverage 0.008 -0.020 0.080*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) 
 
   ROA 0.049*** 0.040*** 0.059*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
 
   Return 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.011** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
 
   B/M 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.001 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
   Tangibles 0.055*** 0.101*** -0.041** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
 
   Dividends 0.723*** 0.311*** 1.227*** 
 
(0.07) (0.09) (0.12) 
 
   H-Index 0.387*** 0.397*** 0.218* 
 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.13) 
 
   H-Index2 -0.290*** -0.212*** -0.260** 
 
(0.07) (0.08) (0.13) 
 
   High-Tech -0.008 0.024** -0.109*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
 
   Intercept 0.244*** 0.198*** 0.392*** 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.05) 
 
   Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.11 0.10 0.17 
N 10,186 7,658 2,528 
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Table 4.16: Impact of the Filing of a Class Action on Innovative Efficiency (Citations 
(Fixed)) – Settled Cases 
Table 4.16 reports OLS regression estimates for the effect the filing of a class action that was settled has on 
innovative efficiency of the citations received on patents.  The dependent variable in this regression is the log of 
one plus IE Citations (Fixed).  The regressions were estimated for a sample of sued and propensity score matching 
sample of non-sued firms.  Innovative efficiency was analysed for a window of up to five years before and after 
the filing of a SCA.  The first column (All) presents results obtained for regressions estimated on all sued and 
matched firms.  The second column (Patent Pre-Filing) reports regression estimates for the sample of sued firms 
that obtained at least one patent in the three years before the filing and the corresponding matched firm.  The 
second column (No-Patent Pre-Filing) reports regression estimates for the sample of sued firms that did not obtain 
a patent in the three years before the filing and the corresponding matched firms.  Robust standard errors clustered 
at the firm level are reported in parentheses.  Variables definitions can be found in Table 4.1. *, **, *** 
Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 
        
 
Dependent Variable: IE Citations (Fixed) 
    
 
      
 
All Patent Pre-Filing No-Patent Pre-Filing 
        
    
Immediate -0.026*** -0.042*** 0.003 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
 
   Post -0.027** -0.039** -0.007 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
   Sued 0.049*** 0.048*** 0.022 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.06) 
 
   Immediate * Sued 0.010 0.016 -0.164* 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.10) 
 
   Post * Sued -0.008 -0.002 -0.147 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.10) 
 
   Size -0.029*** -0.025*** -0.039*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
   Leverage -0.055*** -0.098*** 0.056 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) 
 
   ROA 0.036*** 0.030** 0.047*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
 
   Return 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.023*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
 
   B/M 0.000** 0.000** -0.002** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
   Tangibles 0.073*** 0.124*** -0.027 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
 
   Dividends 0.041 -0.424*** 0.462** 
 
(0.12) (0.15) (0.18) 
 
   H-Index 0.291*** 0.456*** -0.209 
 
(0.09) (0.11) (0.17) 
 
   H-Index2 -0.175* -0.275** 0.207 
 
(0.10) (0.12) (0.17) 
 
   High-Tech -0.007 0.044*** -0.146*** 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
 
   Intercept 0.375*** 0.324*** 0.529*** 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.06) 
 
   Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.05 0.05 0.09 
N 13,189 9,602 3,587 
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Table 4.17: Impact of the Filing of a Class Action on Innovative Efficiency (Citations 
(Quasi)) – Settled Cases 
Table 4.17 reports OLS egression estimates for the effect the filing of a class action that was settled has on 
innovative efficiency of the citations received on patents.  The dependent variable in this regression is the log of 
one plus IE Citations (Quasi).  The regressions were estimated for a sample of sued and propensity score matching 
sample of non-sued firms.  Innovative efficiency was analysed for a window of up to five years before and after 
the filing of a SCA.  The first column (All) presents results obtained for regressions estimated on all sued and 
matched firms.  The second column (Patent Pre-Filing) reports regression estimates for the sample of sued firms 
that obtained at least one patent in the three years before the filing and the corresponding matched firm.  The 
second column (No-Patent Pre-Filing) reports regression estimates for the sample of sued firms that did not obtain 
a patent in the three years before the filing and the corresponding matched firms.  Robust standard errors clustered 
at the firm level are reported in parentheses.  Variables definitions can be found in Table 4.1. *, **, *** 
Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 
        
 
Dependent Variable: IE Citations (Quasi) 
    
 
      
 
All Patent Pre-Filing No-Patent Pre-Filing 
        
    
Immediate -0.043 -0.072** -0.009 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) 
 
   Post -0.036 -0.045 -0.060 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.07) 
 
   Sued 0.164*** 0.176*** -0.167 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.16) 
 
   Immediate * Sued 0.036 0.052 -0.503* 
 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.27) 
 
   Post * Sued -0.025 -0.010 -0.292 
 
(0.08) (0.09) (0.26) 
 
   Size -0.064*** -0.049*** -0.108*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
   Leverage -0.365*** -0.475*** -0.079 
 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.10) 
 
   ROA 0.139*** 0.117*** 0.192*** 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) 
 
   Return 0.061*** 0.055*** 0.082*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
 
   B/M 0.000 0.000 -0.005** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
   Tangibles 0.294*** 0.470*** -0.042 
 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.07) 
 
   Dividends -0.579* -1.810*** 0.497 
 
(0.32) (0.43) (0.49) 
 
   H-Index 1.596*** 2.352*** -0.505 
 
(0.26) (0.31) (0.46) 
 
   H-Index2 -1.330*** -1.935*** 0.467 
 
(0.28) (0.35) (0.48) 
 
   High-Tech 0.139*** 0.285*** -0.273*** 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.07) 
 
   Intercept 1.098*** 0.855*** 1.847*** 
 
(0.09) (0.11) (0.17) 
 
   Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.12 0.12 0.15 
N 13,189 9,602 3,587 













5.1 Summary of Main Findings 
This thesis investigates the determinants and consequences of securities class actions 
(SCAs) from three different perspectives.  First, Chapter 2 investigates whether the 
reputation of a lender or lending relationships are associated with the occurrence of SCAs.  
In the second empirical study (Chapter 3) the relationship between political lobbying and 
SCAs is examined.  Finally, Chapter 4 analyses the association between a firm’s 
innovative activities and the incidence of shareholder litigation. 
The main findings from Chapter 2 indicate that firms are less likely to have a SCA filed 
against them if they borrow from a reputable lender.  This finding appears to be a result of 
reputable lenders screening out prospective borrowers with a high risk of litigation.  
Chapter 2 also presents evidence that, after being sued, firms are less likely to be able to 
develop a relationship with a lender if they did not already have one.  Further, if a firm did 
not have a prior relationship with a lender, loans obtained after the filing of a SCA 
generally have larger spreads and are shorter in maturity.  However, if a firm had a 
relationship with a lender they are more likely to continue that relationship after being 
sued.  Sued firms with an ex-ante lending relationship receive more favourable terms on 
loans obtained after the filing relative to sued firms without a relationship.  These benefits 
include relatively smaller spreads and better access to more capital.  Overall, these findings 
suggest that lenders may be willing to provide more lenient terms, even after the firm faces 
 




allegations of misconduct, in order to maintain a relationship with the borrowing firm.  
Consequently, the evidence suggests that reputational penalties imposed on loans after the 
filing of a SCA can mostly be negated by the existence of a lending relationship. 
The analysis conducted in Chapter 2 makes several contributions to the literature on the 
determinants and consequences of SCAs, as well as the literature on private debt financing.  
First, this is the first empirical work that examines whether reputable lenders are more 
adept at avoiding or limiting the incidence of shareholder litigation.  Second, this is the 
first empirical work to examine how a firm’s relationship with its lenders is impacted by 
the filing of a SCA.  Finally, this paper extends the current understanding of reputational 
penalties imposed on new loans by explicitly accounting for firms’ ex-ante lending 
relationships. 
Chapter 3 investigates whether lobbying activities are associated with the occurrence of 
corporate misconduct.  The main findings of this chapter indicate that lobbying firms 
exhibited longer class periods and were marginally less likely to settle a SCA prior to 
2004.  These findings suggest economic agents may have been unwilling to come forward 
with evidence of misconduct against lobbying firms, for fear of the repercussions.  
However, from 2005 onwards, lobbying is not related to the length of the class period or 
the likelihood of settlement.  These findings are consistent with the enactment of SOX 
improving the incentives for economic agents to reveal evidence of corporate misconduct.   
The findings of Chapter 3 contribute to the understanding of factors that influence the 
detection and outcome of SCAs.  Specifically, it extends the analysis undertaken by Yu 
and Yu (2011) and shows that although lobbying firms appear to be able to get away with 
their misconduct for longer prior to 2004, they are not able to do so afterward.  
Furthermore, Chapter 3 also contributes to the understanding of the drivers of the direct 
costs of SCAs by examining the impact political connections have on the probability and 
size of the settlement.  Finally, this study also provides insight into the effect that SOX 
may have had on the detection of corporate misconduct. 
In the final empirical study (Chapter 4), the association between corporate innovation 
and SCAs is examined.  The primary findings of this chapter indicate that firms are more 
likely to be sued if they invest in innovation, which is consistent with innovative firms 
having higher information asymmetry thereby providing them with more opportunities to 
commit misconduct.  Furthermore, among innovating firms, the level of innovative success 
is inversely associated with the probability of being sued.  This finding is consistent with 
 




less innovatively successful firms facing greater pressures to commit misconduct.  Finally, 
after the filing of a SCA investment in innovation immediately declines.  This appears to 
result in a decline in the number of patents obtained.  However, the filing of a SCA does 
not appear to substantially impact the quality of patents being produced or the innovative 
efficiency of firms. 
The results presented in Chapter 4 contribute to the understanding of the determinants 
and consequences of SCAs.  This chapter is the first empirical study to investigate whether 
corporate innovation is associated with the occurrence of shareholder litigation.  This is 
also the first empirical work to examine the impact that the filing of a SCA has on a firm’s 
innovative activities. 
 
5.2 Practical Implications and Future Research 
The results reported in the three empirical studies contribute to the literature on the 
determinants and consequences of shareholder litigation, but also have a number of 
practical implications.  The findings from Chapter 2 suggest that firms are more likely to 
be sued if they do not borrow from a reputable lender.  Similarly, the results of Chapter 4 
indicate that litigation risk is higher for innovative firms.  Furthermore, firms that do not 
innovate successfully relative to their competitors are also more likely to face shareholder 
litigation.  These two chapters, therefore, provide a better understanding of characteristics 
that are associated with the occurrence of shareholder litigation.  As such, particularly risk 
averse market participants that want to limit their exposure to the risk of litigation may 
want to potentially avoid dealing with firms with high levels of innovation and firms that 
do not borrow from reputable lenders. 
The results reported in Chapter 2 suggest that reputable lenders are able to avoid 
lending to high litigation risk firms.  However, there is no evidence to suggest that 
reputable lenders enhanced incentives to monitor borrowers, impacts the occurrence of 
misconduct.  These results suggest that it is possible for lenders to avoid firms that end up 
being sued but they are not able to limit the incidence of shareholder litigation.  This 
would indicate that lenders wanting to avoid the potential negative reputational 
consequences of lending to a firm that is sued should focus on screening rather than 
monitoring in their lending policies. 
 




An understanding of the determinants of shareholder litigation can also be very useful 
for detecting and preventing the future violation of securities laws.  Although not all class 
actions are meritorious in nature, the findings reported in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4 can be 
useful for identifying firms where misconduct is more likely to occur.  The analysis 
conducted in Chapters 2 and 4 suggest that simple indicators for whether firms are 
innovating or whether they are borrowing from a less reputable lender could be helpful in 
identifying firms that are more likely to commit misconduct.  As such, the findings should 
be a useful aide to help market participants and public enforcement agencies (such as the 
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)) be more effective at detecting the violation of 
securities laws.  Furthermore, the findings reported in Chapter 4 suggest that the 
innovative success of a firm relative to its competitors could be useful in identifying and 
detecting the incidence of malfeasance. 
The analysis on the probability of being sued that was conducted in Chapter 4 could 
also be used to develop appropriate legislation to limit the occurrence of misconduct.  In 
Chapter 4, it is argued that innovative firms may have more opportunities and face greater 
pressures to commit misconduct, which is supported by the results.  It may be possible to 
limit the incidence of managerial malfeasance by developing appropriate legislation that 
limits the opportunities and alleviates the pressures that innovating firms face.  This 
legislation could come in the form of more informative disclosures about innovative 
projects and the likelihood of them coming to fruition.  To be effective such legislation 
would need to ensure that these disclosures do not unduly undercut the competitive 
advantage of innovating firms. 
An alternative way to limit the occurrence of misconduct would be to improve the 
incentives for various economic agents to come forward with evidence of any illegal 
activities.  Chapter 3 presents evidence that the class period is significantly longer for 
lobbying firms before the enactment of SOX.  However, following the implementation of 
SOX this longer class period no longer holds.  It is argued that SOX has improved the 
incentives for various economic agents to come forward with evidence of misconduct, 
thereby improving the detection of malfeasance.  These findings support the notion that 
appropriate legislation can be a useful way to improve the detection of corporate 
misconduct. 
The empirical analyses also investigate the consequences of SCAs, which are useful for 
determining the efficacy of SCAs as an ex-post method of disciplining managers.  The 
 




results reported in Chapter 2 suggest that shareholder litigation does not undermine a 
firm’s relationship with its providers of financial capital.  Firms that had an existing 
relationship with a lender are more likely to continue that relationship and receive more 
favourable terms on new loans after being sued (relative to firms without a relationship).  
These more favourable terms effectively offset any reputational consequences caused by 
the allegation of misconduct.  The results suggest that the damage associated with the 
filing of a SCA is likely to be minimal provided that the firm had a relationship with its 
lender.  Since the reputational damage can largely be negated by the existence of a lending 
relationship, SCAs appear to serve a very limited role as an ex-post method of disciplining 
managers.  The findings reported in Chapter 2 also suggest that SCAs play a relatively 
limited role in deterring managers from violating securities laws due to the minimal nature 
of the penalties they face if the firm had a lending relationship. 
The consequences of the filing of a SCA on a firm’s innovative activities are also 
examined in Chapter 4.  The results suggest that R&D expenditures immediately decline 
after being sued, which appears to result in a decline in the number of patents being 
produced.  However, the quality of patents and the overall innovative efficiency are 
unaffected.  These findings indicate that SCAs may have an impact on innovative activities 
but there is no evidence to suggest that this change is beneficial to the firm.  Based on 
these results, SCAs do not appear to discipline managers or improve the efficiency of 
investment in innovation. 
Overall, this thesis reports little evidence to suggest that SCAs are an effective 
mechanism for disciplining a firm’s managers.  Consequently, the results do not support 
the notion that SCAs serve as a deterrence mechanism.  Although this thesis furthers the 
current understanding of the determinants and consequences of SCAs, there is still further 
avenues of research that could be explored to gain a greater understanding of the 
importance of shareholder litigation in corporate governance.   
Future research could extend the study conducted in Chapter 2 by exploring whether 
reputational penalties imposed by other stakeholders (such as customers or suppliers) after 
the filing of a SCA are impacted by a relationship between the sued firm and the 
stakeholder. Future research could also investigate in more detail whether the observed 
changes in innovative activity after the filing of a SCA, as reported in Chapter 4, are 
beneficial to the firm.  The focus of this thesis and the majority of the literature so far has 
been on shareholder litigation in the US.  There has been very limited research 
 




investigating the determinants and consequences of SCAs in non-US countries.  As such, 
there are numerous research opportunities to investigate how differences in legal, 
regulatory, political and corporate structures impact the occurrence and outcomes of 
shareholder litigation.  This research will help provide further insight into the efficacy of 
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Appendix A:  
 
Diff-in-Diff-in-Diff Estimation for the 
Impact a Relationship with a Bank has on 
Loan Features 
 
This appendix presents complete results for the robustness tests performed in Chapter 2 
that examine the change in loan terms following the filing of a class action (see Section 
2.4.4.2).
60
 The models reported in Appendix A.1 to A.7 were estimated using equation 
(2.7).  The dependent variable is one of the seven loan characteristics that were examined 
in Chapter 2.  The characteristics include: loan spread, maturity, number of covenants, loan 
size, collateral, syndicate size and the percentage of the loan held by the lead arranger.
61
  
Each table in this appendix reports models that were estimated for the entire sample of 
sued and corresponding matched firms (All columns).  The sample of was then split into 
two based on the outcome of the case.  Estimates obtained from running the regression on 
the sample of sued and the corresponding matched firms where the case was dismissed are 
reported in the Dismissed columns.  Similarly, estimates for the sample of sued and the 
corresponding matched firms where the case was settled are reported in the Settled 




                                                 
60
 These robustness tests are used to check the validity of Hypothesis 3 from Chapter 2. 
61
 See Table 2.1 for variable definitions. 
62
 See Section 2.4.4.2 for a discussion of these results. 
 




Appendix A.1: Impact a Relationship with a Bank has on Loan Spread – Diff-in-Diff-
in-Diff 
Appendix A.1 reports OLS regression estimates for the effect the filing of a class action has on loan spread, 
using equation (2.7).  The dependent variable in these regressions is the natural log of the loan spread.  
Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses.  Variable definitions can be 
found in Table 2.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, 
respectively. 
 




            
       
 
All Dismissed Settled 
              
       
Sued 0.105*** -0.009 0.094*** 0.084 0.125*** -0.078 
 
(0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.07) (0.02) (0.08) 
 
      PostFiling -0.004 -0.028 -0.012 0.016 0.012 -0.054 
 
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.04) 
 














      PostFiling * Sued 0.149*** 0.321*** 0.119*** -0.005 0.172*** 0.727*** 
 
(0.03) (0.11) (0.04) (0.12) (0.04) (0.16) 
 










































      Size -0.285*** -0.283*** -0.290*** -0.289*** -0.282*** -0.279*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
      Leverage 0.673*** 0.674*** 0.641*** 0.644*** 0.661*** 0.662*** 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
 
      ROA -0.577*** -0.584*** -1.106*** -1.108*** -0.350*** -0.356*** 
 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) 
 
      B/M -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.008*** -0.008*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
      Tangibles -0.252*** -0.253*** -0.231*** -0.231*** -0.247*** -0.248*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
      Dividends -7.479*** -7.444*** -8.487*** -8.472*** -6.574*** -6.538*** 
 
(0.91) (0.91) (1.20) (1.20) (1.24) (1.24) 
 
      Term Spread 0.118* 0.120* 0.201*** 0.200*** -0.120 -0.121 
 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.13) (0.13) 
 
      Credit Spread 0.463* 0.464* 0.742*** 0.740*** -0.237 -0.307 
 
(0.25) (0.25) (0.28) (0.28) (0.50) (0.50) 
 
      Intercept 6.999*** 7.041*** 6.631*** 6.650*** 8.144*** 8.279*** 
 
(0.40) (0.40) (0.45) (0.45) (0.81) (0.81) 
 
      Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.54 0.54 0.57 0.57 0.52 0.52 
N 28,274 28,274 13,547 13,547 14,727 14,727 








Appendix A.2: Impact a Relationship with a Bank has on Loan Size – Diff-in-Diff-in-
Diff 
Appendix A.2 reports OLS regression estimates for the effect the filing of a class action has on loan size, 
using equation (2.7).  The dependent variable in these regressions is the natural log of the size of the loan.  
Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses.  Variable definitions can be 
found in Table 2.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, 
respectively. 
 




            
       
 
All Dismissed Settled 
              
       
Sued -0.163*** -0.075 -0.162*** -0.193 -0.149*** -0.009 
 
(0.03) (0.08) (0.04) (0.13) (0.05) (0.11) 
 
      PostFiling 0.027* -0.097* 0.009 -0.134* 0.026 -0.123 
 
(0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.08) (0.02) (0.08) 
 














      PostFiling * Sued 0.089** -0.061 0.085 0.099 0.086 -0.200 
 
(0.05) (0.15) (0.06) (0.21) (0.06) (0.22) 
 










































      Size 0.414*** 0.412*** 0.403*** 0.399*** 0.428*** 0.428*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
      Leverage 0.446*** 0.441*** 0.480*** 0.471*** 0.444*** 0.440*** 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
 
      ROA -0.247*** -0.244*** -0.121 -0.114 -0.293*** -0.292*** 
 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.13) (0.13) (0.09) (0.09) 
 
      B/M 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
      Tangibles 0.086*** 0.084*** 0.173*** 0.172*** 0.032 0.028 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
 
      Dividends 3.923*** 3.880*** 4.896*** 4.824*** 2.986*** 2.965*** 
 
(0.56) (0.56) (0.66) (0.66) (0.80) (0.79) 
 
      Term Spread -0.223** -0.224** -0.370*** -0.375*** 0.051 0.056 
 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13) (0.20) (0.20) 
 
      Credit Spread -1.158*** -1.167*** -1.474*** -1.511*** -0.546 -0.499 
 
(0.41) (0.41) (0.49) (0.49) (0.75) (0.75) 
 
      Intercept 18.248*** 18.258*** 18.986*** 19.004*** 16.858*** 16.838*** 
 
(0.66) (0.66) (0.78) (0.78) (1.19) (1.19) 
 
      Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.34 
N 33,427 33,427 16,092 16,092 17,335 17,335 









Appendix A.3: Impact a Relationship with a Bank has on Loan Maturity – Diff-in-
Diff-in-Diff 
Appendix A.3 reports OLS regression estimates for the effect the filing of a class action has on loan maturity, 
using equation (2.7).  The dependent variable in these regressions is the natural log of the number of months 
until maturity of the loan.  Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses.  
Variable definitions can be found in Table 2.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 
percent significance levels, respectively. 
 




            
       
 
All Dismissed Settled 
              
       
Sued 0.046** -0.064 0.029 -0.001 0.060** -0.107 
 
(0.02) (0.06) (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.08) 
 
      PostFiling -0.003 -0.137*** -0.016 -0.135*** 0.014 -0.121** 
 
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.05) 
 














      PostFiling * Sued -0.053** 0.087 -0.027 0.115 -0.071** -0.009 
 
(0.03) (0.10) (0.04) (0.14) (0.04) (0.14) 
 










































      Size -0.069*** -0.069*** -0.069*** -0.068*** -0.071*** -0.072*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
      Leverage 0.394*** 0.390*** 0.416*** 0.413*** 0.377*** 0.374*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
      ROA 0.201*** 0.199*** 0.290*** 0.283*** 0.171*** 0.170*** 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) 
 
      B/M -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002* -0.002* -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
      Tangibles -0.033* -0.035* -0.095*** -0.098*** 0.014 0.012 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
      Dividends -3.065*** -3.066*** -4.029*** -4.011*** -2.192*** -2.209*** 
 
(0.44) (0.44) (0.59) (0.59) (0.55) (0.56) 
 
      Term Spread -0.516*** -0.515*** -0.555*** -0.554*** -0.439*** -0.437*** 
 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11) (0.11) 
 
      Credit Spread -1.933*** -1.938*** -2.151*** -2.151*** -1.445*** -1.418*** 
 
(0.23) (0.22) (0.26) (0.26) (0.42) (0.42) 
 
      Intercept 7.878*** 7.936*** 8.326*** 8.381*** 7.011*** 7.029*** 
 
(0.36) (0.36) (0.42) (0.42) (0.66) (0.65) 
 
      Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.21 
N 31,491 31,491 15,278 15,278 16,213 16,213 








Appendix A.4: Impact a Relationship with a Bank has on Loan Collateral – Diff-in-
Diff-in-Diff 
Appendix A.4 reports logit regression estimates for the effect the filing of a class action has on loan 
collateral, using equation (2.7).  The dependent variable in these regressions takes the value of one if the loan 
requires collateral.  Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses.  Variable 
definitions can be found in Table 2.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent 
significance levels, respectively. 
 




            
 
      
 
All Dismissed Settled 
              
 
      Sued 0.458*** -0.027 0.606*** -0.337 0.346*** -0.026 
 
(0.00) (0.92) (0.00) (0.45) (0.00) (0.94) 
       Post Filing -0.018 -0.283* -0.134** -0.138 0.075 -0.433* 
 
(0.69) (0.08) (0.04) (0.58) (0.25) (0.05) 













       Post Filing * Sued 0.027 0.051* 0.033 0.060* -0.003 0.057 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.15) (0.04) 







































       Size -0.879*** -0.874*** -0.932*** -0.927*** -0.863*** -0.859*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
       Leverage 2.920*** 2.921*** 2.899*** 2.909*** 2.983*** 2.982*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
       ROA -3.961*** -3.978*** -4.576*** -4.600*** -3.724*** -3.733*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
       B/M -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.079*** -0.080*** -0.023*** -0.023*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
       Tangibles -0.782*** -0.789*** -0.938*** -0.952*** -0.671*** -0.671*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
       Term Spread 0.248 0.250 -0.020 -0.017 1.022 1.042 
 
(0.45) (0.45) (0.96) (0.97) (0.12) (0.11) 
       Credit Spread -1.266 -1.265 -1.367 -1.386 -3.153 -3.340 
 
(0.31) (0.31) (0.38) (0.38) (0.17) (0.15) 
       Intercept 7.226 7.466 8.763 9.035 7.380 7.812 
 
(0.32) (0.30) (0.57) (0.55) (0.71) (0.70) 
       Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.40 0.40 0.42 0.43 0.44 0.44 
N 18167 18167 8787 8787 9380 9380 








Appendix A.5: Impact a Relationship with a Bank has on Loan Covenants – Diff-in-
Diff-in-Diff 
Appendix A.5 reports poisson regression estimates for the effect the filing of a class action has on loan 
covenants, using equation (2.7).  The dependent variable in these regressions is the number of covenants in 
the loan contract.  Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses.  Variable 
definitions can be found in Table 2.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent 
significance levels, respectively. 
 
              
 
Number of Covenants 
 
            
       
 
All Dismissed Settled 
              
       
Sued 0.031 -0.038 0.009 -0.074 0.053 0.007 
 
(0.20) (0.56) (0.80) (0.43) (0.12) (0.94) 
 
      PostFiling -0.017 -0.086** -0.035* -0.129** -0.001 -0.045 
 
(0.17) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.95) (0.42) 
 














      PostFiling * Sued -0.027 0.012 -0.010 0.081 -0.047 -0.060 
 
(0.43) (0.93) (0.84) (0.65) (0.31) (0.79) 
 










































      Size -0.105*** -0.105*** -0.116*** -0.115*** -0.099*** -0.100*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
      Leverage 0.352*** 0.349*** 0.298*** 0.293*** 0.386*** 0.385*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
      ROA 0.032 0.031 0.012 0.009 0.058 0.059 
 
(0.52) (0.54) (0.89) (0.92) (0.33) (0.33) 
 
      B/M -0.002** -0.002** -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.22) (0.21) 
 
      Tangibles -0.104*** -0.105*** -0.126*** -0.129*** -0.088*** -0.088*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
      Dividends -2.473*** -2.465*** -2.361*** -2.339*** -2.470*** -2.471*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
      Term Spread 0.038 0.040 -0.028 -0.029 0.170 0.176 
 
(0.72) (0.71) (0.83) (0.82) (0.37) (0.35) 
 
      Credit Spread -0.021 -0.015 -0.186 -0.202 0.202 0.252 
 
(0.96) (0.97) (0.71) (0.69) (0.78) (0.73) 
 
      Intercept 1.488** 1.504** 1.978** 2.035** 0.819 0.767 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.47) (0.50) 
 
      Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.39 0.39 0.52 0.53 0.36 0.37 
N 15,695 15,695 7,537 7,537 8,158 8,158 
              
 
:   
 




Appendix A.6: Impact a Relationship with a Bank has on Syndicate Size – Diff-in-
Diff-in-Diff 
Appendix A.6 reports negative binomial regression estimates for the effect the filing of a class action has on 
syndicate size, using equation (2.7).  The dependent variable in these regressions is the number of 
participants in the loan syndicate.  Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in 
parentheses.  Variable definitions can be found in Table 2.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 
10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 




            
       
 
All Dismissed Settled 
              
       
Sued 0.022 0.062 -0.052* -0.009 0.075*** 0.078 
 
(0.26) (0.35) (0.06) (0.93) (0.01) (0.37) 
 
      PostFiling 0.005 0.097** -0.033** 0.020 0.031** 0.137*** 
 
(0.62) (0.01) (0.03) (0.72) (0.04) (0.01) 
 














      PostFiling * Sued -0.077*** -0.420*** 0.027 -0.225 -0.155*** -0.591*** 
 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.50) (0.20) (0.00) (0.00) 
 










































      Size 0.172*** 0.170*** 0.165*** 0.162*** 0.181*** 0.179*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
      Leverage 0.453*** 0.453*** 0.345*** 0.345*** 0.570*** 0.569*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
      ROA -0.059 -0.054 -0.029 -0.021 -0.041 -0.039 
 
(0.26) (0.31) (0.76) (0.83) (0.53) (0.55) 
 
      B/M 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
      Tangibles -0.033* -0.032* -0.027 -0.026 -0.033 -0.032 
 
(0.09) (0.10) (0.36) (0.39) (0.20) (0.22) 
 
      Dividends 0.800*** 0.780*** 0.454 0.417 1.161*** 1.147*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.23) (0.27) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
      Term Spread 0.078 0.075 0.035 0.030 0.097 0.097 
 
(0.36) (0.38) (0.73) (0.77) (0.52) (0.52) 
 
      Credit Spread 0.258 0.256 0.083 0.067 0.669 0.704 
 
(0.43) (0.44) (0.83) (0.87) (0.25) (0.22) 
 
      Intercept 0.527 0.479 0.891 0.858 0.028 -0.051 
 
(0.31) (0.36) (0.16) (0.17) (0.98) (0.96) 
 
      Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.16 0.17 
N 33,444 33,444 16,100 16,100 17,344 17,344 
              
 
:   
 




Appendix A.7: Impact a Relationship with a Bank has on Loan Allocation – Diff-in-
Diff-in-Diff 
Appendix A.7 reports tobit regression estimates for the effect the filing of a class action has on lead 
allocation, using equation (2.7).  The dependent variable in these regressions is the percentage of the loan 
retained by the lead arranger.  Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses.  
Variable definitions can be found in Table 2.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 
percent significance levels, respectively. 
 




            
       
 
All Dismissed Settled 
              
       
Sued 0.004 -0.091*** 0.051*** -0.071 -0.032** -0.099** 
 
(0.68) (0.00) (0.00) (0.12) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
      PostFiling -0.002 -0.021 0.009 -0.052** -0.011 0.004 
 
(0.65) (0.26) (0.19) (0.04) (0.12) (0.87) 
 














      PostFiling * Sued 0.047*** 0.145** 0.002 0.183** 0.083*** 0.117 
 
(0.00) (0.03) (0.93) (0.03) (0.00) (0.26) 
 










































      Size -0.051*** -0.049*** -0.052*** -0.051*** -0.052*** -0.050*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
      Leverage -0.103*** -0.103*** -0.083*** -0.084*** -0.123*** -0.124*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
      ROA -0.040 -0.047* -0.157*** -0.158*** 0.013 0.000 
 
(0.13) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) (0.70) (0.99) 
 
      B/M -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.001** -0.001** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.05) 
 
      Tangibles -0.018* -0.019* 0.008 0.008 -0.035*** -0.038*** 
 
(0.06) (0.05) (0.58) (0.58) (0.01) (0.00) 
 
      Dividends -0.324*** -0.304*** -0.395** -0.401** -0.321** -0.282** 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) 
 
      Term Spread 0.066* 0.070** 0.077* 0.081** 0.030 0.031 
 
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.64) (0.62) 
 
      Credit Spread 0.240* 0.250* 0.257 0.274* 0.109 0.095 
 
(0.09) (0.08) (0.12) (0.10) (0.67) (0.71) 
 
      Intercept 0.320 0.330 0.291 0.311 0.500 0.554 
 
(0.15) (0.14) (0.27) (0.23) (0.22) (0.17) 
 
      Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.22 0.22 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.31 
N 9,737 9,737 4,605 4,605 5,132 5,132 








Appendix B:  
 
Replication of Yu and Yu (2011) 
 
This appendix presents a replication of the results obtained in the paper by Yu and Yu 
(2011).  Yu and Yu’s (2011) sample and method differs from the analysis conducted in 
Chapter 3 in several key ways.  First, their sample period for SCAs was from 1998 to 
2004, whereas in Chapter 3 the sample period analysed was from 2000 to 2012.   
The second difference is in the lobbying data set that is used.  Yu and Yu (2011) used 
lobbying data obtained from Political MoneyLine whereas in Chapter 3 lobbying data was 
obtained from the Centre for Responsive Politics (CRP) (see Section 3.3.4.1).  The 
lobbying data Yu and Yu used in their analysis was also restricted so that the semi-annual 
lobbying expenditure was at least $250,000.  A comparison of the annual lobbying each 
year for the sample period from 1998 to 2004 can be found in Appendix B.1.  Panel A and 
B of Appendix B.1 show the annual lobbying spending breakdown found by Yu and Yu 
and the replication, respectively.  The difference between these two panels is negligible.
63
  
Panel C of Appendix B.1 provides an annual breakdown of lobbying spending based on 
the lobbying data obtained from the CRP.  Over the sample period the CRP dataset 
consists of a significantly larger number of firms that lobbied over the sample period and 
the average lobbying expenses are much smaller.  These differences can primarily be 
attributed to the semi-annual restriction of $250,000 used in Yu and Yu’s data. 
                                                 
63
 One aspect of the lobbying datasets that should be noted is that a unique identifier is not included, which 
means that a manual matching of company names had to be performed in order to merge the lobbying 
information with firm financial data.  Therefore, it is possible that slight differences in the matches may 
occur. 
 




Another difference in the method implemented by Yu and Yu (2011) and that 
implemented in Chapter 3 is how lobbying is defined.  In their paper Yu and Yu define a 
lobbying firm as a firm that lobbies at any point in time from the 2
nd
 half of 1998 to the 1
st
 
half of 2005.  This definition of lobbying represents loosely whether firms are involved in 
politics.  In Chapter 3, a firm is defined as a lobbying firm if they have undertaken 
lobbying during the two years prior to the filing year (see section 3.3.1 for further details).  
This definition of lobbying reflects not only the period when the alleged misconduct 
occurs but the two year time period is also a sufficient amount of time for political 
connections to have been developed (Snyder, 1992). 
The final major difference is in the number of class actions that have been analysed.  
Yu and Yu (2011) specify that they use a sample of 205 class actions obtained from an 
analysis conducted by Dyck et al. (2010).  For the purpose of the replication, a sample of 
172 class actions has been used, which have been obtained from Professor Adair Morse’s 
webpage.
64
   
Appendix B.2 presents the number of class actions by the year in which the alleged 
misconduct began.  Appendix B.3 provides a breakdown of a few key firm characteristics.  
In both of these tables, Panel A shows the results reported by Yu and Yu (2011) and Panel 
B is the breakdown for my replication sample.  Some differences are evident between Yu 
and Yu’s sample and the replication sample in these tables.  However, these discrepancies 
are most likely driven by the differences in the number of class actions.  For the purposes 
of this analysis, this sample should be adequate to replicate the results of Yu and Yu 
(2011). 
The main focus of Yu and Yu (2011) is the relationship between the time it takes to 
detect fraud and a firm’s lobbying activity.  To examine this, the authors estimated a 
regression, where the dependent variable is the number of days in the class period (similar 
to equation (3.1)).  The results of Yu and Yu’s regressions as well as the replication can be 
found in Appendix B.4.  The first two columns (Models 1 and 2) of Appendix B.4 depict 
the results that were obtained by Yu and Yu (2011).  The next two columns (3 and 4) show 
the results from the replication.  The results for these models are largely consistent.  The 
key variables of interest are the dummy variable for lobbying activities and the average 
annual lobbying expense.  These variables are all positive and significant indicating that 








lobbying activities are associated with longer class periods.
65
  Although the coefficients for 
these two variables are significant in the replication regressions they are not as statistically 
significant as the results presented by Yu and Yu (2011).  The dummy variable for 
lobbying in the replication sample is only significant at the 10% level and the average 
annual lobbying expenses variable is only significant at the 5% level.  In contrast, Yu and 
Yu find that both of these variables are significant at the 1% level.  The differences in the 
significance of the coefficients are likely a result of the slight differences in the sample of 
class actions being analysed.  However, the differences in significance are relatively 
unimportant for the purposes of this replication.  The key take away from this analysis is 
that during the period from 1998 to 2004 and using Yu and Yu’s definition of lobbying 
there is evidence to suggest that lobbying firms were able to evade detection for longer. 
 
                                                 
65
 These results are also consistent with those reported for the pre-SOX period (models 1 and 2) in Table 
3.11. 
 




Appendix B.1: Comparison of Annual Lobbying Spending 
Appendix B.1 presents a comparison of the annual lobbying expenditures. Panel A presents the annual 
lobbying statistics reported by Yu and Yu (2011).  Panel B reports annual lobbying statistics obtained from 
my replication of Yu and Yu’s (2011) results.  Lobbying data for Panels A and B have been obtained from 
Political Money Line.  Panel C presents reports annual lobbying statistics obtained from the Centre for 
Responsive Politics (CRP). 
 
              
Panel A: Annual Spending on Lobbying: Yu and Yu (2011) 
              
       
Year Mean Median 25th Percentile 75th Percentile Standard Deviation No. of Firms 
              
       
1998 2,213.28 1,320.00 800 2,840 2,555.00 211 
1999 1,894.71 1,120.00 660 2,480 1,970.66 242 
2000 1,986.54 1,140.00 660 2,453 2,209.44 240 
2001 1,926.71 1,140.00 598 2,696 2,120.87 251 
2002 2,081.24 1,230.00 690 2,375 2,279.13 245 
2003 1,985.61 1,138.95 620 2,220 2,367.86 280 
2004 1,955.75 1,110.34 640 2,180 2,450.60 304 
2005 2,199.17 1,335.60 760 2,590 2,549.87 280 
       
Total 2,027.32 1,167.00 680 2,480 2,324.62 2,053 
  
        
      
Panel B: Annual Spending on Lobbying: Replication 
  
      
       
Year Mean Median 25th Percentile 75th Percentile Standard Deviation No. of Firms 
  
      
       
1998 1,120.67 660.00 380 1,420 1,292.74 214 
1999 1,932.30 1,120.00 680 2,600 2,011.68 234 
2000 1,969.19 1,100.00 640 2,210 2,243.13 241 
2001 1,990.52 1,148.34 620 2,696 2,250.59 250 
2002 2,073.64 1,210.00 680 2,348 2,359.29 254 
2003 2,018.14 1,140.00 660 2,280 2,420.21 281 
2004 2,029.78 1,119.65 680 2,343 2,587.10 299 
2005 1,105.15 640.00 383 1,280 1,295.66 283 
       
Total 1,788.74 1,000.00 560 2,064 2,159.95 2,056 
  
        
      
Panel C: Annual Spending on Lobbying: Centre for Responsive Politics 
  
      
       
Year Mean Median 25th Percentile 75th Percentile Standard Deviation No. of Firms 
  
      
       
1998 723.75 141.14 60 520 1,920.57 797 
1999 645.40 160.00 60 481 1,595.23 828 
2000 695.14 160.00 60 520 1,553.81 811 
2001 697.34 160.00 60 538 1,566.52 848 
2002 693.46 160.00 60 520 1,547.15 904 
2003 697.75 180.00 80 560 1,586.51 981 
2004 743.14 190.00 80 616 1,720.41 986 
2005 733.09 200.00 80 549 1,791.45 1,063 
       
Total 705.14 163.75 60 540 1,666.05 7,218 








Appendix B.2: Comparison of the Number of Class Actions by Year When Class 
Period Began 
Appendix B.2 shows the annual frequency and duration of frauds by the year when the class period began for 
the sample period from 1998 to 2004.  Panel A presents the annual frequency and the mean and median 
length of the class period based on the year when the class period began that was reported by Yu and Yu 
(2011).  Panel B presents the annual frequency and the mean and median length of the class period based on 
the year when the class period began obtained for a sample replicating Yu and Yu’s results. 
 
          
Panel A: Number of Class Actions by Year When Class Period Began: Yu and Yu (2011) 
          
     
   
Duration of Fraud (no. of days) 
   
    
     
Year When Fraud Began Count % of Total Mean Median 
          
     
1995 3 1.46% 1,297 1,400 
1996 1 0.49% 930 930 
1997 19 9.27% 830 599 
1998 40 19.51% 730 520 
1999 42 20.49% 827 987 
2000 42 20.49% 572 436 
2001 33 16.10% 421 437 
2002 14 6.83% 298 253 
2003 10 4.88% 305 293 
2004 1 0.49% 126 126 
     
Total 205 100.00% 633 456 
          
          
Panel B: Number of Class Actions by Year When Class Period Began: Replication 
          
     
   
Duration of Fraud (no. of days) 
   
    
     
Year When Fraud Began Count % of Total Mean Median 
          
     
1995 2 1.16% 1,246 1,246 
1996 2 1.16% 882 882 
1997 20 11.63% 821 528 
1998 30 17.44% 688 512 
1999 33 19.19% 797 976 
2000 41 23.84% 543 446 
2001 28 16.28% 402 417 
2002 12 6.98% 288 284 
2003 3 1.74% 230 213 
2004 1 0.58% 126 126 
     
Total 172 100.00% 613 447 








Appendix B.3: Comparison of the Characteristics of Firms Subject to Securities Class 
Actions 
Appendix B.3 presents a comparison of characteristics of firms that are subject to a SCA for the sample 
period from 1998 to 2004.  Panel A presents the mean and median values for lobbying and non-lobbying 
firms that were reported by Yu and Yu (2011).  Panel B presents the mean and median values for lobbying 
and non-lobbying firms based on a replication of Yu and Yu’s (2011) results.  The market value of equity, 
book value of equity and the book-to-market ratio are all measured in the year prior to the detection year.  
The p-value reported is for testing the difference between the mean value for lobbying and non-lobbying 
firms. 
 
            
Panel A: Characteristics of Firms Subject to a SCA: Yu and Yu (2011) 
            





        
 
      
 
Mean Median Mean Median p-Value 
            
      
Market Value of Equity 38,777.09 20,377.38 5,825.54 1,677.09 0.00 
Book Value of Equity 11,902.49 6,569.38 1,743.31 699.35 0.00 
Book-to-Market Ratio 0.88 0.28 0.58 0.40 0.38 
Assets 53,206.35 24,917.91 9,530.54 2,541.22 0.00 
Days In CP 711.12 510.00 594.17 417.00 0.10 
Settlement Amount 513.29 78.50 195.51 19.00 0.00 
            
            
Panel B: Characteristics of Firms Subject to a SCA: Replication 
            





        
 
      
 
Mean Median Mean Median p-Value 
            
      
Market Value of Equity 39,533.02 14,384.15 4,752.25 1,705.36 0.00 
Book Value of Equity 12,576.85 6,320.41 1,401.21 704.20 0.00 
Book-to-Market Ratio 0.42 0.37 0.56 0.38 0.20 
Assets 54,523.95 27,172.50 6,084.87 2,343.06 0.00 
Days In CP 693.72 537.00 644.28 521.00 0.52 
Settlement Amount 492.08 99.25 45.29 16.00 0.02 








Appendix B.4: Determinants of the Length of the Class Period 
Appendix B.4 presents regressions for the effect lobbying has on the length of the class period, between 1998 
and 2004.  The dependent variable is the number of days in the class period.  Models 1 and 2 are the results 
of these regressions reported by Yu and Yu (2011).  Models 3 and 4 are the results of these regressions 
obtained from a replication of Yu and Yu’s (2011) results.  The dummy variable for lobbying activities is 
equal to 1 if a firm has lobbied at any point in time during the sample period of 1998 to 2004 and equals 0 
otherwise.  The average lobby spending equals the average annual amount spent on lobbying over the sample 
period from 1998 to 2004.  *, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance 
levels, respectively. 
 
          
 
Dependent Variable: Number of Days in Class Period 
 
        
     
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
     

















   
  Book-to-Market -10.72 -4.66 -10.62 -17.97 
 
(16.13) (16.24) (39.70) (39.92) 
   
  Size -57.32** -41.10* -52.15* -51.06** 
 
(22.53) (21.86) (27.34) (25.66) 
   
  Intercept 987.38*** 903.00*** 1,113.23*** 1,152.07*** 
 
(175.85) (175.65) (226.93) (229.10) 
   
  Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 192 192 167 167 
R
2
 0.15 0.19 0.10 0.10 








Appendix C:  
 
Probability of Being Sued by Change in 
Innovation 
 
This appendix presents results examining the probability of being sued based on the 
change in innovative activity, which are used to examine Hypothesis 2 from Chapter 4 (see 
Section 4.4.2).  The models reported in Appendix C.1 and C.2 were estimated using 
equation (4.4) (Section 4.3.3).  The dependent variable is a dummy variable that is equal to 
one if a firm is sued in year t. 
 The primary independent variables of interest in these tables are the innovation 
measures.  In total eight innovation measures are used including; R&D/Assets, Patents, 
Citations (Fixed), Citations (Quasi), Value Added, IE Patents, IE Citations (Fixed) and IE 
Citations (Quasi).
66
  In Appendix C.1 the innovation measures are calculated based on the 
change in the level of the measure from t-1 to t-3.  In Appendix C.2 the innovation 
measures are calculated as the change in the level of the innovation variable from t-1 to t-3 
less the change in the industry average change in the level of the innovation variable over 
the same period. 
 
                                                 
66
 See Section 4.3.1 for an overview of these measures and how they are calculated. 
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Appendix C.1: Probability of Being Sued by the Change in the Amount of Innovation 
Appendix C.1 reports regression estimates for the probability of a firm being sued, using equation (4.4).  The dependent variable in these regressions is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the firm is sued in year t.  The eight innovation measures (R&D/Assets, Patents, Citations (Fixed), Citations (Quasi), Value Added, IE Patents, IE Citations 
(Fixed) and IE Citations (Quasi)) are calculated based on the change in the level of innovative activity from three years prior to one year prior (from t-3 to t-1).  Robust 
standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses.  Variables definitions can be found in Table 4.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 
and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 
                  
 
Dependent Variable: Sued 
                  
         
ΔR&D/Assets t-1,t-3 -0.023 
       
 
(0.16) 
       
 
        ΔPatents t-1,t-3 
 
0.009 
      
  
(0.06) 
      
 
        ΔCitations (Fixed) t-1,t-3 
  
-0.040 
     
   
(0.10) 
     
 
        ΔCitations (Quasi) t-1,t-3 
   
-0.013 
    
    
(0.03) 
    
 
        ΔValue Added t-1,t-3 
    
-0.171*** 
   
     
(0.05) 
   
 
        ΔIE Patents t-1,t-3 
     
-0.022 
  




        ΔIE Citations (Fixed) t-1,t-3 
      
-0.002 
 




        ΔIE Citations (Quasi) t-1,t-3 
       
0.000 
        
(0.00) 
 
        Size 0.381*** 0.387*** 0.388*** 0.388*** 0.378*** 0.354*** 0.368*** 0.368*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
        Leverage 0.375** 0.378** 0.378** 0.378** 0.385** 0.394 0.450* 0.452* 
 
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.26) (0.25) (0.25) 
 
        
 




ROA -0.202** -0.196** -0.195** -0.195** -0.184* -0.517*** -0.214 -0.214 
 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) 
 
        Return 0.010 0.024 0.024 0.025 0.032 0.051 -0.127 -0.127 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) 
 
        B/M -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.010 -0.009 -0.009 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
        Tangibles -1.109*** -1.134*** -1.135*** -1.137*** -1.127*** -0.709** -0.700** -0.697** 
 
(0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.30) (0.27) (0.27) 
 
        Dividends -7.248* -7.968** -7.951** -7.960** -7.535** -3.030 -4.932 -4.932 
 
(3.74) (3.54) (3.54) (3.54) (3.50) (4.47) (4.15) (4.15) 
 
        Std Ret 0.036** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 0.053** 0.039* 0.039* 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
        Beta 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
        Skew -0.190*** -0.191*** -0.191*** -0.191*** -0.192*** -0.181*** -0.210*** -0.210*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
     
   
Intercept -9.368 -9.107 -9.112 -9.112 -9.068 -10.352 -10.563 -10.570 
 
(63.27) (79.37) (79.30) (79.31) (76.83) (182.96) (152.66) (152.68) 
 
        Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R
2
 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14 
N 17,430 18,463 18,463 18,462 18,463 7,427 10,555 10,553 








Appendix C.2: Probability of Being Sued by the Relative Change in the Amount of Innovation 
Appendix C.2 reports regression estimates for the probability of a firm being sued, using equation (4.4).  The dependent variable in these regressions is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the firm is sued in year t.  The eight innovation measures (R&D/Assets, Patents, Citations (Fixed), Citations (Quasi), Value Added, IE Patents, IE Citations 
(Fixed) and IE Citations (Quasi)) are calculated based on the change in the level of innovative activity from three years prior to one year prior (from t-3 to t-1) relative to the 
change in the industry level of innovative activity over the same period.  Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses.  Variables definitions 
can be found in Table 4.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 
                  
 
Dependent Variable: Sued 
                  
         
ΔR&D/Assetsi t-1,t-3 - ΔR&D/Assetsind t-1,t-3 -0.063 
       
 
(0.15) 
       
 
        ΔPatentsi t-1,t-3 - ΔPatentsind t-1,t-3 
 
0.010 
      
  
(0.06) 
      
 
        ΔCitations (Fixed)i t-1,t-3 - ΔCitations (Fixed)ind t-1,t-3 
  
-0.055 
     
   
(0.10) 
     
 
        ΔCitations (Quasi)i t-1,t-3 - ΔCitations (Quasi)ind t-1,t-3 
   
-0.019 
    
    
(0.03) 
    
 
        ΔValue Addedi t-1,t-3 - ΔValue Addedind t-1,t-3 
    
-0.179*** 
   
     
(0.05) 
   
 
        ΔIE Patentsi t-1,t-3 - ΔIE Patentsind t-1,t-3 
     
-0.023 
  




        ΔIE Citations (Fixed)i t-1,t-3 - ΔIE Citations (Fixed)ind t-1,t-3 
      
-0.003 
 




        ΔIE Citations (Quasi)i t-1,t-3 - ΔIE Citations (Quasi)ind t-1,t-3 
       
0.000* 
        
(0.00) 
 
        Size 0.381*** 0.387*** 0.388*** 0.388*** 0.378*** 0.354*** 0.368*** 0.368*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
        Leverage 0.372** 0.378** 0.378** 0.378** 0.385** 0.393 0.451* 0.453* 
 
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.26) (0.25) (0.25) 
 
        
 




ROA -0.208** -0.196** -0.195** -0.195** -0.184* -0.517*** -0.214 -0.213 
 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) 
 
        Return 0.010 0.024 0.024 0.025 0.033 0.051 -0.127 -0.126 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) 
 
        B/M -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
        Tangibles -1.105*** -1.134*** -1.135*** -1.137*** -1.126*** -0.709** -0.698** -0.695** 
 
(0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.30) (0.27) (0.27) 
 
        Dividends -7.239* -7.967** -7.935** -7.946** -7.515** -3.034 -4.927 -4.925 
 
(3.73) (3.53) (3.54) (3.54) (3.50) (4.47) (4.15) (4.14) 
 
        Std Ret 0.036** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 0.053** 0.039* 0.039* 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
        Beta 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
        Skew -0.190*** -0.191*** -0.191*** -0.191*** -0.192*** -0.181*** -0.210*** -0.210*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
     
   
Intercept -9.372 -9.108 -9.111 -9.111 -9.059 -10.349 -10.564 -10.573 
 
(63.32) (79.37) (79.27) (79.28) (76.89) (182.94) (152.66) (152.65) 
 
        Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R
2
 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14 
N 17,430 18,463 18,463 18,462 18,463 7,427 10,555 10,553 










Appendix D:  
 
Change in Innovation after the Filing of a 
SCA 
 
This appendix presents results examining the level of innovative activity after the filing of 
a SCA, which are used to examine Hypothesis 3 from Chapter 4 (see Section 4.4.3).  The 
models reported in Appendix D.1 to D.8 were estimated using equation (4.5) (Section 
4.3.4).  The dependent variable in these regressions is one of eight measures of innovation.  
These measures include R&D/Assets, Patents, Citations (Fixed), Citations (Quasi), Value 
Added, IE Patents, IE Citations (Fixed) and IE Citations (Quasi).
67
  The results obtained 
for regressions that were estimated for the sample of sued and corresponding matched 




                                                 
67
 See Section 4.3.1 for an overview of these measures and how they are calculated. 
68
 See Section 4.4.3 for a discussion of these results. 
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Appendix D.1: Impact of the Filing of a Class Action on R&D 
Appendix D.1 reports regression estimates for the effect the filing of a class action has on R&D expenditures.  The dependent variable in this regression is the ratio of 
R&D/Assets.  The regressions were estimated for a sample of sued and propensity score matching sample of non-sued firms.  R&D was analysed for a window of up to five 
years before and after the filing of a SCA.  The first three columns (All) presents results obtained for regressions estimated on all sued and matched firms.  Columns four to 
six (Patent Pre-Filing) reports regression estimates for the sample of sued firms that obtained at least one patent in the three years before the filing and the corresponding 
matched firm.  The last three columns (No-Patent Pre-Filing) reports regression estimates for the sample of sued firms that did not obtain a patent in the three years before 
the filing and the corresponding matched firms.  The first column in each grouping (All-Sued) reports regressions estimated for sued and non-sued firm in that category.  The 
Dismissed and Settled columns report regressions for those cases that were dismissed and settled.  Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in 
parentheses.  Variables definitions can be found in Table 4.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 
                        
 
Dependent Variable: R&D/Assets 
            
 







            
 
      
 
      
 
      
 
All-Sued Dismissed Settled 
 
All-Sued Dismissed Settled 
 
All-Sued Dismissed Settled 
                        
            
Immediate -0.003 -0.010*** 0.002 
 
-0.005 -0.010*** 0.000 
 
0.002 -0.003 0.006 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
 
           Post -0.006* -0.006 -0.006 
 
-0.007* -0.001 -0.012* 
 
0.000 -0.009 0.006 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
           Sued 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.010** 
 
0.028*** 0.030*** 0.026*** 
 
-0.021*** -0.024*** -0.019*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
           Immediate * Sued -0.018*** -0.007 -0.026*** 
 
-0.023*** -0.012 -0.031*** 
 
-0.009 0.007 -0.016 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
           Post * Sued -0.012* -0.016* -0.010 
 
-0.020** -0.036*** -0.008 
 
0.001 0.031* -0.018 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
 
           Size -0.008*** -0.010*** -0.007*** 
 
-0.010*** -0.014*** -0.007*** 
 
-0.007*** -0.006*** -0.008*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
           Leverage -0.042*** -0.025*** -0.055*** 
 
-0.012** 0.022*** -0.040*** 
 
-0.086*** -0.097*** -0.081*** 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
             
 




ROA -0.159*** -0.144*** -0.168*** 
 
-0.145*** -0.113*** -0.171*** 
 
-0.173*** -0.204*** -0.163*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
 
           Return -0.001* -0.001 -0.001 
 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
-0.002 0.000 -0.002 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
           B/M 0.000* -0.001*** 0.000 
 
0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 
 
0.000*** 0.000** 0.000** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
           Tangibles -0.011*** -0.003 -0.015*** 
 
-0.026*** -0.012* -0.031*** 
 
0.005 0.008 0.004 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
           Dividends 0.002 -0.016 0.012 
 
0.021 0.041 0.018 
 
-0.028 -0.084 0.009 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) 
 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
 
           H-Index -0.031 -0.011 -0.037 
 
-0.144*** -0.110*** -0.154*** 
 
0.045* 0.022 0.063* 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
 
           H-Index2 0.028 0.017 0.027 
 
0.131*** 0.112*** 0.132** 
 
-0.044 -0.017 -0.065* 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
 
           High-Tech 0.089*** 0.095*** 0.086*** 
 
0.063*** 0.070*** 0.059*** 
 
0.105*** 0.104*** 0.105*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
 
           Intercept 0.162*** 0.160*** 0.166*** 
 
0.222*** 0.211*** 0.235*** 
 
0.111*** 0.126*** 0.099*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
           Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.22 0.27 0.20 
 
0.17 0.25 0.15 
 
0.32 0.35 0.31 
N 36,043 14,645 21,350 
 
21,793 9,247 12,500 
 
14,250 5,398 8,850 
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Appendix D.2: Impact of the Filing of a Class Action on the Number of Patents 
Appendix D.2 reports regression estimates for the effect the filing of a class action has on the number of patents.  The dependent variable in this regression is the log of one 
plus the number of patents.  The regressions were estimated for a sample of sued and propensity score matching sample of non-sued firms.  The number of patents were 
analysed for a window of up to five years before and after the filing of a SCA.  The first three columns (All) presents results obtained for regressions estimated on all sued and 
matched firms.  Columns four to six (Patent Pre-Filing) reports regression estimates for the sample of sued firms that obtained at least one patent in the three years before the 
filing and the corresponding matched firm.  The last three columns (No-Patent Pre-Filing) reports regression estimates for the sample of sued firms that did not obtain a 
patent in the three years before the filing and the corresponding matched firms.  The first column in each grouping (All-Sued) reports regressions estimated for sued and non-
sued firm in that category.  The Dismissed and Settled columns report regressions for those cases that were dismissed and settled.  Robust standard errors clustered at the firm 
level are reported in parentheses.  Variables definitions can be found in Table 4.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, 
respectively. 
 
                        
 
Dependent Variable: Patents 
            
 







            
 
      
 
      
 
      
 
All-Sued Dismissed Settled 
 
All-Sued Dismissed Settled 
 
All-Sued Dismissed Settled 
                        
            
Immediate -0.054*** -0.037 -0.060** 
 
-0.034 -0.042 -0.024 
 
-0.094*** -0.022 -0.144*** 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) 
 
           Post -0.008 0.002 -0.004 
 
0.062* 0.040 0.090** 
 
-0.136*** -0.057 -0.203*** 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05) 
 
(0.03) (0.06) (0.04) 
 
           Sued 0.085*** 0.153*** 0.029 
 
0.346*** 0.428*** 0.273*** 
 
-0.592*** -0.648*** -0.557*** 
 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.03) 
 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05) 
 
(0.04) (0.07) (0.04) 
 
           Immediate * Sued -0.019 -0.007 -0.028 
 
-0.042 -0.003 -0.081 
 
0.124** 0.049 0.162** 
 
(0.04) (0.07) (0.05) 
 
(0.06) (0.09) (0.07) 
 
(0.06) (0.10) (0.06) 
 
           Post * Sued 0.039 0.109 -0.022 
 
-0.108 0.036 -0.238** 
 
0.233*** 0.187 0.270*** 
 
(0.06) (0.10) (0.07) 
 
(0.07) (0.12) (0.10) 
 
(0.08) (0.14) (0.09) 
 
           Size 0.488*** 0.540*** 0.444*** 
 
0.569*** 0.620*** 0.526*** 
 
0.245*** 0.259*** 0.229*** 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
           Leverage 0.251*** 0.290*** 0.256*** 
 
0.209*** 0.209*** 0.218*** 
 
0.144*** 0.116 0.177*** 
 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.04) 
 
(0.05) (0.08) (0.06) 
 
(0.05) (0.08) (0.05) 
 
           
 




ROA 0.075*** 0.055 0.092*** 
 
0.058* 0.002 0.117*** 
 
0.078*** 0.188*** 0.040 
 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) 
 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
 
(0.03) (0.07) (0.03) 
 
           Return -0.081*** -0.070*** -0.084*** 
 
-0.082*** -0.072*** -0.086*** 
 
-0.048*** -0.034* -0.051*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
 
           B/M 0.007*** 0.022*** 0.006*** 
 
0.006*** 0.031*** 0.006*** 
 
0.015*** 0.016*** 0.014*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
           Tangibles 0.614*** 0.531*** 0.642*** 
 
1.147*** 0.990*** 1.219*** 
 
0.237*** 0.365*** 0.169*** 
 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
 
(0.04) (0.07) (0.05) 
 
(0.03) (0.06) (0.04) 
 
           R&D 1.023*** 1.398*** 0.845*** 
 
1.078*** 1.451*** 0.945*** 
 
0.628*** 0.907*** 0.503*** 
 
(0.06) (0.10) (0.07) 
 
(0.08) (0.14) (0.10) 
 
(0.07) (0.14) (0.08) 
 
           Dividends 1.234*** 1.501*** 1.033*** 
 
0.898*** 1.426** 0.593 
 
0.301 -0.198 0.507* 
 
(0.22) (0.40) (0.25) 
 
(0.32) (0.59) (0.37) 
 
(0.24) (0.46) (0.27) 
 
           H-Index 4.646*** 5.966*** 3.689*** 
 
5.561*** 7.463*** 4.101*** 
 
2.399*** 3.081*** 1.789*** 
 
(0.17) (0.29) (0.21) 
 
(0.26) (0.41) (0.33) 
 
(0.19) (0.34) (0.22) 
 
           H-Index2 -4.195*** -5.533*** -3.174*** 
 
-5.217*** -7.525*** -3.328*** 
 
-2.045*** -2.669*** -1.465*** 
 
(0.18) (0.30) (0.23) 
 
(0.29) (0.44) (0.37) 
 
(0.20) (0.35) (0.23) 
 
           High-Tech 1.083*** 1.309*** 0.937*** 
 
0.979*** 1.197*** 0.842*** 
 
0.779*** 1.011*** 0.625*** 
 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) 
 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05) 
 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.03) 
 
           Intercept -4.159*** -4.935*** -3.606*** 
 
-4.913*** -5.741*** -4.321*** 
 
-1.919*** -2.368*** -1.572*** 
 
(0.06) (0.10) (0.07) 
 
(0.08) (0.13) (0.11) 
 
(0.07) (0.13) (0.08) 
 
           Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.38 0.41 0.35 
 
0.43 0.45 0.40 
 
0.23 0.25 0.22 
N 36,242 14,665 21,530 
 
21,913 9,285 12,583 
 
14,329 5,380 8,947 








Appendix D.3: Impact of the Filing of a Class Action on the Number of Citations (Fixed) 
Appendix D.3 reports regression estimates for the effect the filing of a class action has on the number of citations.  The dependent variable in this regression is the log of one 
plus the number of citations per patent scaled by the average number of citations received by patents granted in the same year and in the same technology subcategory.  The 
regressions were estimated for a sample of sued and propensity score matching sample of non-sued firms.  The number of citations were analysed for a window of up to five 
years before and after the filing of a SCA.  The first three columns (All) presents results obtained for regressions estimated on all sued and matched firms.  Columns four to 
six (Patent Pre-Filing) reports regression estimates for the sample of sued firms that obtained at least one patent in the three years before the filing and the corresponding 
matched firm.  The last three columns (No-Patent Pre-Filing) reports regression estimates for the sample of sued firms that did not obtain a patent in the three years before 
the filing and the corresponding matched firms.  The first column in each grouping (All-Sued) reports regressions estimated for sued and non-sued firm in that category.  The 
Dismissed and Settled columns report regressions for those cases that were dismissed and settled.  Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in 
parentheses.  Variables definitions can be found in Table 4.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 
                        
 
Dependent Variable: Citations (Fixed) 
            
 







            
 
      
 
      
 
      
 
All-Sued Dismissed Settled 
 
All-Sued Dismissed Settled 
 
All-Sued Dismissed Settled 
                        
            
Immediate -0.029*** -0.026*** -0.030*** 
 
-0.032*** -0.030** -0.033*** 
 
-0.015* -0.001 -0.024** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
           Post -0.037*** -0.030** -0.041*** 
 
-0.022** -0.010 -0.032** 
 
-0.044*** -0.036* -0.050*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
           Sued 0.025*** 0.019 0.028** 
 
0.141*** 0.127*** 0.149*** 
 
-0.222*** -0.235*** -0.214*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
           Immediate * Sued 0.000 -0.012 0.007 
 
-0.022 -0.038 -0.013 
 
0.067*** 0.054 0.074*** 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) 
 
           Post * Sued 0.023 0.018 0.028 
 
-0.048** -0.054 -0.043 
 
0.141*** 0.151*** 0.137*** 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
 
           Size 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 
 
0.070*** 0.071*** 0.069*** 
 
0.055*** 0.051*** 0.056*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
           Leverage -0.032*** -0.035** -0.026* 
 
-0.043*** -0.035 -0.049** 
 
-0.021 -0.048* -0.003 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
 
           
 




ROA 0.039*** 0.050*** 0.031*** 
 
0.032*** 0.042*** 0.023 
 
0.036*** 0.067*** 0.022* 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
 
           Return 0.000 0.006* -0.004 
 
0.002 0.006 -0.001 
 
-0.001 0.006 -0.004 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
 
           B/M 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 
 
0.000*** 0.001 0.000*** 
 
0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
           Tangibles -0.002 -0.038** 0.021* 
 
0.020 -0.024 0.047*** 
 
-0.018 -0.026 -0.007 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
           R&D 0.307*** 0.401*** 0.255*** 
 
0.278*** 0.367*** 0.229*** 
 
0.230*** 0.316*** 0.186*** 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.03) 
 
           Dividends -0.247*** -0.438*** -0.152* 
 
-0.455*** -0.620*** -0.360*** 
 
-0.124 -0.355** -0.023 
 
(0.07) (0.12) (0.09) 
 
(0.10) (0.17) (0.12) 
 
(0.09) (0.16) (0.11) 
 
           H-Index 0.636*** 0.858*** 0.498*** 
 
0.524*** 0.879*** 0.300*** 
 
0.392*** 0.487*** 0.312*** 
 
(0.05) (0.08) (0.07) 
 
(0.08) (0.12) (0.11) 
 
(0.07) (0.12) (0.09) 
 
           H-Index2 -0.503*** -0.692*** -0.380*** 
 
-0.385*** -0.730*** -0.148 
 
-0.293*** -0.364*** -0.231** 
 
(0.06) (0.09) (0.08) 
 
(0.09) (0.13) (0.13) 
 
(0.07) (0.12) (0.09) 
 
           High-Tech 0.262*** 0.298*** 0.240*** 
 
0.197*** 0.252*** 0.163*** 
 
0.241*** 0.270*** 0.220*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
 
           Intercept -0.529*** -0.590*** -0.491*** 
 
-0.461*** -0.556*** -0.404*** 
 
-0.372*** -0.401*** -0.342*** 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
 
           Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.16 0.18 0.14 
 
0.14 0.16 0.12 
 
0.15 0.17 0.14 
N 36,242 14,665 21,530 
 
21,913 9,285 12,583 
 
14,329 5,380 8,947 








Appendix D.4: Impact of the Filing of a Class Action on the Number of Citations (Quasi) 
Appendix D.4 reports regression estimates for the effect the filing of a class action has on the number of citations.  The dependent variable in this regression is the log of one 
plus the number of citations per patent multiplied by an adjustment factor obtained from the citation lag distribution.  The regressions were estimated for a sample of sued and 
propensity score matching sample of non-sued firms.  The number of citations were analysed for a window of up to five years before and after the filing of a SCA.  The first 
three columns (All) presents results obtained for regressions estimated on all sued and matched firms.  Columns four to six (Patent Pre-Filing) reports regression estimates 
for the sample of sued firms that obtained at least one patent in the three years before the filing and the corresponding matched firm.  The last three columns (No-Patent Pre-
Filing) reports regression estimates for the sample of sued firms that did not obtain a patent in the three years before the filing and the corresponding matched firms.  The first 
column in each grouping (All-Sued) reports regressions estimated for sued and non-sued firm in that category.  The Dismissed and Settled columns report regressions for 
those cases that were dismissed and settled.  Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses.  Variables definitions can be found in Table 4.1. *, 
**, *** Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 
                        
 
Dependent Variable: Citations (Quasi) 
            
 







            
 
      
 
      
 
      
 
All-Sued Dismissed Settled 
 
All-Sued Dismissed Settled 
 
All-Sued Dismissed Settled 
                        
            
Immediate -0.087*** -0.075** -0.088*** 
 
-0.072*** -0.070* -0.068* 
 
-0.069** -0.006 -0.109*** 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
 
           Post -0.100*** -0.074* -0.112*** 
 
-0.028 0.005 -0.047 
 
-0.153*** -0.105* -0.191*** 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05) 
 
           Sued 0.136*** 0.115*** 0.146*** 
 
0.591*** 0.543*** 0.623*** 
 
-0.848*** -0.904*** -0.817*** 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
 
(0.04) (0.07) (0.06) 
 
           Immediate * Sued -0.028 -0.038 -0.027 
 
-0.136** -0.133 -0.148* 
 
0.277*** 0.215* 0.310*** 
 
(0.04) (0.07) (0.06) 
 
(0.06) (0.08) (0.08) 
 
(0.07) (0.11) (0.08) 
 
           Post * Sued 0.034 0.008 0.053 
 
-0.269*** -0.293*** -0.256** 
 
0.561*** 0.592*** 0.550*** 
 
(0.06) (0.09) (0.08) 
 
(0.07) (0.11) (0.10) 
 
(0.10) (0.16) (0.12) 
 
           Size 0.283*** 0.288*** 0.277*** 
 
0.277*** 0.283*** 0.272*** 
 
0.201*** 0.196*** 0.198*** 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
           Leverage -0.116*** -0.114** -0.106** 
 
-0.139*** -0.117* -0.154** 
 
-0.103* -0.157* -0.067 
 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05) 
 
(0.05) (0.07) (0.06) 
 
(0.06) (0.09) (0.07) 
 
           
 




ROA 0.159*** 0.187*** 0.137*** 
 
0.139*** 0.157*** 0.124*** 
 
0.138*** 0.255*** 0.089** 
 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) 
 
(0.04) (0.07) (0.04) 
 
           Return -0.012* 0.007 -0.022*** 
 
-0.005 0.007 -0.013 
 
-0.015 0.010 -0.024* 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
 
           B/M 0.003*** 0.007*** 0.003*** 
 
0.002*** 0.006 0.002*** 
 
0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
           Tangibles 0.174*** 0.045 0.254*** 
 
0.309*** 0.137** 0.416*** 
 
0.055 0.057 0.068 
 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06) 
 
(0.04) (0.07) (0.05) 
 
           R&D 1.012*** 1.336*** 0.836*** 
 
0.850*** 1.128*** 0.710*** 
 
0.760*** 1.066*** 0.610*** 
 
(0.06) (0.10) (0.08) 
 
(0.08) (0.12) (0.10) 
 
(0.09) (0.16) (0.10) 
 
           Dividends -0.351 -0.937** -0.063 
 
-0.994*** -1.357** -0.759* 
 
-0.133 -0.942* 0.239 
 
(0.22) (0.38) (0.27) 
 
(0.31) (0.54) (0.39) 
 
(0.29) (0.50) (0.35) 
 
           H-Index 3.240*** 4.012*** 2.750*** 
 
2.991*** 4.264*** 2.175*** 
 
1.912*** 2.201*** 1.629*** 
 
(0.17) (0.27) (0.23) 
 
(0.25) (0.37) (0.35) 
 
(0.23) (0.37) (0.29) 
 
           H-Index2 -2.703*** -3.378*** -2.250*** 
 
-2.432*** -3.721*** -1.521*** 
 
-1.530*** -1.744*** -1.299*** 
 
(0.19) (0.28) (0.25) 
 
(0.28) (0.40) (0.39) 
 
(0.24) (0.38) (0.31) 
 
           High-Tech 1.067*** 1.218*** 0.973*** 
 
0.834*** 1.052*** 0.701*** 
 
0.913*** 1.046*** 0.822*** 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.04) 
 
           Intercept -2.392*** -2.651*** -2.219*** 
 
-2.227*** -2.556*** -2.024*** 
 
-1.529*** -1.723*** -1.356*** 
 
(0.06) (0.09) (0.08) 
 
(0.08) (0.12) (0.11) 
 
(0.09) (0.14) (0.11) 
 
           Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.23 0.26 0.20 
 
0.23 0.26 0.21 
 
0.18 0.22 0.17 
N 36,242 14,665 21,530 
 
21,913 9,285 12,583 
 
14,329 5,380 8,947 








Appendix D.5: Impact of the Filing of a Class Action on the Value Added by Patents 
Appendix D.5 reports regression estimates for the effect the filing of a class action has on the value added by patents.  The dependent variable in this regression is the log of 
one plus the average value added per patent.  The regressions were estimated for a sample of sued and propensity score matching sample of non-sued firms.  The value added 
was analysed for a window of up to five years before and after the filing of a SCA.  The first three columns (All) presents results obtained for regressions estimated on all 
sued and matched firms.  Columns four to six (Patent Pre-Filing) reports regression estimates for the sample of sued firms that obtained at least one patent in the three years 
before the filing and the corresponding matched firm.  The last three columns (No-Patent Pre-Filing) reports regression estimates for the sample of sued firms that did not 
obtain a patent in the three years before the filing and the corresponding matched firms.  The first column in each grouping (All-Sued) reports regressions estimated for sued 
and non-sued firm in that category.  The Dismissed and Settled columns report regressions for those cases that were dismissed and settled.  Robust standard errors clustered at 
the firm level are reported in parentheses.  Variables definitions can be found in Table 4.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance 
levels, respectively. 
 
                        
 
Dependent Variable: Value Added 
            
 







            
 
      
 
      
 
      
 
All-Sued Dismissed Settled 
 
All-Sued Dismissed Settled 
 
All-Sued Dismissed Settled 
                        
            
Immediate -0.048*** -0.057** -0.041** 
 
-0.046** -0.030 -0.050** 
 
-0.037 -0.080* -0.005 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
 
           Post -0.052** -0.007 -0.092*** 
 
-0.042* 0.038 -0.103*** 
 
-0.065* -0.090 -0.042 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05) 
 
           Sued 0.043** 0.015 0.060** 
 
0.014 -0.032 0.047 
 
0.319** 0.323 0.306 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
(0.14) (0.20) (0.21) 
 
           Immediate * Sued -0.072** -0.115** -0.032 
 
-0.041 -0.085 -0.002 
 
-0.265 -0.388 -0.220 
 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05) 
 
(0.18) (0.28) (0.24) 
 
           Post * Sued -0.044 -0.116* 0.035 
 
0.005 -0.085 0.102 
 
-0.430** -0.371 -0.485* 
 
(0.05) (0.07) (0.06) 
 
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07) 
 
(0.20) (0.30) (0.28) 
 
           Size 0.476*** 0.457*** 0.488*** 
 
0.461*** 0.434*** 0.476*** 
 
0.510*** 0.508*** 0.512*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
           Leverage 0.262*** 0.234*** 0.275*** 
 
0.246*** 0.193*** 0.288*** 
 
0.296*** 0.346*** 0.243*** 
 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05) 
 
(0.06) (0.09) (0.07) 
 
           
 




ROA 0.084*** 0.191*** 0.000 
 
0.160*** 0.222*** 0.099*** 
 
-0.076** 0.089 -0.154*** 
 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
 
(0.04) (0.07) (0.04) 
 
           Return -0.009* -0.008 -0.012** 
 
-0.011** -0.009 -0.016** 
 
0.000 -0.006 0.003 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
 
           B/M 0.001** -0.009*** 0.001*** 
 
0.001*** -0.012*** 0.001*** 
 
-0.003*** -0.006*** -0.001 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
           Tangibles -0.054** -0.110*** -0.033 
 
-0.165*** -0.186*** -0.174*** 
 
0.175*** 0.027 0.268*** 
 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) 
 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05) 
 
           R&D 0.432*** 0.495*** 0.364*** 
 
0.566*** 0.526*** 0.541*** 
 
0.136 0.425*** -0.020 
 
(0.05) (0.08) (0.06) 
 
(0.06) (0.10) (0.07) 
 
(0.09) (0.14) (0.11) 
 
           Dividends -0.501*** -0.595** -0.351 
 
-0.102 -0.213 0.100 
 
-0.968*** -1.233** -0.788** 
 
(0.18) (0.30) (0.22) 
 
(0.22) (0.34) (0.29) 
 
(0.28) (0.60) (0.31) 
 
           H-Index -1.475*** -1.797*** -1.158*** 
 
-1.635*** -2.143*** -1.214*** 
 
-1.446*** -1.872*** -1.076*** 
 
(0.15) (0.23) (0.19) 
 
(0.18) (0.29) (0.23) 
 
(0.25) (0.40) (0.32) 
 
           H-Index2 1.577*** 1.970*** 1.200*** 
 
1.845*** 2.534*** 1.290*** 
 
1.301*** 1.644*** 0.981*** 
 
(0.16) (0.25) (0.20) 
 
(0.20) (0.31) (0.26) 
 
(0.26) (0.41) (0.33) 
 
           High-Tech -0.009 -0.096*** 0.060** 
 
-0.032 -0.117*** 0.040 
 
-0.005 -0.178*** 0.111** 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05) 
 
           Intercept -1.757*** -1.562*** -1.863*** 
 
-1.634*** -1.372*** -1.762*** 
 
-1.944*** -1.750*** -2.096*** 
 
(0.05) (0.09) (0.07) 
 
(0.06) (0.10) (0.08) 
 
(0.10) (0.16) (0.13) 
 
           Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.62 0.59 0.65 
 
0.61 0.57 0.64 
 
0.65 0.63 0.67 
N 18,395 8,220 10,131 
 
13,953 6,303 7,607 
 
4,442 1,917 2,524 








Appendix D.6: Impact of the Filing of a Class Action on Innovative Efficiency (Patents) 
Appendix D.6 reports regression estimates for the effect the filing of a class action has on innovative efficiency of patenting.  The dependent variable in this regression is the 
log of one plus IE Patents.  The regressions were estimated for a sample of sued and propensity score matching sample of non-sued firms.  Innovative efficiency was 
analysed for a window of up to five years before and after the filing of a SCA.  The first three columns (All) presents results obtained for regressions estimated on all sued and 
matched firms.  Columns four to six (Patent Pre-Filing) reports regression estimates for the sample of sued firms that obtained at least one patent in the three years before the 
filing and the corresponding matched firm.  The last three columns (No-Patent Pre-Filing) reports regression estimates for the sample of sued firms that did not obtain a 
patent in the three years before the filing and the corresponding matched firms.  The first column in each grouping (All-Sued) reports regressions estimated for sued and non-
sued firm in that category.  The Dismissed and Settled columns report regressions for those cases that were dismissed and settled.  Robust standard errors clustered at the firm 
level are reported in parentheses.  Variables definitions can be found in Table 4.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, 
respectively. 
 
                        
 
Dependent Variable: IE Patents 
            
 







            
 
      
 
      
 
      
 
All-Sued Dismissed Settled 
 
All-Sued Dismissed Settled 
 
All-Sued Dismissed Settled 
                        
            
Immediate -0.009** -0.008 -0.011* 
 
-0.021*** -0.027*** -0.018** 
 
0.011 0.022 0.000 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
 
           Post -0.007 -0.003 -0.012 
 
-0.018*** -0.026*** -0.013 
 
0.014 0.045** -0.018 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
           Sued 0.011* 0.010 0.012 
 
0.012** 0.016** 0.010 
 
0.017 -0.029 0.065 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.05) (0.07) (0.08) 
 
           Immediate * Sued 0.009 0.005 0.012 
 
0.015 0.013 0.015 
 
-0.075 -0.096 -0.093 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.07) (0.11) (0.09) 
 
           Post * Sued 0.011 -0.003 0.021 
 
0.008 0.004 0.010 
 
-0.024 -0.073 -0.009 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
(0.08) (0.12) (0.11) 
 
           Size -0.027*** -0.023*** -0.031*** 
 
-0.022*** -0.016*** -0.027*** 
 
-0.038*** -0.039*** -0.039*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
           Leverage 0.001 -0.003 0.008 
 
-0.024** -0.026** -0.020 
 
0.083*** 0.094*** 0.080*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
           
 




ROA 0.046*** 0.045*** 0.049*** 
 
0.037*** 0.034*** 0.040*** 
 
0.062*** 0.071*** 0.059*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
           Return 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.009*** 
 
0.007*** 0.006*** 0.009*** 
 
0.008** 0.005 0.011** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
           B/M 0.000*** -0.001** 0.000*** 
 
0.000*** -0.002*** 0.000*** 
 
-0.001** -0.001** -0.001 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
           Tangibles 0.081*** 0.117*** 0.055*** 
 
0.113*** 0.122*** 0.101*** 
 
0.013 0.099*** -0.041** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
           Dividends 0.390*** -0.161* 0.723*** 
 
0.080 -0.206** 0.311*** 
 
0.925*** -0.108 1.227*** 
 
(0.05) (0.08) (0.07) 
 
(0.06) (0.08) (0.09) 
 
(0.11) (0.23) (0.12) 
 
           H-Index 0.413*** 0.495*** 0.387*** 
 
0.414*** 0.503*** 0.397*** 
 
0.400*** 0.731*** 0.218* 
 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06) 
 
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07) 
 
(0.10) (0.16) (0.13) 
 
           H-Index2 -0.350*** -0.460*** -0.290*** 
 
-0.324*** -0.517*** -0.212*** 
 
-0.381*** -0.618*** -0.260** 
 
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07) 
 
(0.05) (0.07) (0.08) 
 
(0.10) (0.16) (0.13) 
 
           High-Tech -0.007 0.006 -0.008 
 
0.018*** 0.025*** 0.024** 
 
-0.075*** -0.014 -0.109*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
           Intercept 0.205*** 0.148*** 0.244*** 
 
0.163*** 0.104*** 0.198*** 
 
0.310*** 0.211*** 0.392*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05) 
 
           Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.10 0.10 0.11 
 
0.09 0.09 0.10 
 
0.14 0.14 0.17 
N 18,452 8,222 10,186 
 
14,009 6,308 7,658 
 
4,443 1,914 2,528 








Appendix D.7: Impact of the Filing of a Class Action on Innovative Efficiency (Citations (Fixed)) 
Appendix D.7 reports regression estimates for the effect the filing of a class action has on innovative efficiency of the citations received on patents.  The dependent variable 
in this regression is the log of one plus IE Citations (Fixed).  The regressions were estimated for a sample of sued and propensity score matching sample of non-sued firms.  
Innovative efficiency was analysed for a window of up to five years before and after the filing of a SCA.  The first three columns (All) presents results obtained for 
regressions estimated on all sued and matched firms.  Columns four to six (Patent Pre-Filing) reports regression estimates for the sample of sued firms that obtained at least 
one patent in the three years before the filing and the corresponding matched firm.  The last three columns (No-Patent Pre-Filing) reports regression estimates for the sample 
of sued firms that did not obtain a patent in the three years before the filing and the corresponding matched firms.  The first column in each grouping (All-Sued) reports 
regressions estimated for sued and non-sued firm in that category.  The Dismissed and Settled columns report regressions for those cases that were dismissed and settled.  
Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses.  Variables definitions can be found in Table 4.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from zero at 
the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 
                        
 
Dependent Variable: IE Citations (Fixed) 
            
 







            
 
      
 
      
 
      
 
All-Sued Dismissed Settled 
 
All-Sued Dismissed Settled 
 
All-Sued Dismissed Settled 
                        
            
Immediate -0.030*** -0.035*** -0.026*** 
 
-0.046*** -0.054*** -0.042*** 
 
-0.002 -0.014 0.003 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
           Post -0.034*** -0.042*** -0.027** 
 
-0.049*** -0.065*** -0.039** 
 
-0.010 -0.018 -0.007 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
 
           Sued 0.040*** 0.028* 0.049*** 
 
0.052*** 0.058*** 0.048*** 
 
-0.069 -0.178*** 0.022 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06) 
 
           Immediate * Sued 0.009 0.007 0.010 
 
0.010 0.001 0.016 
 
-0.099 -0.030 -0.164* 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
(0.08) (0.14) (0.10) 
 
           Post * Sued -0.004 -0.006 -0.008 
 
-0.003 -0.010 -0.002 
 
-0.094 -0.055 -0.147 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
(0.08) (0.14) (0.10) 
 
           Size -0.026*** -0.022*** -0.029*** 
 
-0.019*** -0.011*** -0.025*** 
 
-0.041*** -0.047*** -0.039*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
 
           Leverage -0.068*** -0.079*** -0.055*** 
 
-0.098*** -0.096*** -0.098*** 
 
0.026 -0.007 0.056 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
 
           
 




ROA 0.036*** 0.039*** 0.036*** 
 
0.028*** 0.027** 0.030** 
 
0.057*** 0.071*** 0.047*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.03) (0.02) 
 
           Return 0.021*** 0.023*** 0.020*** 
 
0.020*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
 
0.027*** 0.039*** 0.023*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
           B/M 0.000*** -0.002*** 0.000** 
 
0.000** -0.004*** 0.000** 
 
-0.001** -0.002 -0.002** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
           Tangibles 0.093*** 0.128*** 0.073*** 
 
0.140*** 0.158*** 0.124*** 
 
0.003 0.069* -0.027 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) 
 
           Dividends -0.186* -0.800*** 0.041 
 
-0.609*** -1.350*** -0.424*** 
 
0.119 -0.710*** 0.462** 
 
(0.10) (0.18) (0.12) 
 
(0.13) (0.28) (0.15) 
 
(0.15) (0.27) (0.18) 
 
           H-Index 0.402*** 0.634*** 0.291*** 
 
0.541*** 0.763*** 0.456*** 
 
0.127 0.706*** -0.209 
 
(0.07) (0.11) (0.09) 
 
(0.08) (0.12) (0.11) 
 
(0.14) (0.23) (0.17) 
 
           H-Index2 -0.291*** -0.514*** -0.175* 
 
-0.429*** -0.722*** -0.275** 
 
-0.035 -0.472** 0.207 
 
(0.07) (0.11) (0.10) 
 
(0.09) (0.13) (0.12) 
 
(0.14) (0.23) (0.17) 
 
           High-Tech 0.006 0.040** -0.007 
 
0.049*** 0.074*** 0.044*** 
 
-0.095*** -0.007 -0.146*** 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
           Intercept 0.336*** 0.271*** 0.375*** 
 
0.263*** 0.156*** 0.324*** 
 
0.501*** 0.461*** 0.529*** 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
 
(0.05) (0.08) (0.06) 
 
           Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.05 0.05 0.05 
 
0.05 0.05 0.05 
 
0.08 0.09 0.09 
N 23,156 9,922 13,189 
 
17,109 7,463 9,602 
 
6,047 2,459 3,587 








Appendix D.8: Impact of the Filing of a Class Action on Innovative Efficiency (Citations (Quasi)) 
Appendix D.8 reports regression estimates for the effect the filing of a class action has on innovative efficiency of the citations received on patents.  The dependent variable 
in this regression is the log of one plus IE Citations (Quasi).  The regressions were estimated for a sample of sued and propensity score matching sample of non-sued firms.  
Innovative efficiency was analysed for a window of up to five years before and after the filing of a SCA.  The first three columns (All) presents results obtained for 
regressions estimated on all sued and matched firms.  Columns four to six (Patent Pre-Filing) reports regression estimates for the sample of sued firms that obtained at least 
one patent in the three years before the filing and the corresponding matched firm.  The last three columns (No-Patent Pre-Filing) reports regression estimates for the sample 
of sued firms that did not obtain a patent in the three years before the filing and the corresponding matched firms.  The first column in each grouping (All-Sued) reports 
regressions estimated for sued and non-sued firm in that category.  The Dismissed and Settled columns report regressions for those cases that were dismissed and settled.  
Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses.  Variables definitions can be found in Table 4.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from zero at 
the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 
                        
 
Dependent Variable: IE Citations (Quasi) 
            
 







            
 
      
 
      
 
      
 
All-Sued Dismissed Settled 
 
All-Sued Dismissed Settled 
 
All-Sued Dismissed Settled 
                        
            
Immediate -0.052*** -0.063** -0.043 
 
-0.078*** -0.091*** -0.072** 
 
-0.024 -0.062 -0.009 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05) 
 
           Post -0.037 -0.031 -0.036 
 
-0.053* -0.068 -0.045 
 
-0.032 -0.008 -0.060 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
 
(0.05) (0.08) (0.07) 
 
           Sued 0.146*** 0.114*** 0.164*** 
 
0.190*** 0.205*** 0.176*** 
 
-0.390*** -0.657*** -0.167 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
 
(0.11) (0.16) (0.16) 
 
           Immediate * Sued 0.051 0.063 0.036 
 
0.043 0.027 0.052 
 
-0.330 -0.151 -0.503* 
 
(0.04) (0.07) (0.06) 
 
(0.05) (0.07) (0.06) 
 
(0.21) (0.35) (0.27) 
 
           Post * Sued -0.010 -0.015 -0.025 
 
-0.017 -0.045 -0.010 
 
-0.137 0.009 -0.292 
 
(0.06) (0.09) (0.08) 
 
(0.06) (0.09) (0.09) 
 
(0.21) (0.37) (0.26) 
 
           Size -0.044*** -0.024*** -0.064*** 
 
-0.026*** 0.007 -0.049*** 
 
-0.097*** -0.093*** -0.108*** 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
           Leverage -0.401*** -0.429*** -0.365*** 
 
-0.488*** -0.493*** -0.475*** 
 
-0.132* -0.156 -0.079 
 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05) 
 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06) 
 
(0.08) (0.13) (0.10) 
 
           
 




ROA 0.134*** 0.139*** 0.139*** 
 
0.103*** 0.094*** 0.117*** 
 
0.226*** 0.294*** 0.192*** 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
(0.04) (0.07) (0.05) 
 
           Return 0.062*** 0.063*** 0.061*** 
 
0.057*** 0.056*** 0.055*** 
 
0.083*** 0.091*** 0.082*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.03) (0.02) 
 
           B/M 0.000 -0.005** 0.000 
 
0.000 -0.016*** 0.000 
 
-0.003* 0.000 -0.005** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
           Tangibles 0.331*** 0.385*** 0.294*** 
 
0.473*** 0.463*** 0.470*** 
 
0.068 0.265*** -0.042 
 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05) 
 
(0.06) (0.09) (0.07) 
 
           Dividends -1.113*** -2.547*** -0.579* 
 
-2.454*** -4.915*** -1.810*** 
 
-0.138 -1.722** 0.497 
 
(0.27) (0.51) (0.32) 
 
(0.38) (0.84) (0.43) 
 
(0.40) (0.69) (0.49) 
 
           H-Index 2.154*** 3.196*** 1.596*** 
 
2.793*** 3.768*** 2.352*** 
 
0.678* 2.560*** -0.505 
 
(0.19) (0.30) (0.26) 
 
(0.23) (0.35) (0.31) 
 
(0.36) (0.59) (0.46) 
 
           H-Index2 -1.865*** -2.813*** -1.330*** 
 
-2.476*** -3.529*** -1.935*** 
 
-0.527 -2.072*** 0.467 
 
(0.21) (0.32) (0.28) 
 
(0.26) (0.39) (0.35) 
 
(0.37) (0.59) (0.48) 
 
           High-Tech 0.212*** 0.372*** 0.139*** 
 
0.336*** 0.475*** 0.285*** 
 
-0.102* 0.192** -0.273*** 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
 
(0.05) (0.09) (0.07) 
 
           Intercept 0.859*** 0.497*** 1.098*** 
 
0.589*** 0.153 0.855*** 
 
1.574*** 1.179*** 1.847*** 
 
(0.07) (0.10) (0.09) 
 
(0.08) (0.12) (0.11) 
 
(0.13) (0.20) (0.17) 
 
           Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.12 0.12 0.12 
 
0.12 0.13 0.12 
 
0.14 0.15 0.15 
N 23,156 9,922 13,189 
 
17,109 7,463 9,602 
 
6,047 2,459 3,587 








Appendix E:  
 
Chapter 2: Dropping Financial Firms and 
Utilities 
 
This appendix presents the results from Chapter 2 after excluding firms in the financial 
sector (SIC codes 6000 to 6799) and utilities (SIC codes 4900 to 4949).   Results from the 
tests of Hypothesis 1, that firms borrowing from a reputable lender will be less likely to 
have a SCA filed against them, are reported in Appendix E.1 and E.2, which are 
comparable to the results presented in Tables 2.5 and 2.6.  The results reported in 
Appendix E.1 are equivalent in sign and significance as those reported in Table 2.5.  The 
reputable (Amount) measure is now marginally significant when estimating the regressions 
from equation (2.3) (see Appendix E.2).  This would suggest that, contrary to Hypothesis 
1, firms that borrow from reputable lenders are more likely to be sued.  However, since 
this result is only marginally significant for one of the measures of reputation this finding 
should be interpreted with caution. 
Appendix E.3 reports the estimated models given in equation (2.4), which test 
Hypothesis 2a and 2b.   These results are equivalent to those reported in Table 2.7.  The 
overall significance of the primary variable of interest (Pre-Rel * Post Filing) remains 
unchanged after excluding financial firms and utilities, which suggests that the results are 
not being driven by differences in these industries. 
Finally the results testing Hypothesis 3 are reported in Appendices E.4 to E.11. This 
hypothesis tested that, after the filing of a SCA, firms that had a relationship with a lender 
 




will receive more favourable loan terms than firms without a relationship. The results in 
Appendices E.4 to E.11 are equivalent to the results presented in Tables 2.8 to 2.15.  
Overall, the results reported in this appendix and in Chapter 2 are quantitatively similar.  
One difference to note is the interaction term (Pre-Rel * Post Filing) is positive and 
significant when Loan Size is the dependent variable in Table 2.8, whereas the interaction 
term is insignificant after excluding financials and utilities (see Appendix E.4).  Although 
the interaction term was only marginally significant in the original model, the findings 
reported in Appendix E.4 suggest that the significance when Loan Size was the dependent 
variable may have been driven by industry differences.  Despite the slight differences in 
significance between the original results and those reported in this appendix, excluding 








Appendix E.1: Impact of Risk of Class Action on Bank Reputation – No Financials or 
Utilities 
Appendix E.1 reports two stage analysis for the effect of litigation risk on the probability of a loan being 
obtained from a reputable lender, using equations (2.1) and (2.2).  The dependent variable in the first stage 
(Sued) takes a value of one if a class action was filed in a particular year and is equal to zero otherwise.  The 
dependent variable in the second stage is equal to one if a loan is obtained from a reputable lender and is 
equal to zero otherwise.  For Reputable (Amount) a lender is deemed to be reputable if the market share 
based on the amount of money lent exceeds 3%.  For Reputable (Number) a lender is deemed to be reputable 
if the market share based on the number of loans provided exceeds 3%.  Robust standard errors clustered at 
the firm level are reported in parentheses.  Variable definitions can be found in Table 2.1. *, **, *** 
Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 
            
 
First Stage Second Stage 
 
          
  
        
 
SCA Dummy Reputable (Amount) Reputable (Number) 
            
      SCA Dummy 
 
-6.609*** -3.186*** -5.562*** -2.843*** 
  
(0.96) (1.07) (0.97) (1.06) 
      Size 0.294*** 0.359*** 0.116*** 0.275*** 0.068*** 
 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
      Leverage 0.368** 0.674*** 0.219** 0.375*** 0.012 
 
(0.16) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) 
      ROA -0.124** 0.380*** 0.264* 0.314** 0.185 
 
(0.06) (0.14) (0.15) (0.13) (0.14) 
      B/M -0.021* 0.004*** 0.001** 0.002*** 0.001* 
 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
      Tangibles -1.349*** -0.269*** -0.241*** -0.23*** -0.2*** 
 
(0.15) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) 
      Dividends -2.119 1.696*** 1.252*** 1.791*** 1.393*** 
 
(1.49) (0.51) (0.48) (0.54) (0.53) 


















      Intercept -5.662*** -1.586*** -8.478*** -1.443*** -7.074*** 
 
(0.30) (0.15) (0.28) (0.14) (0.27) 
      Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.023 0.1019 0.1533 0.0603 0.1003 
N 43841 20619 19209 20619 19209 








Appendix E.2: Impact of Bank Reputation on Probability of Class Action – No 
Financials or Utilities 
Appendix E.2 reports logit regression estimates for the effect the reputation of banks have on the probability 
of a firm being sued, using equation (2.3).  The dependent variable in these regressions takes the value of one 
if a class action was filed in a particular year and is equal to zero otherwise.  Robust standard errors clustered 
at the firm level are reported in parentheses.  Variable definitions can be found in Table 2.1. *, **, *** 
Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 
      
 
Dependant Variable: Sued 
      









   Size 0.290*** 0.283*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) 
   Leverage 0.083 0.060 
 
(0.14) (0.14) 
   ROA -0.044 -0.052 
 
(0.06) (0.06) 
   Return -0.028* -0.027* 
 
(0.02) (0.02) 
   B/M -0.006** -0.006** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
   Tangibles -1.324*** -1.324*** 
 
(0.14) (0.14) 
   Dividends -1.248 -1.276 
 
(1.30) (1.31) 
   Intercept -5.635 -5.546 
 
(8.02) (8.03) 
   Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.0222 0.0221 
N 33631 33631 








Appendix E.3: Impact of Class Action on Relationship with Bank – No Financials or 
Utilities 
Appendix E.3 reports logit regression estimates for the effect the filing of a class action has on whether a 
loan is obtained from a lender that the firm has a relationship with, using equation (2.4).  The dependent 
variable in these regressions takes the value of one if the loan was obtained from a lender that the firm has 
previously borrowed from and is equal to zero otherwise.  Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level 
are reported in parentheses.  Variable definitions can be found in Table 2.1. *, **, *** Statistically different 
from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 
              
 
Dependant Variable: Relationship with Lender 
        
            
 
All Dismissed Settled 
              
       Post Filing -0.153 -0.364 -0.107 0.657 -0.197 -1.482** 
 
(0.12) (0.34) (0.18) (0.49) (0.19) (0.59) 


























       Size 0.072** 0.049 0.077 0.049 0.071 0.041 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
       Leverage -0.213 -0.278 -0.488 -0.669 -0.504 -0.551 
 
(0.31) (0.31) (0.49) (0.50) (0.48) (0.49) 
       ROA -0.237 -0.212 0.911 1.167 -0.439 -0.426 
 
(0.35) (0.35) (0.81) (0.82) (0.59) (0.60) 
       B/M 0.002 0.007 -0.016 -0.033 0.002 0.003 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) 
       Tangibles 0.106 0.114 -0.484 -0.454 0.641* 0.614* 
 
(0.22) (0.22) (0.33) (0.34) (0.34) (0.35) 
       Dividends 19.74*** 17.481*** 29.988*** 29.011*** -0.166 -3.586 
 
(6.17) (6.04) (9.18) (8.93) (10.11) (10.24) 
       Term Spread -0.909 -0.915 -0.450 -0.486 -4.859 -5.150 
 
(20.64) (20.64) (22.57) (23.02) (12.09) (10.95) 
       Credit Spread 7.764 8.115 -3.696 -2.795 124.000 132.100 
 
(49.44) (49.44) (54.12) (55.18) (362.20) (327.70) 
       Intercept -2.737 -3.671 8.081 6.123 -113.300 -121.200 
 
(25.56) (25.27) (25.10) (24.77) (341.30) (308.80) 
       Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.0682 0.0812 0.1090 0.1279 0.1062 0.1176 
N 2738 2738 1320 1320 1418 1418 
              
 




Appendix E.4: Summary of Results When Class Action is Settled – No Financials or Utilities 
Appendix E.4 presents a summary of the results of the impact a SCA have on loan characteristics.  The dependent variables are one of seven loan characteristics, using 
equation (2.5).  These loan characteristics include loan: spread, size, maturity, collateral, number of covenants, syndicate size and percentage held by the lead arranger. The 
results reported are for the class actions that were settled. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses.  Variable definitions can be found in 
Table 2.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 






    
 
          






PostFiling PostFiling PreRel 
Expected  
PreRel*PostFiling PreRel*PostFiling 
                  
         
Loan Spread + 0.289*** 
 












 Loan Size - -0.006 
 












 Loan Maturity - -0.112*** 
 












 Loan Collateral + 0.254 
 












 Loan Covenants + -0.002 
 












 Syndicate Size - -0.163*** 
 












 Lead Allocation + 0.013 
 















Appendix E.5: Impact a Relationship with a Bank has on Loan Spread – No 
Financials or Utilities 
Appendix E.5 reports OLS regression estimates for the effect the filing of a class action has on loan spread, 
using equation (2.5).  The dependent variable in these regressions is the natural log of the all-in drawn 
spread.  Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses.  Variable definitions 
can be found in Table 2.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance 
levels, respectively. 
 




            
       
 
All Dismissed Settled 
              
       Post Filing 0.201*** 0.337*** 0.127*** -0.018 0.289*** 0.916*** 
 
(0.03) (0.10) (0.04) (0.10) (0.04) (0.17) 


























       Size -0.299*** -0.299*** -0.318*** -0.320*** -0.253*** -0.25*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
       Leverage 0.956*** 0.961*** 0.815*** 0.811*** 0.969*** 0.99*** 
 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.13) (0.13) (0.10) (0.10) 
       ROA 0.165* 0.164* -0.700*** -0.673*** 0.275*** 0.283*** 
 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.26) (0.26) (0.08) (0.08) 
       B/M -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.093*** -0.093*** -0.043*** -0.042*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
       Tangibles -0.272*** -0.273*** -0.046 -0.045 -0.335*** -0.334*** 
 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) 
       Dividends -4.974*** -4.958** -3.440** -3.457** -14.211*** -14.287*** 
 
(1.92) (1.92) (1.52) (1.52) (1.54) (1.52) 
       Term Spread 0.465* 0.483* 0.888*** 0.864*** -0.410 -0.350 
 
(0.25) (0.25) (0.27) (0.27) (0.46) (0.42) 
       Credit Spread 1.596* 1.612* 2.524*** 2.440*** 1.863 1.003 
 
(0.88) (0.88) (0.91) (0.91) (1.62) (1.58) 
       Intercept 4.803*** 4.717*** 3.255** 3.398** 5.729** 6.388** 
 
(1.39) (1.39) (1.45) (1.45) (2.55) (2.53) 
       Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.6162 0.6165 0.6632 0.6639 0.6451 0.6503 
N 2315 2315 1077 1077 1238 1238 








Appendix E.6: Impact a Relationship with a Bank has on Loan Size – No Financials 
or Utilities 
Appendix E.6 reports OLS regression estimates for the effect the filing of a class action has on loan size, 
using equation (2.5).  The dependent variable in these regressions is the natural log of the size of the loan.  
Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses.  Variable definitions can be 
found in Table 2.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, 
respectively. 
 




            
       
 
All Dismissed Settled 
              
       Post Filing 0.026 0.055 0.006 -0.027 -0.006 0.066 
 
(0.05) (0.14) (0.07) (0.19) (0.07) (0.23) 


























       Size 0.494*** 0.489*** 0.459*** 0.454*** 0.494*** 0.487*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
       Leverage 0.496*** 0.494*** 0.574*** 0.565*** 0.620*** 0.638*** 
 
(0.13) (0.13) (0.20) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) 
       ROA -0.397*** -0.396*** -0.641** -0.586* -0.238 -0.240 
 
(0.14) (0.14) (0.32) (0.32) (0.16) (0.16) 
       B/M 0.071*** 0.072*** 0.067*** 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.066*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
       Tangibles 0.268*** 0.267*** 0.231* 0.233* 0.153 0.143 
 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) 
       Dividends 0.142 0.058 -0.490 -0.508 0.988 0.467 
 
(0.72) (0.72) (0.71) (0.71) (2.98) (2.98) 
       Term Spread 0.918** 0.905** 0.263 0.249 2.594*** 2.561*** 
 
(0.38) (0.38) (0.45) (0.44) (0.69) (0.70) 
       Credit Spread 2.729* 2.724* 1.075 1.013 5.342* 5.511** 
 
(1.43) (1.42) (1.62) (1.62) (2.77) (2.78) 
       Intercept 10.465*** 10.351*** 14.106*** 14.067*** 3.647 3.364 
 
(2.22) (2.21) (2.57) (2.56) (4.24) (4.21) 
       Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.4444 0.4462 0.4863 0.4879 0.4477 0.4502 
N 2736 2736 1319 1319 1417 1417 








Appendix E.7: Impact a Relationship with a Bank has on Loan Maturity – No 
Financials or Utilities 
Appendix E.7 reports OLS regression estimates for the effect the filing of a class action has on loan maturity, 
using equation (2.5).  The dependent variable in these regressions is the natural log of the number of months 
until maturity of the loan.  Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses.  
Variable definitions can be found in Table 2.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 
percent significance levels, respectively. 
 




            
       
 
All Dismissed Settled 
              
       Post Filing -0.077*** -0.076 -0.033 -0.009 -0.112*** -0.209 
 
(0.03) (0.10) (0.04) (0.12) (0.04) (0.17) 


























       Size -0.116*** -0.119*** -0.122*** -0.123*** -0.112*** -0.117*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
       Leverage 0.361*** 0.360*** 0.393*** 0.391*** 0.433*** 0.439*** 
 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.13) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) 
       ROA 0.371*** 0.37*** 0.67*** 0.673*** 0.305*** 0.302*** 
 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.21) (0.21) (0.08) (0.08) 
       B/M -0.011* -0.011* -0.009 -0.009 -0.010 -0.010 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
       Tangibles 0.019 0.018 -0.015 -0.014 0.013 0.006 
 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) 
       Dividends -1.010 -1.037 -1.080 -1.079 1.575 1.342 
 
(0.64) (0.64) (0.75) (0.76) (2.10) (2.10) 
       Term Spread -0.362** -0.369** -0.279 -0.278 -0.309 -0.342 
 
(0.17) (0.17) (0.20) (0.20) (0.33) (0.35) 
       Credit Spread -2.083*** -2.083*** -2.009** -2.010** -2.845** -2.587** 
 
(0.65) (0.65) (0.81) (0.82) (1.16) (1.22) 
       Intercept 8.031*** 7.981*** 7.980*** 7.949*** 8.319*** 8.049*** 
 
(1.04) (1.04) (1.28) (1.29) (1.83) (1.85) 
       Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.2255 0.2269 0.2865 0.2866 0.226 0.2293 
N 2584 2584 1266 1266 1318 1318 








Appendix E.8: Impact a Relationship with a Bank has on Loan Collateral – No 
Financials or Utilities 
Appendix E.8 reports logit regression estimates for the effect the filing of a class action has on loan 
collateral, using equation (2.5).  The dependent variable in these regressions takes the value of one if the loan 
requires collateral and is equal to zero otherwise. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are 
reported in parentheses.  Variable definitions can be found in Table 2.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from 
zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 




            
       
 
All Dismissed Settled 
              
       Post Filing 0.270 -0.147 0.333 0.323 0.254 -0.139 
 
(0.11) (0.81) (0.19) (0.72) (0.33) (0.92) 


























       Size -0.973*** -0.972*** -0.996*** -1.020*** -1.027*** -1.024*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
       Leverage 2.930*** 2.943*** 2.258*** 2.176*** 3.765*** 3.809*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
       ROA -0.541 -0.503 0.914 0.661 -1.242 -1.253 
 
(0.54) (0.57) (0.54) (0.66) (0.34) (0.35) 
       B/M -0.131*** -0.133*** -0.096 -0.128 -0.166*** -0.183*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.43) (0.28) (0.00) (0.00) 
       Tangibles -0.601* -0.602* 0.594 0.563 -1.196** -1.170** 
 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.24) (0.26) (0.01) (0.02) 
       Dividends -25.589*** -25.626*** -26.956** -23.813** -41.448** -37.199** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) 
       Term Spread 0.616 0.601 1.962 2.089 -8.375 -8.403 
 
(0.59) (0.60) (0.16) (0.14) (0.95) (0.95) 
       Credit Spread -1.693 -1.777 -2.276 -2.053 15.496 15.36 
 
(0.69) (0.68) (0.67) (0.70) (0.96) (0.96) 
       Intercept 8.643 9.008 6.172 4.974 12.970 13.767 
 
(0.78) (0.77) (0.82) (0.85) (0.71) (0.69) 
       Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R
2
 0.4178 0.4181 0.4495 0.4526 0.4541 0.4555 
N 1678 1678 782 782 896 896 








Appendix E.9: Impact a Relationship with a Bank has on Loan Covenants – No 
Financials or Utilities 
Appendix E.9 reports poisson regression estimates for the effect the filing of a class action has on loan 
covenants, using equation (2.5).  The dependent variable in these regressions is the number of covenants in 
the loan contract.  Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses.  Variable 
definitions can be found in Table 2.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent 
significance levels, respectively. 
 
              
 
Number of Covenants 
 
            
       
 
All Dismissed Settled 
              
       Post Filing -0.001 -0.002 -0.019 0.071 -0.002 -0.175 
 
(0.99) (0.99) (0.75) (0.70) (0.98) (0.51) 


























       Size -0.122*** -0.124*** -0.134*** -0.136*** -0.097*** -0.099*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
       Leverage 0.208** 0.206** 0.205 0.192 0.257* 0.249* 
 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.23) (0.26) (0.09) (0.10) 
       ROA 0.020 0.014 0.011 -0.009 0.029 0.020 
 
(0.82) (0.88) (0.97) (0.98) (0.78) (0.85) 
       B/M -0.049*** -0.048*** -0.043 -0.043 -0.058*** -0.058*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.23) (0.22) (0.00) (0.00) 
       Tangibles -0.189*** -0.191*** -0.114 -0.105 -0.218** -0.226** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.33) (0.37) (0.03) (0.03) 
       Dividends -1.489 -1.489 -0.955 -0.928 -6.898* -6.954* 
 
(0.16) (0.16) (0.38) (0.39) (0.05) (0.05) 
       Term Spread 0.333 0.336 0.469 0.498 0.326 0.314 
 
(0.32) (0.32) (0.26) (0.23) (0.62) (0.63) 
       Credit Spread -0.011 0.011 -0.053 -0.016 1.284 1.555 
 
(0.99) (0.99) (0.97) (0.99) (0.66) (0.60) 
       Intercept 0.969 0.902 0.825 0.631 -0.786 -1.020 
 
(0.64) (0.66) (0.73) (0.79) (0.86) (0.82) 
       Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R
2
  0.3885  0.3918  0.5247  0.5312  0.3616  0.3683 
N 1420 1420 656 656 764 764 








Appendix E.10: Impact a Relationship with a Bank has on Syndicate Size – No 
Financials or Utilities 
Appendix E.10 reports negative binomial regression estimates for the effect the filing of a class action has on 
syndicate size, using equation (2.5).  The dependent variable in these regressions is the number of 
participants in the loan syndicate.  Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in 
parentheses.  Variable definitions can be found in Table 2.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 
10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 




            
       
 
All Dismissed Settled 
              
       
Post Filing -0.077** -0.114 0.048 -0.081 -0.163*** -0.098 
 
(0.04) (0.40) (0.35) (0.66) (0.00) (0.64) 
 




























      Size 0.226*** 0.222*** 0.200*** 0.197*** 0.236*** 0.231*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
      Leverage 0.361*** 0.362*** 0.171 0.171 0.553*** 0.564*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.26) (0.26) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
      ROA -0.242** -0.242** -0.123 -0.100 -0.213* -0.214* 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.67) (0.72) (0.07) (0.07) 
 
      B/M 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.012 0.011 0.020*** 0.021*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.37) (0.44) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
      Tangibles 0.158** 0.156** -0.050 -0.051 0.097 0.091 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.64) (0.63) (0.30) (0.33) 
 
      Dividends 0.431 0.354 0.438 0.420 -1.250 -1.733 
 
(0.57) (0.64) (0.60) (0.61) (0.56) (0.42) 
 
      Term Spread 0.534** 0.524* 0.433 0.412 1.055** 1.058** 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.17) (0.19) (0.05) (0.05) 
 
      Credit Spread 2.591** 2.592** 2.935** 2.883** 1.324 1.477 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.52) (0.47) 
 
      Intercept -3.917** -3.988** -3.935** -3.855** -3.767 -4.067 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.23) (0.19) 
 
      Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R
2
 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.16 0.17 
N 2738 2738 1320 1320 1418 1418 
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Appendix E.11: Impact a Relationship with a Bank has on Lead Allocation – No 
Financials or Utilities 
Appendix E.11 reports Tobit regression estimates for the effect the filing of a class action has on lead 
allocation, using equation (2.5).  The dependent variable in these regressions is the percentage of the loan 
retained by the lead arranger.  Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses.  
Variable definitions can be found in Table 2.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 
percent significance levels, respectively. 
 




            
       
 
All Dismissed Settled 
              
       
Post Filing 0.025 0.077 0.037 0.208** 0.013 -0.060 
 
(0.13) (0.30) (0.13) (0.03) (0.56) (0.60) 
 




























      Size -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.072*** -0.071*** -0.044*** -0.044*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
      Leverage 0.094** 0.095** 0.088 0.092 0.101 0.099 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.26) (0.24) (0.10) (0.11) 
 
      ROA 0.030 0.029 -0.075 -0.087 0.049 0.052 
 
(0.58) (0.59) (0.49) (0.43) (0.40) (0.38) 
 
      B/M -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
      Tangibles -0.096*** -0.097*** -0.041 -0.042 -0.057 -0.053 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.48) (0.46) (0.13) (0.16) 
 
      Dividends -0.250 -0.250 0.434 0.404 -0.143 -0.238 
 
(0.50) (0.50) (0.32) (0.35) (0.90) (0.84) 
 
      Term Spread -0.033 -0.024 0.010 0.019 -0.493*** -0.514*** 
 
(0.76) (0.82) (0.94) (0.89) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
      Credit Spread -0.343 -0.331 -0.320 -0.217 -1.637* -1.536* 
 
(0.47) (0.49) (0.57) (0.70) (0.06) (0.08) 
 
      Intercept 1.219* 1.184 1.177 1.019 3.701*** 3.650*** 
 
(0.10) (0.11) (0.18) (0.25) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
      Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R
2
 0.22 0.22 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.31 
N 824 824 387 387 437 437 










Appendix F:  
 
Chapter 3: Dropping Financial Firms and 
Utilities 
 
This appendix presents the results from Chapter 3 after excluding firms in the financial 
sector (SIC codes 6000 to 6799) and utilities (SIC codes 4900 to 4949).   The results 
reported in Appendices F.1 to F.4 are equivalent to the results presented in Tables 3.7 to 
3.10.   
Overall, the results reported in this appendix are quantitatively similar to the findings 
presented in Chapter 3.  The one key difference to note is the Pre-SOX models when the 
dependent variable is the settled dummy variable (Table 3.8 and Appendix F.2).  In Table 
3.8 the Lobby Dummy and Amount variables are significantly negatively related to 
whether the case was settled in the Pre-SOX models.  However, the two lobby variables 
are insignificant after excluding financials and utilities.  It should be noted that this finding 
was only marginally significant in Table 3.8, but the lack of significance for the two lobby 
measures in Appendix F.2 suggest that industry differences could in part be driving the 
results.  Overall, however, dropping financial firms and utilities from the analysis does not 








Appendix F.1: Regressions with Days in Class Period as the Dependent Variable – No 
Financials or Utilities 
Appendix F.1 reports OLS regression estimates for the effect the lobbying has on the number of days in the 
class period, using equation (3.1). The dependent variable in these regressions is the natural log of the 
number of days in the class period. The first two columns present the regressions estimated for the pre-SOX 
period, from 2000 to 2004. The last two columns present the regressions estimated for the post-SOX period, 
from 2005 to 2012. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Variables definitions can be found in Table 
3.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 
            
 
Dependent Variable: Log of Days in Class Period 
 
          
      
 
Pre-SOX - 2000 to 2004 
 





            









































































      R2 0.05 0.04 
 
0.05 0.05 
N 604 604 
 
376 376 








Appendix F.2: Regressions with Settled Dummy as the Dependent Variable – No 
Financials or Utilities 
Appendix F.2 reports logit regression estimates for the effect the lobbying has on the whether the class action 
was settled, using equation (3.2). The dependent variable in these regressions takes the value of one if the 
class action is settled and is equal to zero if it is dismissed. The first two columns present the regressions 
estimated for the pre-SOX period, from 2000 to 2004. The last two columns present the regressions 
estimated for the post-SOX period, from 2005 to 2012. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Variables 
definitions can be found in Table 3.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent 
significance levels, respectively. 
 
            
 
Dependent Variable: Settled Dummy Variable 
 
          
      
 
Pre-SOX - 2000 to 2004 
 





            









































































      Pseudo R2 0.11 0.11 
 
0.08 0.08 
N 604 604 
 
376 376 








Appendix F.3: Regressions with Provable Loss as the Dependent Variable – No 
Financials or Utilities 
Appendix F.3 reports OLS regression estimates for the effect the lobbying has on the size of the provable 
loss, using equation (3.3). The dependent variable in these regressions is the percentage change in the firm’s 
market capitalization from the beginning of the class period to the end of the class period. The first two 
columns present the regressions estimated for the pre-SOX period, from 2000 to 2004. The last two columns 
present the regressions estimated for the post-SOX period, from 2005 to 2012. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. Variables definitions can be found in Table 3.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 
10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 
            
 
Dependent Variable: Provable Loss 
 
          
      
 
Pre-SOX - 2000 to 2004 
 





            









































































      R2 0.12 0.12 
 
0.01 0.01 
N 604 604 
 
376 376 








Appendix F.4: Regressions with Settlement Size as the Dependent Variable – No 
Financials or Utilities 
Appendix F.4 reports OLS regression estimates for the effect the lobbying has on the size of the settlement, 
using equation (3.4). The dependent variable in these is the natural log of the cash settlement. Only those 
class actions that were settled with available data on cash settlement are used in these regressions. The first 
two columns present the regressions estimated for the pre-SOX period, from 2000 to 2004. The last two 
columns present the regressions estimated for the post-SOX period, from 2005 to 2012. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. Variables definitions can be found in Table 3.1. *, **, *** Statistically different 
from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 
            
 
Dependent Variable: Log of Cash Settlement 
 
          
      
 
Pre-SOX - 2000 to 2004 
 





            









































































      R2 0.38 0.38 
 
0.47 0.47 
N 219 219 
 
170 170 








Appendix G:  
 
Chapter 4: Accounting for Missing R&D 
 
This appendix presents robustness tests for Chapter 4.  The results reported in this 
appendix replace any missing R&D value for firms that have received at least one patent 
with the industry average R&D.  This robustness test is used to combat the issue that just 
over 10% of firms with missing R&D receive patents (Koh and Reeb, 2015).  In the tests 
of Hypotheses 2 and 3 from Chapter 4, it was required that firms be involved in innovative 
activity, categorised based on whether a firm had R&D expenditures.  Based on Koh and 
Reeb’s (2015) findings this approach is likely overlooking some innovative firms.  This is 




For the results reported in this appendix the industry average R&D is multiplied by the 
ratio of a firm’s sales to the industry average sales, as in equation (G.1). 
 R&Di,t =  Ave(R&DInd,t) ∗ Salesi,t/𝐴𝑣𝑒(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝐼𝑛𝑑,𝑡) (G.1) 
This adjusted R&D measure is used in place of any missing R&D data. 
Results for tests of Hypothesis 2, which predicts that among innovating firms those 
firms that are struggling to innovate are more likely to commit misconduct, are presented 
in Appendices G.1 and G.2.  These tables are equivalent to Tables 4.7 and 4.8.  The results 
from these robustness are quantitatively similar to those presented in Chapter 4, which 
suggests that firms with missing R&D data are unlikely to be driving the results. 
                                                 
69
 See section 4.3.1.3 for an overview of how these measures are calculated. 
 




Hypothesis 3 in Chapter 4 predicts that innovative efficiency will improve post-filing.  
The re-estimated regressions to test this hypothesis, using the adjusted measure of R&D in 
place of missing R&D data, are reported in Appendices G.3 to G.10, which are equivalent 
to Tables 4.10 to 4.17.  The coefficients and significance are quantitatively similar 
between the results presented in this appendix and those reported in Chapter 4.  As such, 









Appendix G.1: Probability of Being Sued by Amount of Innovation 
Appendix G.1 reports logit regression estimates for the probability of a firm being sued, using equation (4.4).  The dependent variable in these regressions is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the firm is sued in year t.  The eight innovation measures (R&D/Assets, Patents, Citations (Fixed), Citations (Quasi), Value Added, IE Patents, IE 
Citations (Fixed) and IE Citations (Quasi)) are calculated based on the level of innovative activity being undertaken in the preceding three years. Robust standard errors 
clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses. Variables definitions can be found in Table 4.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent 
significance levels, respectively. 
 
                  
 
Dependant Variable: SCA Dummy 
                  
         
R&D/Assetsi t-1,t-3 -0.210** 
       
 
(0.09) 
       
 
        Patentsi t-1,t-3 
 
-0.077*** 
      
  
(0.02) 
      
 
        Citations (Fixed)i t-1,t-3 
  
0.097 
     
   
(0.07) 
     
 
        Citations (Quasi)i t-1,t-3 
   
0.024 
    
    
(0.02) 
    
 
        Value Addedi t-1,t-3 
    
-0.192*** 
   
     
(0.04) 
   
 
        IE Patentsi t-1,t-3 
     
0.106 
  




        IE Citations (Fixed)i t-1,t-3 
      
0.051 
 




        IE Citations (Quasi)i t-1,t-3 
       
0.032 
        
(0.03) 
 
        Size 0.331*** 0.379*** 0.327*** 0.327*** 0.428*** 0.300*** 0.322*** 0.321*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
        Leverage -0.011 -0.004 0.010 0.006 0.017 0.021 0.242 0.242 
 
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) 
 
        
 




ROA -0.250*** -0.225*** -0.205*** -0.206*** -0.221*** -0.213*** -0.192*** -0.192*** 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
 
        Return -0.030*** -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.046** -0.066 -0.067 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) 
 
        B/M -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
        Tangibles -1.800*** -1.734*** -1.806*** -1.813*** -1.756*** -1.740*** -1.432*** -1.430*** 
 
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
 
        Dividends -2.285 -2.061 -1.911 -1.956 -2.182 -3.235 -6.049* -6.033* 
 
(1.66) (1.60) (1.60) (1.61) (1.63) (2.61) (3.17) (3.17) 
 
        Std Ret 0.018* 0.019* 0.019* 0.019* 0.021* 0.023 0.034** 0.034** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
        Beta 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
        Skew -0.161*** -0.160*** -0.160*** -0.160*** -0.160*** -0.169*** -0.176*** -0.177*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
     
   
Intercept -5.895 -6.160 -5.956 -5.957 -6.365 -6.394 -7.349 -7.390 
 
(15.03) (14.94) (15.09) (15.06) (15.07) (47.94) (54.15) (54.23) 
 
        Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R
2
 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
N 34192 34192 34192 34188 34192 21221 21353 21350 








Appendix G.2: Probability of Being Sued by Amount of Innovation Relative to the Industry 
Appendix G.2 reports logit regression estimates for the probability of a firm being sued, using equation (4.4).  The dependent variable in these regressions is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the firm is sued in year t.  The eight innovation measures (R&D/Assets, Patents, Citations (Fixed), Citations (Quasi), Value Added, IE Patents, IE 
Citations (Fixed) and IE Citations (Quasi)) are calculated as the level of innovative activity being undertaken in the preceding three years by firm i less the industry average 
level of innovative activity in the preceding three years. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses.  Variables definitions can be found in 
Table 4.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 
                  
 
Dependant Variable: SCA Dummy 
                  
         
R&D/Assetsi t-1,t-3 - R&D/Assetsind t-1,t-3 -0.154* 
       
 
(0.09) 
       
 
        Patentsi t-1,t-3 - Patentsind t-1,t-3 
 
-0.070*** 
      
  
(0.02) 
      
 
        Citations (Fixed)i t-1,t-3 - Citations (Fixed)ind t-1,t-3 
  
0.107* 
     
   
(0.07) 
     
 
        Citations (Quasi)i t-1,t-3 - Citations (Quasi)ind t-1,t-3 
   
0.030 
    
    
(0.02) 
    
 
        Value Addedi t-1,t-3 - Value Addedind t-1,t-3 
    
-0.180*** 
   
     
(0.04) 
   
 
        IE Patentsi t-1,t-3 - IE Patentsind t-1,t-3 
     
0.124 
  




        IE Citations (Fixed)i t-1,t-3 - IE Citations (Fixed)ind t-1,t-3 
      
0.055 
 




        IE Citations (Quasi)i t-1,t-3 - IE Citations (Quasi)ind t-1,t-3 
       
0.031 
        
(0.03) 
 
        Size 0.332*** 0.375*** 0.326*** 0.325*** 0.422*** 0.301*** 0.322*** 0.321*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
        Leverage -0.007 -0.003 0.011 0.008 0.016 0.024 0.243 0.243 
 
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) 
 
        
 




ROA -0.240*** -0.223*** -0.205*** -0.206*** -0.220*** -0.213*** -0.192*** -0.192*** 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
 
        Return -0.031*** -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.046** -0.067 -0.066 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) 
 
        B/M -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
        Tangibles -1.802*** -1.739*** -1.806*** -1.814*** -1.760*** -1.740*** -1.432*** -1.431*** 
 
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
 
        Dividends -2.224 -2.072 -1.892 -1.924 -2.184 -3.245 -6.040* -6.040* 
 
(1.65) (1.60) (1.59) (1.60) (1.63) (2.61) (3.18) (3.17) 
 
        Std Ret 0.018* 0.019* 0.019* 0.019* 0.020* 0.023 0.034** 0.034** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
        Beta 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
        Skew -0.161*** -0.160*** -0.160*** -0.160*** -0.160*** -0.169*** -0.176*** -0.177*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
     
   
Intercept -5.938 -6.204 -5.932 -5.928 -6.432 -6.342 -7.308 -7.302 
 
(15.03) (14.95) (15.10) (15.08) (15.04) (47.87) (54.07) (54.04) 
 
        Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R
2
 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
N 34192 34192 34192 34188 34192 21221 21353 21350 








Appendix G.3: Impact of a Filing on R&D – Settled Cases 
Appendix G.3 reports OLS regression estimates for the effect the filing of a class action that was settled has on 
R&D expenditures.  The dependent variable in this regression is the ratio of R&D/Assets.  The regressions were 
estimated for a sample of sued and propensity score matching sample of non-sued firms.  R&D was analysed for a 
window of up to five years before and after the filing of a SCA.  The first column (All) presents results obtained 
for regressions estimated on all sued and matched firms.  The second column (Patent Pre-Filing) reports 
regression estimates for the sample of sued firms that obtained at least one patent in the three years before the 
filing and the corresponding matched firm.  The second column (No-Patent Pre-Filing) reports regression 
estimates for the sample of sued firms that did not obtain a patent in the three years before the filing and the 
corresponding matched firms.  Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses.  
Variables definitions can be found in Table 4.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 
percent significance levels, respectively. 
 
        
 
Dependant Variable: R&D/Assets 
    
 
      
 
All Inn Pre-Filing No-Inn Pre-Filing 
        
    
Immediate 0.002 0.000 0.006 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
   Post -0.005 -0.011 0.007 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
   Sued 0.010** 0.024*** -0.019*** 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
   Immediate * Sued -0.025*** -0.028*** -0.015 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
   Post * Sued -0.010 -0.008 -0.017 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
   Size -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.008*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
   Leverage -0.055*** -0.040*** -0.079*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
   ROA -0.166*** -0.168*** -0.160*** 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
 
   Return -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
   B/M 0.000 0.000 -0.001** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
   Tangibles -0.012*** -0.029*** 0.006 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
   Dividends 0.016 0.021 0.015 
 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
 
   H-Index -0.035 -0.132*** 0.056* 
 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.03) 
 
   H-Index2 0.024 0.111** -0.060* 
 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.03) 
 
   High-Tech 0.085*** 0.062*** 0.103*** 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
 
   Intercept 0.164*** 0.228*** 0.099*** 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
 
   Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.20 0.15 0.31 
N 22183 13007 9176 








Appendix G.4: Impact of a Filing on the Number of Patents – Settled Cases 
Appendix G.4 reports OLS regression estimates for the effect the filing of a class action that was settled has on the 
number of patents.  The dependent variable in this regression is the log of one plus the number of patents.  The 
regressions were estimated for a sample of sued and propensity score matching sample of non-sued firms.  The 
number of patents were analysed for a window of up to five years before and after the filing of a SCA.  The first 
column (All) presents results obtained for regressions estimated on all sued and matched firms.  The second 
column (Patent Pre-Filing) reports regression estimates for the sample of sued firms that obtained at least one 
patent in the three years before the filing and the corresponding matched firm.  The second column (No-Patent 
Pre-Filing) reports regression estimates for the sample of sued firms that did not obtain a patent in the three years 
before the filing and the corresponding matched firms.  Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are 
reported in parentheses.  Variables definitions can be found in Table 4.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from 
zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 
        
 
Dependant Variable: Patents 
    
 
      
 
All Inn Pre-Filing No-Inn Pre-Filing 
        
    
Immediate -0.062*** -0.033 -0.132*** 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
   Post -0.012 0.079* -0.190*** 
 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
 
   Sued 0.031 0.229*** -0.562*** 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
 
   Immediate * Sued -0.001 -0.022 0.157** 
 
(0.05) (0.07) (0.06) 
 
   Post * Sued 0.001 -0.189** 0.267*** 
 
(0.07) (0.09) (0.09) 
 
   Size 0.435*** 0.515*** 0.229*** 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
   Leverage 0.236*** 0.178*** 0.189*** 
 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05) 
 
   ROA 0.101*** 0.126*** 0.039 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
 
   Return -0.083*** -0.084*** -0.052*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
   B/M 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.015*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
   Tangibles 0.577*** 1.131*** 0.159*** 
 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
 
   R&D 0.843*** 0.957*** 0.496*** 
 
(0.07) (0.10) (0.08) 
 
   Dividends 0.978*** 0.632* 0.431* 
 
(0.24) (0.37) (0.26) 
 
   H-Index 3.696*** 4.200*** 1.624*** 
 
(0.20) (0.32) (0.22) 
 
   H-Index2 -3.133*** -3.291*** -1.325*** 
 
(0.22) (0.36) (0.23) 
 
   High-Tech 0.915*** 0.853*** 0.588*** 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
 
   Intercept -3.521*** -4.238*** -1.559*** 
 
(0.07) (0.10) (0.08) 
 
   Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.34 0.39 0.22 
N 22419 13136 9283 








Appendix G.5: Impact of a Filing on the Number of Citations (Fixed) – Settled Cases 
Appendix G.5 reports OLS regression estimates for the effect the filing of a class action that was settled has on the 
number of citations.  The dependent variable in this regression is the log of one plus the number of citations per 
patent scaled by the average number of citations received by patents granted in the same year and in the same 
technology subcategory.  The regressions were estimated for a sample of sued and propensity score matching 
sample of non-sued firms.  The number of citations were analysed for a window of up to five years before and 
after the filing of a SCA.  The first column (All) presents results obtained for regressions estimated on all sued and 
matched firms.  The second column (Patent Pre-Filing) reports regression estimates for the sample of sued firms 
that obtained at least one patent in the three years before the filing and the corresponding matched firm.  The 
second column (No-Patent Pre-Filing) reports regression estimates for the sample of sued firms that did not obtain 
a patent in the three years before the filing and the corresponding matched firms.  Robust standard errors clustered 
at the firm level are reported in parentheses.  Variables definitions can be found in Table 4.1. *, **, *** 
Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 
        
 
Dependant Variable: Citations (Fixed) 
    
 
      
 
All Inn Pre-Filing No-Inn Pre-Filing 
        
    
Immediate -0.032*** -0.037*** -0.022** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
   Post -0.042*** -0.036** -0.042*** 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
   Sued 0.028** 0.136*** -0.220*** 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
   Immediate * Sued 0.007 -0.004 0.073*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
 
   Post * Sued 0.029 -0.025 0.129*** 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) 
 
   Size 0.073*** 0.069*** 0.058*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
   Leverage -0.027* -0.060*** 0.008 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
   ROA 0.023** 0.009 0.018 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
   Return -0.004 -0.001 -0.005 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
   B/M 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.001** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
   Tangibles 0.022* 0.043** -0.002 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
 
   R&D 0.232*** 0.200*** 0.176*** 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
   Dividends -0.176** -0.381*** -0.047 
 
(0.08) (0.12) (0.11) 
 
   H-Index 0.391*** 0.201* 0.228*** 
 
(0.07) (0.11) (0.09) 
 
   H-Index2 -0.287*** -0.046 -0.168* 
 
(0.08) (0.12) (0.09) 
 
   High-Tech 0.220*** 0.151*** 0.201*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
   Intercept -0.471*** -0.380*** -0.345*** 
 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) 
 
   Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.14 0.12 0.14 
N 22419 13136 9283 
        
  
 




Appendix G.6: Impact of a Filing on the Number of Citations (Quasi) – Settled Cases 
Appendix G.6 reports OLS regression estimates for the effect the filing of a class action that was settled has on the 
number of citations.  The dependent variable in this regression is the log of one plus the number of citations per 
patent multiplied by an adjustment factor obtained from the citation lag distribution.  The regressions were 
estimated for a sample of sued and propensity score matching sample of non-sued firms.  The number of citations 
were analysed for a window of up to five years before and after the filing of a SCA.  The first column (All) 
presents results obtained for regressions estimated on all sued and matched firms.  The second column (Patent 
Pre-Filing) reports regression estimates for the sample of sued firms that obtained at least one patent in the three 
years before the filing and the corresponding matched firm.  The second column (No-Patent Pre-Filing) reports 
regression estimates for the sample of sued firms that did not obtain a patent in the three years before the filing and 
the corresponding matched firms.  Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses.  
Variables definitions can be found in Table 4.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 
percent significance levels, respectively. 
 
        
 
Dependant Variable: Citations (Quasi) 
    
 
      
 
All Inn Pre-Filing No-Inn Pre-Filing 
        
    
Immediate -0.094*** -0.081** -0.101*** 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
 
   Post -0.119*** -0.066 -0.170*** 
 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
 
   Sued 0.153*** 0.583*** -0.841*** 
 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) 
 
   Immediate * Sued -0.025 -0.110 0.308*** 
 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.09) 
 
   Post * Sued 0.056 -0.200** 0.535*** 
 
(0.08) (0.10) (0.12) 
 
   Size 0.278*** 0.271*** 0.206*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
   Leverage -0.101** -0.183*** -0.022 
 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07) 
 
   ROA 0.113*** 0.084* 0.076* 
 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
 
   Return -0.024*** -0.012 -0.029** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
   B/M 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.006*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
   Tangibles 0.259*** 0.411*** 0.085* 
 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
 
   R&D 0.769*** 0.622*** 0.584*** 
 
(0.08) (0.10) (0.10) 
 
   Dividends -0.149 -0.827** 0.162 
 
(0.27) (0.39) (0.34) 
 
   H-Index 2.332*** 1.815*** 1.254*** 
 
(0.22) (0.33) (0.29) 
 
   H-Index2 -1.882*** -1.150*** -0.999*** 
 
(0.24) (0.38) (0.30) 
 
   High-Tech 0.895*** 0.657*** 0.744*** 
 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
 
   Intercept -2.139*** -1.930*** -1.367*** 
 
(0.08) (0.11) (0.11) 
 
   Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.20 0.20 0.16 
N 22419 13136 9283 
        
  
 




Appendix G.7: Impact of a Filing on the Value Added by Patents – Settled Cases 
Appendix G.7 reports OLS regression estimates for the effect the filing of a class action that was settled has on the 
value added by patents.  The dependent variable in this regression is the log of one plus the average value added 
per patent.  The regressions were estimated for a sample of sued and propensity score matching sample of non-
sued firms.  The value added was analysed for a window of up to five years before and after the filing of a SCA.  
The first column (All) presents results obtained for regressions estimated on all sued and matched firms.  The 
second column (Patent Pre-Filing) reports regression estimates for the sample of sued firms that obtained at least 
one patent in the three years before the filing and the corresponding matched firm.  The second column (No-Patent 
Pre-Filing) reports regression estimates for the sample of sued firms that did not obtain a patent in the three years 
before the filing and the corresponding matched firms.  Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are 
reported in parentheses.  Variables definitions can be found in Table 4.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from 
zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 
        
 
Dependant Variable: Value Added 
    
 
      
 
All Inn Pre-Filing No-Inn Pre-Filing 
        
    
Immediate -0.040** -0.050** 0.002 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
 
   Post -0.082*** -0.099*** -0.029 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) 
 
   Sued 0.076*** 0.061** 0.396** 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.19) 
 
   Immediate * Sued -0.052 -0.021 -0.297 
 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.22) 
 
   Post * Sued 0.007 0.078 -0.564** 
 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.27) 
 
   Size 0.494*** 0.481*** 0.519*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
 
   Leverage 0.278*** 0.291*** 0.230*** 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.07) 
 
   ROA -0.002 0.092** -0.150*** 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
 
   Return -0.015** -0.018*** -0.002 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
   B/M 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
   Tangibles 0.009 -0.131*** 0.257*** 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
 
   R&D 0.358*** 0.513*** 0.011 
 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.11) 
 
   Dividends -0.382* 0.129 -0.838*** 
 
(0.22) (0.29) (0.31) 
 
   H-Index -1.516*** -1.677*** -1.051*** 
 
(0.18) (0.22) (0.29) 
 
   H-Index2 1.479*** 1.701*** 0.894*** 
 
(0.19) (0.25) (0.31) 
 
   High-Tech 0.000 -0.032 0.094** 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) 
 
   Intercept -1.867*** -1.721*** -2.188*** 
 
(0.07) (0.08) (0.12) 
 
   Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.66 0.64 0.70 
N 10748 8014 2734 








Appendix G.8: Impact of a Filing on Innovative Efficiency (Patents) – Settled Cases 
Appendix G.8 reports OLS regression estimates for the effect the filing of a class action that was settled has on 
innovative efficiency of patenting.  The dependent variable in this regression is the log of one plus IE Patents.  The 
regressions were estimated for a sample of sued and propensity score matching sample of non-sued firms.  
Innovative efficiency was analysed for a window of up to five years before and after the filing of a SCA.  The first 
column (All) presents results obtained for regressions estimated on all sued and matched firms.  The second 
column (Patent Pre-Filing) reports regression estimates for the sample of sued firms that obtained at least one 
patent in the three years before the filing and the corresponding matched firm.  The second column (No-Patent 
Pre-Filing) reports regression estimates for the sample of sued firms that did not obtain a patent in the three years 
before the filing and the corresponding matched firms.  Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are 
reported in parentheses.  Variables definitions can be found in Table 4.1. *, **, *** Statistically different from 
zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 
        
 
Dependant Variable: IE (Patents) 
    
 
      
 
All Inn Pre-Filing No-Inn Pre-Filing 
        
    
Immediate 0.088 0.187 -0.116 
 
(0.22) (0.30) (0.20) 
 
   Post -0.178 -0.231 -0.027 
 
(0.31) (0.42) (0.29) 
 
   Sued 0.812*** 0.765** -0.250 
 
(0.31) (0.36) (1.16) 
 
   Immediate * Sued -1.058** -1.192** 0.069 
 
(0.50) (0.59) (1.35) 
 
   Post * Sued -0.905 -0.980 0.134 
 
(0.70) (0.84) (1.63) 
 
   Size -0.127*** -0.124** -0.149*** 
 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) 
 
   Leverage -0.980** -1.262** -0.248 
 
(0.44) (0.58) (0.45) 
 
   ROA 0.176 0.151 0.237 
 
(0.28) (0.40) (0.24) 
 
   Return 0.045 0.061 -0.005 
 
(0.07) (0.09) (0.09) 
 
   B/M -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
 
   Tangibles 0.070 0.166 0.163 
 
(0.32) (0.45) (0.28) 
 
   Dividends -1.428 -1.902 -0.326 
 
(2.56) (3.75) (2.01) 
 
   H-Index -5.043** -8.607*** 1.519 
 
(2.04) (2.81) (1.83) 
 
   H-Index2 4.916** 8.747*** -1.647 
 
(2.23) (3.14) (1.92) 
 
   High-Tech -1.324*** -1.777*** -0.384 
 
(0.28) (0.38) (0.27) 
 
   Intercept 2.646*** 3.347*** 1.344* 
 
(0.78) (1.03) (0.78) 
 
   Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 
N 10971 8143 2828 
        
  
 




Appendix G.9: Impact of a Filing on Innovative Efficiency (Citations (Fixed)) – 
Settled Cases 
Appendix G.9 reports OLS regression estimates for the effect the filing of a class action that was settled has on 
innovative efficiency of the citations received on patents.  The dependent variable in this regression is the log of 
one plus IE Citations (Fixed).  The regressions were estimated for a sample of sued and propensity score matching 
sample of non-sued firms.  Innovative efficiency was analysed for a window of up to five years before and after 
the filing of a SCA.  The first column (All) presents results obtained for regressions estimated on all sued and 
matched firms.  The second column (Patent Pre-Filing) reports regression estimates for the sample of sued firms 
that obtained at least one patent in the three years before the filing and the corresponding matched firm.  The 
second column (No-Patent Pre-Filing) reports regression estimates for the sample of sued firms that did not obtain 
a patent in the three years before the filing and the corresponding matched firms.  Robust standard errors clustered 
at the firm level are reported in parentheses.  Variables definitions can be found in Table 4.1. *, **, *** 
Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 
        
 
Dependant Variable: IE (Citations (Fixed)) 
    
 
      
 
All Inn Pre-Filing No-Inn Pre-Filing 
        
    
Immediate 0.032 0.133 -0.026 
 
(0.41) (0.60) (0.13) 
 
   Post -0.579 -0.942 0.254 
 
(0.56) (0.81) (0.18) 
 
   Sued 0.585 0.407 0.157 
 
(0.61) (0.78) (0.41) 
 
   Immediate * Sued 1.163 1.084 -0.527 
 
(0.93) (1.18) (0.64) 
 
   Post * Sued -0.539 -0.465 -0.687 
 
(1.23) (1.57) (0.71) 
 
   Size -0.212** -0.268** -0.135*** 
 
(0.08) (0.12) (0.03) 
 
   Leverage -1.851** -2.745** 0.131 
 
(0.80) (1.11) (0.29) 
 
   ROA 0.295 0.358 0.187 
 
(0.44) (0.65) (0.14) 
 
   Return 0.040 0.039 0.055 
 
(0.13) (0.17) (0.05) 
 
   B/M -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
   Tangibles 0.223 0.562 -0.030 
 
(0.60) (0.90) (0.19) 
 
   Dividends -3.657 -5.484 -0.615 
 
(4.91) (8.02) (1.35) 
 
   H-Index -6.207* -12.204** 3.521*** 
 
(3.76) (5.62) (1.21) 
 
   H-Index2 6.056 11.110* -1.984 
 
(4.14) (6.33) (1.28) 
 
   High-Tech -2.286*** -3.535*** -0.185 
 
(0.53) (0.78) (0.18) 
 
   Intercept 4.285*** 6.455*** 0.693 
 
(1.32) (1.91) (0.46) 
 
   Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.00 0.00 0.03 
N 15457 10913 4544 








Appendix G.10: Impact of a Filing on Innovative Efficiency (Citations (Quasi)) – 
Settled Cases 
Appendix G.10 reports OLS egression estimates for the effect the filing of a class action that was settled has on 
innovative efficiency of the citations received on patents.  The dependent variable in this regression is the log of 
one plus IE Citations (Quasi).  The regressions were estimated for a sample of sued and propensity score matching 
sample of non-sued firms.  Innovative efficiency was analysed for a window of up to five years before and after 
the filing of a SCA.  The first column (All) presents results obtained for regressions estimated on all sued and 
matched firms.  The second column (Patent Pre-Filing) reports regression estimates for the sample of sued firms 
that obtained at least one patent in the three years before the filing and the corresponding matched firm.  The 
second column (No-Patent Pre-Filing) reports regression estimates for the sample of sued firms that did not obtain 
a patent in the three years before the filing and the corresponding matched firms.  Robust standard errors clustered 
at the firm level are reported in parentheses.  Variables definitions can be found in Table 4.1. *, **, *** 
Statistically different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 
        
 
Dependant Variable: IE (Citations (Quasi)) 
    
 
      
 
All Inn Pre-Filing No-Inn Pre-Filing 
        
    
Immediate 0.540 2.453 -1.212 
 
(6.65) (9.40) (5.54) 
 
   Post -7.067 -12.202 4.610 
 
(9.00) (12.64) (7.58) 
 
   Sued 15.069 11.258 28.225* 
 
(9.88) (12.14) (16.73) 
 
   Immediate * Sued 23.795 24.270 -36.697 
 
(14.96) (18.38) (26.19) 
 
   Post * Sued -11.014 -8.333 -38.566 
 
(19.75) (24.57) (29.02) 
 
   Size -4.674*** -5.483*** -3.526*** 
 
(1.34) (1.84) (1.29) 
 
   Leverage -37.966*** -50.476*** -10.779 
 
(12.82) (17.34) (11.91) 
 
   ROA 7.444 7.930 6.553 
 
(7.12) (10.19) (5.80) 
 
   Return 1.564 1.400 2.472 
 
(2.06) (2.70) (2.10) 
 
   B/M -0.055 -0.055 -0.163 
 
(0.09) (0.10) (0.26) 
 
   Tangibles 5.668 11.004 1.207 
 
(9.69) (14.01) (7.96) 
 
   Dividends -92.026 -117.961 -56.868 
 
(78.94) (125.10) (55.69) 
 
   H-Index -127.753** -206.628** 2.364 
 
(60.51) (87.74) (49.59) 
 
   H-Index2 122.339* 182.684* 23.340 
 
(66.51) (98.71) (52.48) 
 
   High-Tech -46.118*** -63.549*** -17.233** 
 
(8.56) (12.10) (7.42) 
 
   Intercept 84.905*** 114.449*** 36.713* 
 
(21.28) (29.83) (18.88) 
 
   Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.01 0.01 0.02 
N 15457 10913 4544 
        
 
